Scale and construal: How larger measurement units shrink length estimates and expand mental horizons

Scale can vary by requiring a different number of units to measure the same target. But what are the consequences of using fewer, larger units? We draw on past psychophysical research that shows how using fewer units reduces clutter in measurement, translating to shorter length estimates. Additionally, we propose that larger scale is associated with targets further from a person’s immediate experience (i.e., psychologically distant) and higher order mental representation. Evidence from Study 1 indicates that framing a target as further away causes it to be estimated as shorter because people use larger units to measure it compared to when the same target is framed as nearby. Two subsequent studies suggest that direct manipulation of larger (versus smaller) measurement scale produces not only shorter length estimates, but also more distal timing judgments (Study 2) and abstract mental representation (Study 3). Implications for scale and level of mental construal are discussed.     

The effects of time perspective and level of construal on social distance

Psychological causes of social distance were examined from the perspective of Construal Level Theory (CLT; Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007), which predicts that temporal distance from and abstract construal of a social target would create perception of social distance. Our studies demonstrate that expectations for temporally remote (versus proximal) social interaction produce greater social distance from a target person, measured as reduced familiarity (Study 1) and as reduced similarity to the self (Study 2). We also show that a more abstract, higher level construal of a social target results in less familiarity (Study 3) and in less allocation of resources (Study 4). The research sheds light on how social closeness can be promoted or hindered by previously unaddressed psychological factors.     

Interpersonal comparison versus persuasive argumentation: A more direct test of alternative explanations for group-induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly “cautious” or overly “risky”. Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Thus, if in a factorial design one independently varied (a) the number of others' choices available for comparison and (b) the number of arguments others presented in support of these choices, interpersonal comparison theories would predict the magnitude of the shift to be a function of (a) and not of (b), while theories of persuasive argumentation would predict the opposite. When such an experiment was performed the only reliable main effects were based on the number of arguments, (b), as predicted by persuasive arguments. In no instance did effects involving (a) approach significance.     

The informational basis of social judgments: Memory for informative and uninformative arguments

This study investigates the encoding and retrieval of arguments in an opinion formation task. It is based on a model of opinion formation that partitions the latter process into initial encoding, elaborative encoding, integration, and decision. According to this model elaborative encoding depends on two factors: (i) the informativeness of the arguments and (ii) their thematic relatedness. Since it is reasonably well established that the likelihood of retrieving an argument is an increasing function of the amount of elaboration performed on it, the first hypothesis is straightforward, namely, that the memory for an argument will increase with its informativeness and with its thematic relatedness to other arguments. The second hypothesis assumes that by dint of their closer association with the decision, informative arguments occupy a more central position in the representation of an opinion than uninformative ones. This implies that an informative argument should be accessed and reported prior to an uninformative argument, even when differences in retrievability (i.e., probabilities of recall) are controlled. The findings were consistent with such an analysis.     

Inferences about others from their reports about themselves

Subjects in this study were asked to infer an attribute of a target person on the basis of his report about himself: Two informational determinants of such inferences were varied: (a) reliability of the report, i.e. the belief that the target person would correctly report events that had actually occurred and (b) diagnosticity of the actual events, i.e. the belief that the actual events are indicative of the attribute. Normative considerations require that the effect of diagnosticity be dependent on reliability so that as reliability increases, judgment should become less regressive, i.e. vary more as a function of events' diagnosticity. The results indicate that subjects employed a simple but inappropriate averaging rule in combining reliability and diagnosticity information. This rule, like many other simplifying judgmental heuristics, resulted in inferences that were more extreme than warranted by normative models. The inappropriate combination of reliability and diagnosticity information may thus contribute to observers' tendency to over-attribute personal characteristics to others.     

Interpersonal similarity as a social distance dimension: Implications for perception of others’ actions

Building on the assumption that interpersonal similarity is a form of social distance, the current research examines the manner in which similarity influences the representation and judgment of others’ actions. On the basis of a construal level approach, we hypothesized that greater levels of similarity would increase the relative weight of subordinate and secondary features of information in judgments of others’ actions. The results of four experiments showed that compared to corresponding judgments of a dissimilar target, participants exposed to a similar target person identified that person’s actions in relatively more subordinate means-related rather than superordinate ends-related terms (Experiment 1), perceived his or her actions to be determined more by feasibility and less by desirability concerns (Experiment 3), and gave more weight to secondary aspects in judgments of the target’s decisions (Experiment 2) and performance (Experiment 4). Implications for the study of interpersonal similarity, as well as social distance in general, are discussed.     

The value of distrust

We assume that a state of distrust is the mental system’s signal that the environment is not normal—things may not be as they appear. Hence, individuals sense they should be on guard. In particular, they are likely to avoid routine strategies, ones proven to be optimal and regularly used in normal environments, because these strategies are easily anticipated by whoever may be seeking to deceive them. Conversely, a state of trust is associated with a feeling of safety. The environment is as it normally is and things really are as they appear to be. Thus, individuals see no reason to refrain from doing what they routinely do. Accordingly, we hypothesize that figuring out a new situation depends on the type of environment and the actor’s state of mind: in normal environments, where routine strategies are optimal, individuals who trust should outperform those who distrust; however, in unusual environments, where non-routine strategies are optimal, individuals who distrust should outperform those who trust. This paper reports three experiments that manipulate distrust via orienting tasks that participants perform prior to attempting to predict a series of events (Experiments 1 and 2) or solve matchstick arithmetic problems (Experiment 3). Performance success depends on discovering and implementing an appropriate rule. We found that, as predicted, the manipulation of distrust sensitized participants to the existence of non-routine contingencies, that is, contingencies that were not expected.     

Counteractive Self-Control

ABSTRACT— We propose a self-control analysis of the role of availability in valuation. We explored the hypothesis that, when temptation becomes available, counteractive self-control processes render it less valuable. We found evidence for devaluation of available temptation among gym users before they choose to forgo an unhealthy snack rather than after they make their choice (Study 1), and among students evaluating leisure activities when their decision to enroll in an uninteresting class is reversible rather than irreversible (Study 2).     

Construal Levels and Psychological Distance: Effects on Representation,Prediction, Evaluation,and Behavior

Construal level theory (CLT) is an account of how psychological distance influences individuals’ thoughts and behavior. CLT assumes that people mentally construe objects that are psychologically near in terms of low‐level, detailed, and contextualized features, whereas at a distance they construe the same objects or events in terms of high‐level, abstract, and stable characteristics. Research has shown that different dimensions of psychological distance (time, space, social distance, and hypotheticality) affect mental construal and that these construals, in turn, guide prediction, evaluation, and behavior. The present paper reviews this research and its implications for consumer psychology.     

Encoding under trust and distrust: the spontaneous activation of incongruent cognitions

Past studies of strategic thinking have shown that the encoding of the message information becomes more complex under distrust. Receivers process the information as if they are trying to protect themselves from being misled by testing alternative potential interpretations. The present study investigates the possibility that when people are mistrustful they spontaneously activate associations that are incongruent with the given message. Findings from 3 experiments suggest that, even when the distrust is unrelated in any meaningful way to the message and even when receivers are unable to prepare a strategic response, the cognitive system reacts to distrust by automatically inducing the consideration of incongruent associations--it seems designed to ask, "and what if the information were false?" The theoretical implications of the results for theories of social perception and persuasion are discussed.