Imagine no religion: Heretical disgust,anger and the symbolic purity of mind

Immoral actions, including physical/sexual (e.g., incest) and social (e.g., unfairness) taboos, are often described as disgusting. But what about immoral thoughts, more specifically, thoughts that violate religious beliefs? Do heretical thoughts taint the purity of mind? The present research examined heretical disgust using self-report measures and facial electromyography. Religious thought violations consistently elicited both self-reported disgust and anger. Feelings of disgust also predicted harsh moral judgement, independent of anger, and were mediated by feelings of “contamination”. However, religious thought violations were not associated with a disgust facial expression (i.e., levator labii muscle activity) that was elicited by physically disgusting stimuli. We conclude that people (especially more religious people) do feel disgust in response to heretical thoughts that is meaningfully distinct from anger as a moral emotion. However, heretical disgust is not embodied in a physical disgust response. Rather, disgust has a symbolic moral value that marks heretical thoughts as harmful and aversive.     

Anxiety,anticipation and contextual information: A test of attentional control theory

We tested the assumptions of Attentional Control Theory (ACT) by examining the impact of anxiety on anticipation using a dynamic, time-constrained task. Moreover, we examined the involvement of high- and low-level cognitive processes in anticipation and how their importance may interact with anxiety. Skilled and less-skilled tennis players anticipated the shots of opponents under low- and high-anxiety conditions. Participants viewed three types of video stimuli, each depicting different levels of contextual information. Performance effectiveness (response accuracy) and processing efficiency (response accuracy divided by corresponding mental effort) were measured. Skilled players recorded higher levels of response accuracy and processing efficiency compared to less-skilled counterparts. Processing efficiency significantly decreased under high- compared to low-anxiety conditions. No difference in response accuracy was observed. When reviewing directional errors, anxiety was most detrimental to performance in the condition conveying only contextual information, suggesting that anxiety may have a greater impact on high-level (top-down) cognitive processes, potentially due to a shift in attentional control. Our findings provide partial support for ACT; anxiety elicited greater decrements in processing efficiency than performance effectiveness, possibly due to predominance of the stimulus-driven attentional system.     

Does Poor Understanding of Physical World Predict Religious and Paranormal Beliefs?

Although supernatural beliefs often paint a peculiar picture about the physical world, the possibility that the beliefs might be based on inadequate understanding of the non‐social world has not received research attention. In this study (N = 258), we therefore examined how physical‐world skills and knowledge predict religious and paranormal beliefs. The results showed that supernatural beliefs correlated with all variables that were included, namely, with low systemizing, poor intuitive physics skills, poor mechanical ability, poor mental rotation, low school grades in mathematics and physics, poor common knowledge about physical and biological phenomena, intuitive and analytical thinking styles, and in particular, with assigning mentality to non‐mental phenomena. Regression analyses indicated that the strongest predictors of the beliefs were overall physical capability (a factor representing most physical skills, interests, and knowledge) and intuitive thinking style. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modeling Individual Differences in Autobiographical Memory Distributions Using Mixed Logitnormal Regression

We introduce a model for examining individual differences in the lifespan distribution of autobiographical memories (after the exclusion of recent memories). The model is based on the logitnormal distribution, contains two submodels, one for location (average age at which autobiographical memories were encoded) and one for scale (range of ages at which autobiographical memories were encoded), allows for the inclusion of predictor variables, and includes random effects. The model was used to analyze autobiographical memories reported by 90 older participants. Results show that there were reliable individual differences in location and scale. Moreover, age, proportion of positive memories, proportion of first‐time experiences, comprehensibility, and meaningfulness accounted for 26% of individual differences in location and 23% of individual differences in scale of autobiographical memory distributions. These findings indicate that individual differences are present in autobiographical memory distributions and can, in part, be accounted for by characteristics of the memories and of the person who generated them.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of daily co-occurrence of affect on older adults’ reactivity to health stressors

Objectives: The present study examined age differences among older adults in the daily co-occurrence of affect and its potential role in buffering the negative effects of health stressors.

Design: Participants were from the Veterans Affairs Normative Aging Study and included 249 young-old adults (age = 60–79 years, M = 71.6) and 64 old-old adults (age = 80–89, M = 82.9) who completed questionnaires assessing stressors, physical health symptoms, and positive and negative affect for eight consecutive days.

Results: An independent samples t-test showed young-old and old-old adults did not significantly differ in their mean levels of daily co-occurrence of affect. The between-person relationships among stressors, health and daily co-occurrence of affect revealed that neither stressors nor health were significantly related to daily co-occurrence of affect. However, results from a multilevel model revealed a three-way cross-level interaction (health stressor × age group × co-occurrence of affect) where old-old adults with higher levels of co-occurrence of affect were less emotionally reactive to health stressors than young-old adults.

Conclusion: These findings provide support for the assertion that co-occurrence of affect functions in an adaptive capacity and highlight the importance of examining domain-specific stressors.     

Leaping to Conclusions: Why Premise Relevance Affects Argument Strength

Everyday reasoning requires more evidence than raw data alone can provide. We explore the idea that people can go beyond this data by reasoning about how the data was sampled. This idea is investigated through an examination of premise non‐monotonicity, in which adding premises to a category‐based argument weakens rather than strengthens it. Relevance theories explain this phenomenon in terms of people's sensitivity to the relationships among premise items. We show that a Bayesian model of category‐based induction taking premise sampling assumptions and category similarity into account complements such theories and yields two important predictions: First, that sensitivity to premise relationships can be violated by inducing a weak sampling assumption; and second, that premise monotonicity should be restored as a result. We test these predictions with an experiment that manipulates people's assumptions in this regard, showing that people draw qualitatively different conclusions in each case.     

How can individual differences in autobiographical memory distributions of older adults be explained?

The reminiscence bump phenomenon has frequently been reported for the recall of autobiographical memories. The present study complements previous research by examining individual differences in the distribution of word-cued autobiographical memories. More importantly, we introduce predictor variables that might account for individual differences in the mean (location) and the standard deviation (scale) of individual memory distributions. All variables were derived from different theoretical accounts for the reminiscence bump phenomenon. We used a mixed location-scale logitnormal model, to analyse the 4602 autobiographical memories reported by 118 older participants. Results show reliable individual differences in the location and the scale. After controlling for age and gender, individual proportions of first-time experiences and individual proportions of positive memories, as well as the ratings on Openness to new Experiences and Self-Concept Clarity accounted for 29% of individual differences in location and 42% of individual differences in scale of autobiographical memory distributions. Results dovetail with a life-story account for the reminiscence bump which integrates central components of previous accounts.     

Group Agents and Their Responsibility

Group agents are able to act but are not literally agents. Some group agents, e.g., we-mode groups and corporations, can, however, be regarded as functional group agents that do not have “intrinsic” mental states and phenomenal features comparable to what their individual members on biological and psychological grounds have. But they can have “extrinsic” mental states, states collectively attributed to them—primarily by their members. In this paper, we discuss the responsibility of such group agents. We defend the view that if the group members have accepted the group agent’s (attributed) attitudes and are committed to them, we can favorably compare the situation with the case of individual human agents and a group agent can be regarded as morally responsible for its intentional activities.