感同身受的社会痛苦：来自神经影像学的证据

社会痛苦是指个体感觉到被渴望的社会关系排斥或者被重要他人和群体贬损时表现出的一种特定的负性情绪反应。对于社会痛苦的神经生理机制的探讨已成为当前研究的重点, 研究者主要从个体经历社会排斥、目睹他人被社会排斥(共情)时的神经活动来解释社会痛苦的神经生理机制。社会痛苦受到依恋、自尊等因素的影响。未来可从探讨社会痛苦在不同年龄阶段的神经机制和探索社会痛苦与人格障碍之间的关系两个方面展开进一步的探究。     

The Priority of “Liberty” or “Ping An ”: Two Different Cultural Value Priorities and Their Impacts

“Liberty” is a core, prior value of modern Western culture, and particularly of Anglo-American political and economic discourse. For more than a century, the US and other Western countries have been doing their utmost to promote the value of liberty around the world. However, different nations and cultures have different value priorities. Considering “liberty” as the essential, unassailable prior value is an Anglo-American cultural particularity without universal applicability. In China, “liberty” as a high value is a new idea imported from the West at the beginning of the modern era which never enjoyed a very important position in ancient China. Generally speaking, in Chinese culture, the value of “ping an,” with its connotations of peace, safety, equality, health, harmony, and tranquility, is obviously a prior value. Different value priorities have different impacts on culture. This paper tries to compare the American value priority of “liberty” with the Chinese value priority of “ping an,” while discussing their different historical backgrounds and cultural impacts. It argues that values and value priorities are neither absolute nor universal, but that they are rather historical, situational, and dynamic. Value priority in a society should be based on that society’s particular social reality and on the stage of development and the life requirements of its people, rather than on an outside imperative. In the era of globalization, different and even sometimes contradictory human values may actually mutually complement and counterbalance one another.     

On Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox: A Logical Dynamical Analysis

As a byproduct of solving the surprise-exam paradox, Saul Kripke formulates a “dogmatism paradox” which seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. In this paper, the author analyzes the nature of the dogmatism paradox from a logical dynamical perspective. The author suggests that the dogmatism paradox is better understood as a paradox of knowledge attribution rather than of knowledge. Therefore, the dogmatism paradox could be solved without sacrificing the principle of epistemic closure. Based on a famous version of relevant alternatives theory, the author formalizes a logic of knowledge attribution in the style of logical dynamics, namely, public retraction logic, and analyzes how knowledge attributions are retracted with the expansion of relevant alternatives.     

Is Intuition Necessary for Defending Platonism?

G?del asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of G?del’s conceptual realism’s basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, G?del asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too na?ve to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. G?del and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, G?del thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of G?del’s conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from na?ve, despite what some philosophers have claimed.     

选择盲：你不一定知道自己在选择什么

选择盲是指个体不能觉察他们的偏好与决策结果之间的不匹配, 即人们不能发现真实偏好被操纵, 这一现象在行为经济学中普遍存在。记忆表征理论主要从记忆表征编码的角度分析人们为什么不能发现选择的改变, 选择偏好理论则着重分析人们偏好反转的原因。选择盲的影响因素主要包括选项相似性和虚假反馈等。未来的研究需要从选择盲的心理机制与产生根源、影响因素和应用研究等方面进一步探讨。     

判断与决策中的基线比例忽略

基线比例忽略是指在事件的判断中忽略相关事件统计学上的信息, 而只关注当前呈现的案例信息, 从而造成判断和决策偏差的一种现象。目前对这一现象的解释主要包括双加工理论和线性整合理论, 而影响基线比例忽略的因素有许多方面, 如信息特征、认知能力等等。在未来研究中, 应该深入分析双加工理论的作用机制以及依据模糊痕迹理论提出新的研究视角, 同时拓展在团体和公共领域中的应用性研究。     

艺术设计中创造性思维的fMRI研究：一项基于智能CAD的探索

本项工作尝试将人类思维的神经生物学基础研究与人工智能的研究成果相结合, 利用类比生成模型的原理, 开发了一个计算机辅助设计系统“多源类比人脸生成系统”, 并运用此平台开展了fMRI实验, 对人类大脑创造性思维的神经生物学机制进行了探索。实验采用open-ends模式下的“design task”和problem solving模式下的“control task”作为对照, 共采得15名健康成人被试的有效数据。数据结果显示design task与control task相比更为显著地激活了内侧前额叶、额中回、右侧颞上回、前扣带回、双侧海马、楔前叶这些脑区。综合以往研究推测, 内侧前额叶可能更多地与即兴自由创作中对自我信息的表征有关, 颞叶可能与不断产生和输出新颖性的观点有关, 边缘系统则可能主要与创造性活动中的动力驱动作用有关。总的来说, 创造性思维是多个脑区同时参与的高度分布式加工的结果。     

动态情景中颜色特征和身份特征在返回抑制中的作用

在动态的“线索-靶子”范式中引入隧道刺激, 以靶子与线索的非空间特征相同时的反应延迟测量返回抑制效应。实验1利用单向隧道创设客体的空间位置信息明确且可靠的条件, 考察客体的颜色特征在返回抑制中的作用。实验2利用双向隧道创设客体的空间位置信息不明确的条件, 考察客体的颜色特征在返回抑制中的独立作用。实验3、4分别采用与实验1、2类似的方法, 在动态任务情景中考察客体的身份特征在返回抑制中的作用。结果显示, 线索呈现与靶子呈现的时间间隔较长时, 4个实验中均存在显著的返回抑制效应。这表明, 动态情景中, 客体的空间位置信息明确且可靠时, 颜色特征和身份特征在返回抑制中都发挥着重要作用; 客体的空间位置信息不明确时, 颜色特征和身份特征在返回抑制中也都具有相对独立的作用。     

辛苦所得与意外所得的非理性消费偏差：基于IAT检测和ERP证据

不同来源的财富因其在人们心理的权重差异会导致对其消费态度与方式的不同。前人运用一系列行为实验已发现意外所得更容易消费、辛苦所得则不容易消费。基于心理账户和内隐社会认知等理论, 运用IAT和ERP考察财富的意外所得与辛苦所得在人们心理引起的内在消费偏差, 进而对内隐消费态度和脑加工机制进行间接检测。IAT研究结果表明, 意外所得与容易消费的联结更加紧密, 辛苦所得与不易消费的联结更加紧密, 从内隐层面验证了前人的行为研究结论; ERP研究结果发现辛苦所得与意外所得这两个不同收入来源可能建立了不同脑加工机制, 且在P3和LPC成分得到反映, P3成分可能是反映辛苦所得组偏好难消费型消费方式的ERP成分, LPC反映了意外所得收入条件下个体偏好易消费型消费方式的特点。     

情绪面孔搜索不对称性：情绪观与知觉观的争议

情绪面孔搜索不对称性是指当负性情绪面孔作为目标, 正性情绪面孔作为分心物时, 其搜索速度比正性情绪面孔作为目标时(负性情绪面孔作为分心物)更快。对于这一现象的解释存在争议, 研究者主要从不同情绪面孔在情绪因素和知觉因素两个方面的差异进行解释。来自行为研究和认知神经科学的证据对情绪面孔搜索不对称性效应的解释主要有威胁性刺激捕获假设和情绪摆脱假设的情绪观, 以及嘴部差异说、闭合结构说、知觉组群说以及其他面部特征假设的知觉观。经过对比评价两类观点的理论异同和实验证据认为未来的研究可以整合情绪因素和知觉因素来解释该效应。