Child and adolescent psychopathology research: Problems and prospects for the 1990s

In November 1990 the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) convened a special conference of over 100 scientists and leaders to outline specific strategies and research initiatives that should be developed to implement the recently released National Plan for Research on Child and Adolescent Mental Disorders.Participants included journal editors, educators from psychology and psychiatry, representatives from private foundations, and leaders of research program areas in public funding agencies. Critical knowledge gaps were identified in five areas of child and adolescent psychopathology, including depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, conduct disorder, the anxiety disorders, and the developmental disorders. For each of these areas, special emphasis was placed on developing new ideas and obtaining critical input from other areas of investigation. This report summarizes the identified research gaps and recommends research initiatives to implement the National Plan, as outlined by the conference participants.     

Is agoraphobia harder to treat? A comparison of agoraphobics' and simple phobics' response to treatment

Agoraphobia is reputed to be more difficult to treat than simple phobia. In a test of this supposition, 38 agoraphobics and 19 simple phobics were each given 10 sessions of graduated in vivo exposure. They were assessed before and after therapy using a behavioral avoidance test, behavioral diaries, and self-report measures. Analysis of covariance revealed unequivocal posttest differences only on self-assessed disability level; agoraphobics had changed less in their report of global disability immediately following treatment but not at follow-up. Sixty-eight percent of the simple phobics showed clinically significant improvement on avoidance of the Main Phobia, compared with 34% of the agoraphobics. On three other outcome measures, including more precise behavioral measures of phobia, agoraphobics and simple phobics responded equivalently to treatment. Given clinicians' impression about the comparative difficulty in treating agoraphobic clients, fewer differences in treatment response were obtained than were expected. Several possible explanations for this discrepancy are discussed.     

Received and Perceived Social Support Following Natural Disaster1

Because they were participating in a concurrent panel study, 222 older adults had been asked how much help they would expect to receive in a hypothetical emergency before experiencing two separate floods. For the subsample suffering losses or injuries during the floods, Study 1 examined the accuracy of their expectations, as well as possible changes in them, as a result of help actually received. Generally, victims received much less help than they had expected to receive prior to the floods. Preflood expectation of support predicted help from kin, whereas loss and education predicted help from nonkin sources. However, subsequent expectations did not change as a result of the level of help received. Using the total sample, Study 2 examined the broader issue of whether the disaster itself affected subsequent perceptions of support. Flood exposure, as measured at both individual and community levels, was associated with declines in perceptions of support and social participation.     

The case for motivated reasoning

It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes--that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning.     

The judgment-choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring?

The study examines the relative merits of a noncompatibility and a restructuring explanation of the recurrent empirical finding that a prominent attribute looms larger in choices than in judgments. Pairs of equally attractive options were presented to 72 undergraduates who were assigned to six conditions in which they performed (1) only preference judgments or choices, (2) preference judgments or choices preceded by judgments of attractiveness of attribute levels, or (3) preference judgments or choices accompanied by think-aloud reports. The results replicated the prominence effect for choices, but a prominence effect was also found for preference judgments. In accordance with the restructuring explanation, the think-aloud protocols indicated that options were more often restructured in choices than in preference judgments. However, restructuring could not explain the prominence effect observed for preference judgments. A modified compatibility hypothesis is offered as an alternative explanation.     

Reliability of self-reported service use: Test-retest consistency of children's responses to the Child and Adolescent Services Assessment (CASA)

This paper reports on the reliability of children's responses on the Child and Adolescent Services Assessment (CASA) — a self-report instrument for use with 8– to 18-year-olds that gathers information about services used to address mental health problems. Findings were based on interviews completed by 77 children at a one week test-retest interval. Results showed that reports of lifetime service use were as reliable as were reports of service use in the preceding three months. Children reported restrictive and intrusive services more reliably than services that were provided in their natural environment. Reliability appeared to be associated more strongly with characteristics of the type of service than with characteristics of the child. Children also could report reliably on some details about their encounters with service providers (e.g., length of stay, number of visits, and onset of service use).     

Who is Afraid of Figure of Speech?

Aristotle's illustrations of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are none too convincing. They are tied to Aristotle's theory of categories and to peculiarities of Greek grammar that fail to hold appeal for a contemporary readership. Yet, upon closer inspection, Figure of Speech shows many points of contact with views and problems that inhabit 20th-century analytical philosophy. In the paper, some Aristotelian examples will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of this fallacy. The case of the Third Man argument and some modern cases lend plausibility to the claim that Figure of Speech is of more interest as a type of fallacy than has generally been assumed. Finally, a case is made for the view that Figure of Speech, though listed among the fallacies dependent upon language, is not properly classified as a fallacy of ambiguity. More likely, it should be looked upon as a type of non sequitur. This has important consequences for the profile of dialogue associated with this fallacy.