Pathways of Risk and Resilience: Impact of a Family Resilience Program on Active‐Duty Military Parents

Over the past decade, studies into the impact of wartime deployment and related adversities on service members and their families have offered empirical support for systemic models of family functioning and a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms by which stress and trauma reverberate across family and partner relationships. They have also advanced our understanding of the ways in which families may contribute to the resilience of children and parents contending with the stressors of serial deployments and parental physical and psychological injuries. This study is the latest in a series designed to further clarify the systemic functioning of military families and to explicate the role of resilient family processes in reducing symptoms of distress and poor adaptation among family members. Drawing upon the implementation of the Families Overcoming Under Stress (FOCUS) Family Resilience Program at 14 active‐duty military installations across the United States, structural equation modeling was conducted with data from 434 marine and navy active‐duty families who participated in the FOCUS program. The goal was to better understand the ways in which parental distress reverberates across military family systems and, through longitudinal path analytic modeling, determine the pathways of program impact on parental distress. The findings indicated significant cross‐influence of distress between the military and civilian parents within families, families with more distressed military parents were more likely to sustain participation in the program, and reductions in distress among both military and civilian parents were significantly mediated by improvements in resilient family processes. These results are consistent with family systemic and resilient models that support preventive interventions designed to enhance family resilient processes as an important part of comprehensive services for distressed military families.     

A claw is like my hand: comparison supports goal analysis in infants

Understanding the intentional relations in others' actions is critical to human social life. Origins of this knowledge exist in the first year and are a function of both acting as an intentional agent and observing movement cues in actions. We explore a new mechanism we believe plays an important role in infants' understanding of new actions: comparison. We examine how the opportunity to compare a familiar action with a novel, tool use action helps 7- and 10-month-old infants extract and imitate the goal of a tool use action. Infants given the chance to compare their own reach for a toy with an experimenter's reach using a claw later imitated the goal of an experimenter's tool use action. Infants who engaged with the claw, were familiarized with the claw's causal properties, or learned the associations between claw and toys (but did not align their reaches with the claw's) did not imitate. Further, active participation in the familiar action to be compared was more beneficial than observing a familiar and novel action aligned for 10-month-olds. Infants' ability to extract the goal-relation of a novel action through comparison with a familiar action could have a broad impact on the development of action knowledge and social learning more generally.     

Deleuze, Nietzsche, and the overcoming of nihilism

This paper critically examines Deleuze’s treatment of the Nietzschean problem of nihilism. Of all the major figures in contemporary continental thought, Deleuze is at once one of the most luminous, and practically a lone voice in suggesting that nihilism may successfully be overcome. Whether or not he is correct on this point is thus a commanding question in relation to our understanding of the issue. Many commentators on Nietzsche have argued that his project of overcoming nihilism is destined to failure because of the affinity between the problem of nihilism and the logic of negation. While Nietzsche wants an absolute affirmation of life, Spinoza’s principle that “all determination is negation,” as well as Hegel’s dialectical conception of negation, suggest that affirmation free of negation is not possible. However, some commentators indicate that Deleuze successfully shows how overcoming nihilism is possible because his “logic of difference” allows for an affirmation which is not dialectically reappropriated by negation. This paper argues that beyond such logical considerations, there are metaphysical and existential reasons why Deleuze’s interpretation of nihilism fails to show that it can be overcome. For Deleuze, the overcoming of nihilism hinges not just on a logic of difference, but on a radical interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal return as “selective being.” Drawing on recent scholarship and on Nietzsche’s own writings I argue that this is not a tenable interpretation, and also, more importantly, that the metaphysical and existential implications of this understanding of eternal return reinstate nihilism at the very point where it is supposedly overcome. Moreover, I argue that there are attendant ethical and political dangers to Deleuze’s position on nihilism.     

"Let's work together": what do infants understand about collaborative goals?

Collaboration is fundamental to our daily lives, yet little is known about how humans come to understand these activities. The present research was conducted to fill this void by using a novel visual habituation paradigm to investigate infants’ understanding of the collaborative-goal structure of collaborative action. The findings of the three experiments reported here suggest that 14-month-old infants understand that the actions of collaborative partners are complementary and critical to the attainment of a common collaborative goal. Importantly, 14-month-olds do not interpret the actions of two individuals in terms of a collaborative goal when their actions are not causally related. The implications of our findings for theories of collaboration and folk psychology are discussed.     

Identity in Fiction

Anthony Everett ( 2005 ) argues that those who embrace the reality of fictional entities run into trouble when it comes to specifying criteria of character identity. More specifically, he argues that realists must reject natural principles governing the identity and distinctness of fictional characters due to the existence of fictions which leave it indeterminate whether certain characters are identical and the existence of fictions which say inconsistent things about the identities of their characters. Everett's critique has deservedly drawn much attention and a number of defensive moves have been made by, or on the behalf of, fictional realists. My goal in this paper is to move this debate on a further step. I have three goals: (i) to clarify the importance of Everett's discussion of identity criteria within the context of fictional realism, (ii) to reassess Everett's objections to realism in light of the resultant literature, and (iii) to develop a novel strategy for responding to Everett's concerns. On the approach to be developed, the problems emerge due to an indeterminacy inherent in the concept of a fictional character itself.     

Do as I do: 7-month-old infants selectively reproduce others' goals

In the current study, we tested whether 7-month-old infants would selectively imitate the goal-relevant aspects of an observed action. Infants saw an experimenter perform an action on one of two small toys and then were given the opportunity to act on the toys. Infants viewed actions that were either goal-directed or goal-ambiguous, and that represented either completed or uncompleted goals. Infants reproduced the goal of the experimenter only in those cases where the action was goal-directed, in both the complete and incomplete goal conditions. These results provide the first evidence that infants as young as 7 months of age selectively imitate actions based on their goal-directedness, and that they are able to analyze the goals of even uncompleted actions. Even during the first year of life, infants' sensitivity to goal-directed action is expressed not only in their responses in visual habituation procedures, but also in their overt actions.     

Infants’ developing understanding of the link between looker and object

Three studies investigated infants’ understanding that gaze involves a relation between a person and the object of his or her gaze. Infants were habituated to an event in which an actor turned and looked at one of two toys. Then, infants saw test events in which (1) the actor turned to the same side as during habituation to look at a different toy, or (2) the actor turned to the other side to look at the same toy as during habituation. The first of these involved a change in the relation between actor and object. The second involved a new physical motion on the part of the actor but no change in the relation between actor and object. Seven‐ and 9‐month‐old infants did not respond to the change in relation between actor and object, although infants at both ages followed the actor's gaze to the toys. In contrast, 12‐month‐old infants responded to the change in the actor–object relation. Control conditions verified that the paradigm was a sensitive index of the younger infants’ representations of action: 7‐ and 9‐month‐olds responded to a change in the actor–object relation when the actor's gaze was accompanied by a grasp. Taken together, these findings indicate that gaze‐following does not initially go hand in hand with understanding the relation between a person who looks and the object of his or her gaze, and that infants begin to understand this relation between 9 and 12 months.     

The influence of cue-task association and location on switch cost and alternating-switch cost.

Task-switching performance is strongly influenced by whether the imperative stimulus uniquely specifies which task to perform: Switch cost is substantial with bivalent stimuli but is greatly reduced with univalent stimuli, suggesting that available contextual information influences processing in task-switching situations. The present study examined whether task-relevant information provided by task cues influences the magnitude of switch cost in a parallel manner. Cues presented 500 ms prior to a trivalent stimulus indicated which of three tasks to perform. These cues either had a preexisting association with the to-be-performed task (verbal cues), or a recently learned association with the task (spatial and shape cues). The results paralleled the effects of stimulus bivalence: substantial switch cost with recently learned cue-task associations and greatly reduced switch cost with preexisting cue-task associations. This suggests that both stimulus-based and cue-based information can activate the relevant task set, possibly providing external support to endogenous control processes. Alternating-switch cost, a greater cost for switching back to a recently abandoned task, was also observed with both preexisting and recently learned cue-task associations, but only when all tasks were presented in a consistent spatial location. When spatial location was used to cue the to-be-performed tasks, no alternating-switch cost was observed, suggesting that different processes may be involved when tasks are uniquely located in space. Specification of the nature of these processes may prove to be complex, as post-hoc inspection of the data suggested that for the spatial cue condition, the alternating-switch cost may oscillate between cost and benefit, depending on the relevant task.