Psychological foundations of number: numerical competence in human infants

An enduring question in philosophy and psychology is that of how we come to possess knowledge of number. Here I review research suggesting that the capacity to represent and reason about number is part of the inherent structure of the human mind. In the first few months of life, human infants can enumerate sets of entities and perform numerical computations. One proposal is that these abilities arise from general cognitive capacities not specific to number. I argue that the body of data supports a very different proposal: humans possess a specialized mental mechanism for number, one which we share with other species and which has evolved through natural selection. This mechanism is inherently restricted in the kinds of numerical knowledge it can support, leading to some striking limitations to early competence.     

Young infants prefer prosocial to antisocial others

The current study replicates and extends the finding (Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom, 2007) that infants prefer individuals who act prosocially toward unrelated third parties over those who act antisocially. Using different stimuli from those used by Hamlin et al. (2007), somewhat younger subjects, and 2 additional social scenarios, we replicated the findings that (a) infants prefer those who behave prosocially versus antisocially, and (b) these preferences are based on the social nature of the actions. The generality of infants’ responses across multiple examples of prosocial and antisocial actions supports the claim that social evaluation is fundamental to perceiving the world.     

Sources of Parental Knowledge as Moderators of the Relation Between Parental Psychological Control and Relational and Physical/Verbal Aggression

Previous research demonstrates that aspects of parenting interact to influence child adjustment. We aimed to extend this research by examining parenting strategies associated with behavioral control, specifically sources of parental knowledge regarding child behavior (child disclosure, parental solicitation, parental control), as moderators of the relation between psychological control and relational and physical/verbal aggression. Our sample included 89 children (56% male), ages 9–12. Consistent with prior research on child adjustment, low child disclosure was the only source of parental knowledge associated with both relational and physical/verbal aggression. Moreover, parental solicitation moderated the association between psychological control and relational, but not physical, aggression. That is, at high levels of parental solicitation, psychological control and relational aggression were positively related, whereas at low levels of parental solicitation, psychological control and relational aggression were unrelated. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

The origins of causal perception: evidence from postdictive processing in infancy

The currency of our visual experience consists not only of visual features such as color and motion, but also seemingly higher-level features such as causality--as when we see two billiard balls collide, with one causing the other to move. One of the most important and controversial questions about causal perception involves its origin: do we learn to see causality, or does this ability derive in part from innately specified aspects of our cognitive architecture? Such questions are difficult to answer, but can be indirectly addressed via experiments with infants. Here we explore causal perception in 7-month-old infants, using a different approach from previous work. Recent work in adult visual cognition has demonstrated a postdictive aspect to causal perception: in certain situations, we can perceive a collision between two objects in an ambiguous display even after the moment of potential 'impact' has already passed. This illustrates one way in which our conscious perception of the world is not an instantaneous moment-by-moment construction, but rather is formed by integrating information over short temporal windows. Here we demonstrate analogous postdictive processing in infants' causal perception. This result demonstrates that even infants' visual systems process information in temporally extended chunks. Moreover, this work provides a new way of demonstrating causal perception in infants that differs from previous strategies, and is immune to some previous types of critiques.     

Cohesion as a constraint on object persistence in infancy

A critical challenge for visual perception is to represent objects as the same persisting individuals over time and motion. Across several areas of cognitive science, researchers have identified cohesion as among the most important theoretical principles of object persistence: An object must maintain a single bounded contour over time. Drawing inspiration from recent work in adult visual cognition, the present study tested the power of cohesion as a constraint as it operates early in development. In particular, we tested whether the most minimal cohesion violation - a single object splitting into two - would destroy infants' ability to represent a quantity of objects over occlusion. In a forced-choice crawling paradigm, 10- and 12-month-old infants witnessed crackers being sequentially placed into containers, and typically crawled toward the container with the greater cracker quantity. When one of the crackers was visibly split in half, however, infants failed to represent the relative quantities, despite controls for the overall quantities and the motions involved. This result helps to characterize the fidelity and specificity of cohesion as a fundamental principle of object persistence, suggesting that even the simplest possible cohesion violation can dramatically impair infants' object representations and influence their overt behavior.     

The Moral Philosophy of Raimond Gaitaand Some Questions of Methodin the Philosophy of Religion

Raimond Gaita's moral philosophy is distinguished by, among other things, its attention to the role of embodied, enacted witness in disclosing certain moral values, and its understanding of the emotions as forms of thought. In this paper, I consider how Gaita's insights on these matters may be applied to certain questions in the philosophy of religion, paying particular attention to the nature of religious experience and 'the problem of evil'. I suggest that Gaita's discussion of how we come to recognise moral values or 'meanings' can be extended to the question of how we might recognise religious meanings. On this view, religious experience may take the form of an appreciation of the meaning borne by a material context (rather than, for example, some supra-sensory encounter with a supernatural agent), and our sense of the goodness or otherwise of the world may be answerable to the authoritative example of particular lives.     

INFANTS' INDIVIDUATION AND ENUMERATION OF ACTIONS

Abstract— Two experiments examined 6-month-old infantsapos; ability to individuate and enumerate physical actions—the sequential jumps of a puppet In both experiments, which employed a habituation paradigm, infants successfully discriminated two-jump from three-jump sequences The sequences of activity in the two experiments provided for an initial exploration of the cues infants use to individuate actions. Results show that (a) infants can individuate and enumerate actions in a sequence, indicating that their enumeration mechanism is quite general in the kinds of entities over which it will operate, (b) action whose temporal boundaries are characterized by a contrast between motion and absence of motion are especially easy to individuate and enumerate, but nonetheless (c) infants can individuate and enumerate actions embedded in a sequence of continuous motion, indicating that infants possess procedures for parsing an ongoing motionful scene into distinct portions of activity.     

Children's understanding of counting

This study examines the abstractness of children's mental representation of counting, and their understanding that the last number word used in a count tells how many items there are (the cardinal word principle). In the first experiment, twenty-four 2- and 3-year-olds counted objects, actions, and sounds. Children counted objects best, but most showed some ability to generalize their counting to actions and sounds, suggesting that at a very young age, children begin to develop an abstract, generalizable mental representation of the counting routine. However, when asked "how many" following counting, only older children (mean age 3.6) gave the last number word used in the count a majority of the time, suggesting that the younger children did not understand the cardinal word principle. In the second experiment (the "give-a-number" task), the same children were asked to give a puppet one, two, three, five, and six items from a pile. The older children counted the items, showing a clear understanding of the cardinal word principle. The younger children succeeded only at giving one and sometimes two items, and never used counting to solve the task. A comparison of individual children's performance across the "how-many" and "give-a-number" tasks shows strong within-child consistency, indicating that children learn the cardinal word principle at roughly 3 1/2 years of age. In the third experiment, 18 2- and 3-year-olds were asked several times for one, two, three, five, and six items, to determine the largest numerosity at which each child could succeed consistently. Results indicate that children learn the meanings of smaller number words before larger ones within their counting range, up to the number three or four. They then learn the cardinal word principle at roughly 3 1/2 years of age, and perform a general induction over this knowledge to acquire the meanings of all the number words within their counting range.