The roles of self-regulation and partner regulation on romantic relationship quality

Research into self-regulation and partner regulation strategies has largely involved parallel lines of research, thus, it is difficult to determine the relative contribution of both forms of regulation when it comes to relationship outcomes. Therefore, the question remains as to which form of regulation is more strongly associated with relationship quality; is it more important to focus on adaptive self-regulation or adaptive strategies to regulate one's partner? The current research addresses this important gap by comparing the relative associations of adaptive self-regulation and adaptive partner regulation strategies on romantic relationship quality. A community sample of mixed gender couples (N = 114) who were predominantly satisfied with their current relationships – but nonetheless still experienced relationship conflict – were administered self-report assessments of various self-regulation and partner regulation strategies as well as a measure of relationship quality. Couples also participated in a videotaped discussion of an unresolved relationship issue that was scored by trained coders for verbal and nonverbal indicators of self-regulation and partner regulation strategies. Actor–partner interdependence modeling revealed that for both men and women, adaptive self-regulation strategies were positively associated with their own evaluations of relationship quality as well as their partner's relationship quality. In contrast, engaging in adaptive partner regulation strategies was not significantly associated with men's or women's own, or their partner's relationship quality. Findings highlight the importance of focusing on self-regulation in relationships, as it is these strategies, over partner regulation strategies, that have more positive implications for the relationship quality experienced by typically satisfied couples.     

Analysis of Religious Bias among Christian Students in Science

Christians are notably underrepresented in science in part due to long-standing public perceptions of science-religion incompatibility and antireligious bias in science. This research explores whether undergraduates at a Christian university perceive and impose anti-Christian cultural stigma in science. Survey results from 126 biology students revealed that though students generally perceived the culture of science to be anti-Christian, they perceived Christians to have equal opportunities for scientific achievement. Results from a quasi-experimental audit study, in which students evaluated one of two profiles for mock prospective Ph.D. applicants (Christian or undisclosed faith) showed that students did not project anti-Christian stereotypes in terms of competence, hireability, or likeability, but showed some evidence of pro-Christian favorability. Together, this study suggests that the affirmational community of a Christian University may alleviate some negative impacts of anti-Christian stereotypes in academic biology, even as students perceive discrimination against Christians in science and atheists as more scientifically competent.     

Psychology and the fall of Communism: The special case of (East) Germany

The fall of Communism is now universally agreed to be what the philosopher Hegel called a world historical event—one that few predicted but nearly everyone saw as inevitable after it happened. In the aftermath many lives—and worldviews—changed, not only, but also in the human sciences. These remarks attempt to address in a preliminary way both the impact of the fall of Communism on psychology in former East Germany (including changes in personnel and approach) and the ways in which these sciences were employed as resources for reflection on the Communist past as well as the transition to new social and political regimes.     

On the role of experience versus motivation in predicting the own-race effect

The other-race effect (ORE) is a longstanding phenomenon in experimental psychology, where recognition for same-race faces is superior than for other-race faces. The present research pits two competing theories of perceptual expertise and social motivation against each other to see which is the more robust predictor of the ORE. In Study 1, we measured Black and White participants' prior contact with individuals from the other-race (i.e. expertise) as well as their expected level of future interaction with other-race individuals (i.e. motivation). Of the two theories, anticipated interaction (i.e. motivation) emerged as a significant predictor of the ORE. Study 2 followed the same design, measuring motivation with a self-report assessment of how much participants are willing to have cross-race friendships. Here, neither experience nor motivation predicted the ORE, though an ORE was established. Differences in measures that assess motivation and the experience versus motivation debate are discussed.     

Radical parochialism about reference

We can use radically different reference-schemes to generate the same truth-conditions for the sentences of a language. In this paper, we do three things. (1) Distinguish two arguments that deploy this observation to derive different conclusions. The first argues that reference is radically indeterminate: there is no fact of the matter what ordinary terms refer to. This threat is taken seriously and most contemporary metasemantic theories come with resources intended to rebut it. The second argues for radical parochialism about reference: it's a reflection of our parochial interests, rather than the nature of the subject matter, that our theorizing about language appeals to reference rather than another relation that generates the same truth-conditions. Rebuttals of the first argument cut no ice against the second, because radical parochialism is compatible with reference being determinate. (2) Argue that radical parochialism, like radical indeterminacy, would be shocking if true. (3) Argue that the case for radical parochialism turns on the explanatory purposes of “reference”-talk: on relatively “thin” conceptions, the argument goes through, and radical parochialism is (shockingly!) true; on richer conceptions, the argument can be blocked. We conclude that non-revisionists must endorse, and justify, a relatively rich conception of the explanatory purposes of “reference”-talk.     

Does Analytic Thinking Insulate Against Pro-Kremlin Disinformation? Evidence From Ukraine

Pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns have long targeted Ukraine. We investigate susceptibility to this pro-Kremlin disinformation from a cognitive-science perspective. Is greater analytic thinking associated with less belief in disinformation, as per classical theories of reasoning? Or does analytic thinking amplify motivated system 2 reasoning (or “cultural cognition”), such that analytic thinking is associated with more polarized beliefs (and thus more belief in pro-Kremlin disinformation among pro-Russia Ukrainians)? In online (N = 1,974) and face-to-face representative (N = 9,474) samples of Ukrainians, we find support for the classical reasoning account. Analytic thinking, as measured using the Cognitive Reflection Test, was associated with greater ability to discern truth from disinformation—even for Ukrainians who are strongly oriented towards Russia. We find similar, albeit weaker, results when operationalizing analytic thinking using the self-report Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale. These results demonstrate a similar pattern to prior work using American participants. Thus, the positive association between analytic thinking and the ability to discern truth versus falsehood generalizes to the qualitatively different information environment of postcommunist Ukraine. Despite low trust in government and media, weak journalistic standards, and years of exposure to Russian disinformation, Ukrainians who engage in more analytic thinking are better able to tell truth from falsehood.