This article will probe into Kant’s viewpoints about parent-child relationship so as to demonstrate that they are inspiring
on the one hand—for example on dealing with the relationship as that pertinent to the thing in itself, but on the other hand,
there are many flaws. His strategy on avoiding the difficulty of “creating by man a being endowed with freedom” depends merely
on an one-sided comprehension of time, because according to Kant himself, there is a difference as to the time between sensual
forms of intuition and expressive form of transcendental imagination. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant gives a profound enunciation with respect to the two and the latter is related to “free causality” and “categorical
imperative” in his moral philosophy. Once it refers to the rights of a being endowed with freedom and the time it requires
to maintain them, it is problematic to assert that the creation of such beings is not concerned with, in any sense whatsoever,
time and the sensual, mortal body. What is more, Kant failed to take into full consideration that parents are also beings
endowed with freedom whose rights to the child are not totally dependent on the latter’s inherent rights but on their own
inherent basis. Granting parents too few natural rights, Kant on the other hand allocates them too much obligations in that
the parent-child relation is unbalanced in his field of view. Thirdly, he gives no consideration as to whether or not the
empirical process of rearing children itself can also create some rights, which nevertheless, should be taken into account
when temporal elements can be found from the very original parent-child relationship. 相似文献
In this study, we found a novel lattice correspondence of the B19–B19′ transformation in a Ti–Ni–Cu thin film: (1?1?1)B19′//(0?0?1)B19, [0, 1, 1]B19′//[1?0?0]B19. Near the coarse precipitate and the grain boundaries, the B19′ martensite forms with the novel lattice correspondence to product the (1?1?1) type I twinning instead of the usual (0?0?1) compound twinning. Crystallographic analyses show that the novel lattice correspondence results from the local stress concentration. 相似文献
The essence of Husserl’s intentionality does not lie in any object, but in the marginal horizon presupposed by intentional acts. This characteristic can be seen whether on the level of intensional act or that of noema (intentional object). The reason is that all intentional act and noema come from the stream of internal time consciousness, and thus have Zeithof (time halo or time aureole), while the original meaning constituted by such a halo is prior to the object they are concretized into, and the noema that contains the possibility of meaning will also be intuited together with the perceived adumbration. Using Husserl’s idea that the meaning of non-objectification is prior to the object, Scheler breaks through Husserl’s dogma that the presentation of an object must precede the giving of value to the object, and thus puts forward the new train of thought that the feeling of value is not later than the objectification, or even prior to it. Heidegger deepens and expands the sense of the marginal horizon, revealing in all human behaviors and world presentation such an ontological structure, that is, halo-like meaning or the act of Being itself precedes objects and beings created by the separation of subject and object. Maurice Merleau-Ponty states that the body field is prior to the separation of body and mind, and the body’s perception of external phenomena is first carried out in the manner of field rather than definite objects, therefore, it must have the original ambiguity and be realized in the form of body schema instead of a causal chain. So, the philosophical vitality of phenomenology does not significantly lie in the explanation of the levels and functions of intentional objects, but in the construction premise of such objects, namely, the spatio-temporal halo manifested as marginal horizon, time stream, and the displaying of existential vista. 相似文献
Second-generation mindfulness-based interventions (SG-MBIs) align well with positive psychology philosophy and practices, but trials of SG-MBIs have largely focused on ill-being. This study developed a mindfulness-based positive psychology (MBPP) intervention integrating positive psychology with an SG-MBI to enhance well-being. A randomized control trial was performed to compare MBPP with a waitlist condition among 138 Chinese participants. The results showed that MBPP significantly reduced negative emotions for subjective well-being and significantly improved environmental mastery for psychological well-being. Improvements in self-compassion and negative attitudes but not avoidance, mediated changes in well-being. Changes in positive emotions, positive relations, and awareness were associated with the amount of meditation practice. These findings showed that MBPP is promising for improving well-being and that the positive psychology components play important roles. Broadly, the study illustrated that positive psychology and SG-MBIs can be effectively integrated, and it supported the further application of SG-MBIs from the positive psychology perspective.