Western and Russian Traditions of Big History: A Philosophical Insight

Summary  Big History – an integral conception of the past since the Big Bang until today – is a novel subject of cross-disciplinary interest. The concept was construed in the 1980–1990s simultaneously in different countries, after relevant premises had matured in the sciences and humanities.Various versions and traditions of Big History are considered in the article. Particularly, most of the Western authors emphasize the idea of equilibrium, and thus reduce cosmic, biological, and social evolution to the mass-energy processes; the informational parameter involving all mental and spiritual aspects are seen as epiphenomena of material structures” complication that do not play their own role in evolution. In Russian tradition ascending to A. Bogdanov, E. Bauer, I. Prigogine, and E. Jantsch, sustainable non-equilibrium patterns are used. This implies attention to the pan-material sources and evolution of mental capacities and spiritual culture (as basic anti-entropy instruments) and humans” growing intervention in the material processes on Earth and outside it.The non-equilibrium approach in the context of modern control and self-organization theories, alters the portrayal of the past, and still more dramatically, estimation of the civilization’s potential perspectives.     

Dennett’s Rhetorical Strategies in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Consciousness Explained</Emphasis>

Dennett’s Consciousness Explained (1991) is an inspiring but also a highly frustrating book. The line of the argument seems to be clear, but then at second sight it fades away. It turns out that Dennett uses six of the seven strategies which I discuss in my “The Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist: A Look into Freud’s Rhetorical Tool Box” (J. Gen. Phil. Sci., 2001) Discussing important examples of these strategies I show why Consciousness Explained is such a frustrating book. As the examples used do not reflect minor problems but go to the heart of the matter and concern the book’s main areas of contention, it turns out that, in spite of the valuable and insightful details, Dennett’s materialistic view of consciousness is supported mainly by rhetorical sleights of hand.     

Mindfulness,learning and the brain

I have tried to sketch an approach to the complex phenomena that go by the name of ‘mindfulness’ that both does justice to this complexity and depth, and also offers a way of thinking about mindfulness in evolutionary, ecosocial and neural terms: terms that enable us to ask questions like: where did mindfulness come from? What kind of consciousness is it? What was it for, before it was co-opted by spiritual and therapeutic kinds of discourse and practice? And how do brains do it? In essence, I am suggesting that human brains seem to have developed, for good evolutionary reasons, a degree of facility with imaginative empathy and as-if identification; and that mindfulness capitalises on this to create what is probably a uniquely human form of learning—or rather unlearning.     

AI &; Law,Logic and Argument Schemes

This paper reviews the history of AI & Law research from the perspective of argument schemes. It starts with the observation that logic, although very well applicable to legal reasoning when there is uncertainty, vagueness and disagreement, is too abstract to give a fully satisfactory classification of legal argument types. It therefore needs to be supplemented with an argument-scheme approach, which classifies arguments not according to their logical form but according to their content, in particular, according to the roles that the various elements of an argument can play. This approach is then applied to legal reasoning, to identify some of the main legal argument schemes. It is also argued that much AI & Law research in fact employs the argument-scheme approach, although it usually is not presented as such. Finally, it is argued that the argument-scheme approach and the way it has been employed in AI & Law respects some of the main lessons to be learnt from Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument.     

Begging the Question in Arguments Based on Testimony

Summary This paper studies some classic cases of the fallacy of begging the question based on appeals to testimony containing circular reasoning. For example, suppose agents a, b and c vouch for d’s credentials, and agents b, d, and e vouch for a’s credentials. Such a sequence of reasoning is circular because a is offering testimony for d but d is offering testimony for a. The paper formulates and evaluates restrictions on the use of testimonial evidence that might be used to deal with such problematic arguments. One is called the Non-repeater Rule: in an extended sequence of argumentation based on testimony, once a source x has been appealed to at any given point in the sequence, that same source x must never be appealed to again at any next point in the same sequence.