Evidence for preserved representations in change blindness

People often fail to detect large changes to scenes, provided that the changes occur during a visual disruption. This phenomenon, known as "change blindness," occurs both in the laboratory and in real-world situations in which changes occur unexpectedly. The pervasiveness of the inability to detect changes is consistent with the theoretical notion that we internally represent relatively little information from our visual world from one glance at a scene to the next. However, evidence for change blindness does not necessarily imply the absence of such a representation---people could also miss changes if they fail to compare an existing representation of the pre-change scene to the post-change scene. In three experiments, we show that people often do have a representation of some aspects of the pre-change scene even when they fail to report the change. And, in fact, they appear to "discover" this memory and can explicitly report details of a changed object in response to probing questions. The results of these real-world change detection studies are discussed in the context of broader claims about change blindness.     

Proactive and reactive aggression in delinquent adolescents: relations to aggression outcome expectancies

Investigated whether the relation between aggression and the tendency to expect positive outcomes for aggressive behavior is specific to the proactive subtype of aggression (as opposed to the reactive subtype). In a sample of 86 incarcerated adolescent boys ages 13 to 18, we measured outcome expectancies for aggression using audiotaped hypothetical vignettes. For each participant, staff members completed proactive and reactive aggression rating scales. Regression analyses revealed that the relation between aggression and outcome expectancies was indeed specific to proactive aggression. Furthermore, this finding was supported regardless of whether outcome expectancies were assessed using vignettes describing proactive-aggressive behavior or those describing reactive-aggressive behavior. We discuss these findings and argue that interventions to reduce proactive or reactive aggression should differ from each other by addressing the specific social cognitive processes involved in each type of aggression.     

What you see is what you set: sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness

This article reports a theoretical and experimental attempt to relate and contrast 2 traditionally separate research programs: inattentional blindness and attention capture. Inattentional blindness refers to failures to notice unexpected objects and events when attention is otherwise engaged. Attention capture research has traditionally used implicit indices (e.g., response times) to investigate automatic shifts of attention. Because attention capture usually measures performance whereas inattentional blindness measures awareness, the 2 fields have existed side by side with no shared theoretical framework. Here, the authors propose a theoretical unification, adapting several important effects from the attention capture literature to the context of sustained inattentional blindness. Although some stimulus properties can influence noticing of unexpected objects, the most influential factor affecting noticing is a person's own attentional goals. The authors conclude that many--but not all--aspects of attention capture apply to inattentional blindness but that these 2 classes of phenomena remain importantly distinct.     

Attention capture is modulated in dual-task situations

Because some features affect the efficiency of visual search even when they are irrelevant to the task, they are thought tocapture attention in a stimulus-driven manner. If such attention shifts are stimulus driven, they should be unaffected by reduced resources. We added a concurrent auditory task to a traditional attention capture paradigm and found that capture by an irrelevant, abruptly appearing stimulus (i.e., an onset) was eliminated. In contrast, prioritization of an irrelevant color singleton—a stimulus that at most receives only mild prioritization in this paradigm—was increased under dual-task conditions. These results challenge the hypothesis that attention capture by irrelevant features is stimulus driven. Instead, prioritization depends on and is modulated by the availability of resources.     

Nothing compares 2 views: change blindness can occur despite preserved access to the changed information

Change blindness, the failure to detect visual changes that occur during a disruption, has increasingly been used to infer the nature of internal representations. If every change were detected, detailed representations of the world would have to be stored and accessible. However, because many changes are not detected, visual representations might not be complete, and access to them might be limited. Using change detection to infer the completeness of visual representations requires an understanding of the reasons for change blindness. This article provides empirical support for one such reason: change blindness resulting from the failure to compare retained representations of both the pre- and postchange information. Even when unaware of changes, observers still retained information about both the pre- and postchange objects on the same trial.     

Semantic categorization in the human brain: spatiotemporal dynamics revealed by magnetoencephalography

We examined the cortical representation of semantic categorization using magnetic source imaging in a task that revealed both dissociations among superordinate categories and associations among different base-level concepts within these categories. Around 200 ms after stimulus onset, the spatiotemporal correlation of brain activity elicited by base-level concepts was greater within than across superordinate categories in the right temporal lobe. Unsupervised clustering of data showed similar categorization between 210 and 450 ms mainly in the left hemisphere. This pattern suggests that well-defined semantic categories are represented in spatially distinct, macroscopically separable neural networks, independent of physical stimulus properties. In contrast, a broader, task-required categorization (natural/man-made) was not evident in our data. The perceptual dynamics of the categorization process is initially evident in the extrastriate areas of the right hemisphere; this activation is followed by higher-level activity along the ventral processing stream, implicating primarily the left temporal lobe.     

Bocheński and Balance: System and History in Analytic Philosophy

Using the work of Józef Bocheski as apositive example, this paper sets out the casefor a balanced use of historical knowledge indoing analytic philosophy. Between the twoextremes of relativizing historicism, whichdenies absolute truth, and arrogant scientism,which denies any constructive role for thehistory of ideas in philosophy, lies a viamedia in which historical reflection onconcepts and their history is placed at theservice of the system of cognitive philosophy.Knowledge of the history of philosophy, whilenot a sine qua non, can empower analyticphilosophy to push forward to new and moresatisfactory solutions to old and new problems.Examples are adduced from Bocheski's oeuvreand from the author's own experience.     

Bursting with anxiety: adult social referencing in an interpersonal balloon analogue risk task (BART)

This study developed an interpersonal modification of the balloon analogue risk task (BART) to assess effects of a friend's real-time facial expressions on coparticipants' risk-taking. Twenty pairs of male friends and 20 pairs of female friends completed two counterbalanced versions of BART, one framed in terms of monetary gain, and the other framed in terms of avoiding loss. Each pair included a player who performed the task across both trials and a reference person in a separate cubicle connected via a soundless video link. In the suppression condition, reference persons were told to minimize facial expressions of anxiety as balloons inflated. In the expression condition, they were told to freely express anxiety. As predicted, players took greater risks and burst more balloons in the suppression condition, but only under the gain frame. Players' BART scores across both frames were also significantly negatively correlated with reference persons' scores on a questionnaire measure of dispositional expressivity (BEQ), confirming that other people's expressions can moderate one's own risk-taking.     

From racial discrimination to risky sex: prospective relations involving peers and parents

This study investigated how early experience with racial discrimination affected the subsequent risky sexual behaviors of a diverse sample of African American youths (N = 745). The analyses focused on 3 risk-promoting factors thought to mediate the hypothesized discrimination → risky sex relation: negative affect, affiliation with deviant peers, and favorable attitudes toward risky sex. In addition, attentive parenting was examined as a protective factor. Analyses using structural equation modeling revealed that youths who perceived more racial discrimination at age 10 or 11 were engaging in more sexual risk taking at age 18 or 19. This relation was mediated by the hypothesized risk-promoting factors via pathways that were consistent with our conceptual model. Results also indicated a prospective reciprocal relation between parenting and children's deviant affiliations: deviant peer affiliations at age 10 or 11 predicted more attentive parenting behaviors by the parents; this response from the parents, in turn, predicted relatively fewer deviant affiliations when the youths were 15 or 16. Study findings are discussed in terms of their relevance to the disproportionately high rates of sexually transmitted infections among African Americans.     

Multiple group membership influences face-recognition: Recall and neurological evidence

The limited face-recognition research involving targets categorizable on multiple dimensions has provided contradictory evidence as to how partial-ingroup members are processed and recognized. This research demonstrates that partial-ingroup members are recognized in a manner distinct from double-ingroup and double-outgroup targets. Specifically, when race and university-affiliation are crossed, university-affiliation does not influence recognition for own-race targets, but does for other-race targets, in that other-race/own-university targets are recalled more accurately than other-race/other-university targets. The neurological mechanisms involved in the effect are explored through the inclusion of electroencephalography.