Most scholars have focused on group differences in overall life satisfaction, and little research has explored group differences in domain-specific satisfaction. This study investigated the variation in the effects of subjective social status on domain-specific satisfaction across personality styles (combined extraversion and neuroticism) in a sample of 1120 female and 745 male Chinese. Participants completed a questionnaire comprising demographics factors, MacArthur Scale, BFI personality scale and self-rated domain-specific satisfaction with interpersonal, health, political, financial, environmental, environmental, and cultural. The findings revealed that subjective social status positively, extraversion positively, and neuroticism negatively predicted six domain-specific satisfactions. Additionally, the results of the hierarchical regression analysis confirmed that the moderating roles of personality traits, but neither extraversion nor neuroticism alone moderated the effects of subjective social status on six domains of life satisfaction. Higher subjective social status related to a substantial increase in domainspecific satisfaction with health, political and environmental for respondents with high extraversion and low neuroticism. Taking together, from the “bottom-up” perspectives, these findings provide support to extend Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory to explain the relationship between subjective social status and domain-specific satisfaction.
Three experiments examined how people reason about what is possible or necessary when a conditional is true. Participants were asked to indicate whether it was necessary, possible or impossible for a specific instance to conform to one of the truth-table cases (pq, p¬q, ¬pq and ¬p¬q) (¬ = not), given the truth of the conditional. It was found that most participants, inconsistently, judged the pq case as necessary but the ¬pq or ¬p¬q cases as possible. Logically, these two kinds of judgments are contradictory. Moreover, a true conditional doesn’t imply that a specific instance under the conditional must be pq . Therefore, people demonstrate a necessity illusion for pq cases which contradicts their commitment to the possibility of ¬pq or ¬p¬q cases. Existing accounts of conditionals are unable to explain the contradiction and the necessity illusion. We propose an inference dissociation account and explore the theoretical implications of this necessity illusion. 相似文献