Compared with their non-migrant peers, migrant children in China face major risks and challenges that may cause them to develop behavioral and psychological problems. Nevertheless, research has seldom addressed their victimization by bullies and its association with their mental health outcomes, much less the roles of intrapersonal and interpersonal sources of resilience in that relationship. In response, this study was designed to examine how bullying victimization both directly and indirectly influences migrant children’s mental health through intrapersonal and interpersonal sources of resilience. Data were collected from a school-based multistage random sample of 1,132 migrant children in Grades 4–9 (mean age = 11.88 years, range = 8–17 years; boys = 55.6%) attending public schools in Nanjing and private schools in Guangzhou, China. Structural equation modeling performed with Amos 25.0 revealed that both intrapersonal and interpersonal sources of resilience mediated the effect of bullying victimization on migrant children’s mental health, albeit intrapersonal sources demonstrated a slightly stronger mediation effect. The results thus suggest that social workers and educators should provide effective prevention and intervention strategies that promote intrapersonal and interpersonal sources of resilience among migrant children in China.
This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea of private sensations. McDowell rightly identifies a primary target of Wittgenstein’s attack to be the Myth of the Given. But he also suggests that Wittgenstein, in the ferocity of his battles with this myth, sometimes goes into overkill, which manifests itself in seemingly behavioristic denials about sensations. But this criticism of Wittgenstein is a mistake. The mistake is made over two important but notoriously difficult sections in the so-called Private Language Argument, namely §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein, maximally charitably read, commits no overkill in these two sections. This correction strengthens McDowell’s overall reading, but it is only a first step toward fully bringing out the deep but obscurely expressed insights in §304 and §293, the full treatment of which must await another occasion. 相似文献
Suppose we wish to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality. Like several other philosophers, we focus on the intentionality of belief, hoping that we may later supplement our account to accommodate other intentional states like desires and fears. Now suppose that we also take partial beliefs or credences seriously. In cashing out our favoured theory of intentionality, we may for the sake of simplicity talk as if belief is merely binary or all-or-nothing. But we should be able to supplement or modify our account to accommodate credences. I shall argue, however, that it is difficult to do so with respect to certain causal or teleological theories of intentionality-in particular, those advanced by the likes of Stalnaker (Inquiry, 1984) and Millikan (J Philos 86:281–297, 1989). I shall first show that such theories are tailor-made to account for the intentionality of binary beliefs. Then I shall argue that it is hard to extend or supplement such theories to accommodate credences. Finally, I shall offer some natural ways of modifying the theories that involve an appeal to objective probabilities. But unfortunately, such modifications face problems. 相似文献
生命意义(Meaning in life)指人们对自己生命中的目的、目标的认识和追求,主要包括意义存在(Presence of Meaning)和意义追求(Search for Meaning)两个维度。生命意义缺失(Absence of Meaning)指个体缺乏生活的目标、对自身存在价值和意义感的感知。意义缺失的体验一方面会带来焦虑、抑郁等消极影响,另一方面将激发起个体强烈的重构意义的动机,引导人们进行意义追求。未来研究应增加对生命意义的获取和提升、意义缺失的原因、含义与结构、意义追求的动机和效果的研究。 相似文献
Empirical studies on the relationship between affect and creativity often produce conflicting results. This inconsistency has led us to believe that the relationship between affect and creativity may be better understood by looking at potential moderators. Our study looked specifically at trait affect and self‐perceived creativity. Using the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) theory with problem clarity as the potential moderator, we hypothesized that when individuals are faced with problems that lack clarity, trait affect has greater sway over their self‐perceived creativity. Our results provided evidence that problem clarity moderated the relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity; the positive relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity is stronger when problem clarity is low and weaker when problem clarity is high. No moderating effect was found in the relationship between negative trait affect and self‐perceived creativity. 相似文献