Whether teachers maintain their expectation bias for students over time is crucial for understanding self-fulfilling prophecy effects. However, the stability of teacher expectation bias has been largely ignored in the literature. We examined the stability of teacher expectation bias across a sample of teachers and the change trajectories of teacher expectation bias across high-, medium-, and low-expectation teacher groups across all teachers and in the curriculum areas of mathematics, Chinese, and English. Our analyses were based on two-year longitudinal data with four time points from 567 Chinese senior high school students and their 50 teachers. The results showed that across all teachers, teacher expectation bias at the individual student level was dynamic over time. That is, teachers seemed to adjust their initial expectation bias in the first few months but then maintained the adjusted expectation bias afterwards. However, when students moved from Grade 11 to Grade 12 (the last year of high school), teachers seemed to change their expectation bias again. The evidence from HLM analyses further supported these results. That is, all the high- and low-expectation teachers alleviated their initial expectation bias significantly in the first six months and then adhered to their adjusted expectation bias. However, when students moved to the last year of high school, some high- and low-expectation teachers’ expectation biases were volatile again. Nevertheless, most high- and low-expectation teachers (except for Chinese low-expectation teachers) tended to either over-estimate or under-estimate their students across two school years. Further, compared to Chinese and mathematics teachers, English teachers’ biases seemed to be even more stable. Our findings suggested that some teachers consistently over- or under-estimated their students over an extended time period and this could have implications for student outcomes.
This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea of private sensations. McDowell rightly identifies a primary target of Wittgenstein’s attack to be the Myth of the Given. But he also suggests that Wittgenstein, in the ferocity of his battles with this myth, sometimes goes into overkill, which manifests itself in seemingly behavioristic denials about sensations. But this criticism of Wittgenstein is a mistake. The mistake is made over two important but notoriously difficult sections in the so-called Private Language Argument, namely §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein, maximally charitably read, commits no overkill in these two sections. This correction strengthens McDowell’s overall reading, but it is only a first step toward fully bringing out the deep but obscurely expressed insights in §304 and §293, the full treatment of which must await another occasion. 相似文献
