Meeting a deviant person: Subjective norms and affective reactions

Studied differences in verbal, nonverbal, and physiological responses during a confrontation with a male confederate role-playing either a physically handicapped (PH), homosexual (HS), or normal (NOR) person. One hundred and eight males from colleges of economics and engineering listened in a laboratory experiment to personal introductions by two confederates in succession. Whereas the first confederate always appeared normal, the second took one of the three roles mentioned. A further informal meeting with this confederate was arranged outside the laboratory; all subjects had taken a stereotype test before. Normative differences between PH and HS (p ≤ 0.05) are found on verbal measures including the stereotype test, self-rated emotion and consent to a further contact. General effects of deviance separating PH and HS from NOR (p ≤ 0.05) emerge on observed emotion, interpersonal distance during the informal meeting, and skin-resistance responses. The results largely confirm the hypotheses. They are interpreted as supporting a distinction between intended (action-type) components of behaviour which are strongly influenced by subjective norms, and unintended (reaction-type) components reflecting undifferentiated reactions to deviance.     

Social influences on remembering: Intellectual,interpersonal and intergroup components

When people recall an event collaboratively we may expect the product to be influenced by the combined cognitive resources of the group, interpersonal acquaintance of the members, and social competition engendered by salient intergroup considerations. Using undergraduate students and serving police officers as subjects, a range of experimental conditions was established which varied on the three factors of cognitive resources of the participants (Cognitive Resources), interpersonal acquaintance of the participants (Interpersonal Acquaintance) and professional salience (Professional Salience) of the recall material. Participants answered a questionnaire concerning a police interrogation they had witnessed, and rated how much confidence they had in their answers. Multiple regression revealed statistically significant associations between (i) Cognitive Resources and number of correct answers, (ii) Interpersonal Acquaintance and confidence for implicational errors, and (iii) Professional Salience and (a) number of implicational errors and (b) confidence in confusional errors. The theoretical implications for our understanding of memory as a social process are discussed, and the practical implications for courtroom testimony briefly described.     

Launching the effect: Representations of causal movements are influenced by what they lead to

We investigated whether the representation of an observed causal movement is influenced by its observed effect. Subjects watched displays showing collisions between two objects. In this 'launching event' (Michotte, 1946/1963), one of the two objects (Object A) started to move and set a second, initially stationary, object (Object B) into motion, which gave a strong impression of apparent causality. The apparent effectiveness of A's movement was manipulated by varying the velocities of A and B. When the velocity of B was higher than that of A, the effectiveness of the collision was high; when it was smaller it was low. Then, subjects were asked to reproduce the velocity of the causal movement. Reproduced velocity followed the velocity of both Object A and Object B, which supports the hypothesis that the effect of a movement is integrated with its apparent cause. However, when apparent causality was reduced by changing the direction of motion of B or by covering the point of collision, the influence of the effect on the representation of the cause persisted, suggesting that retroactive interference may account for the findings. The interference effect could not be reduced to temporal recency or spatial integration and was not obtained in the reverse temporal order (proactive interference). Rather, the two successive movements were blended in memory.     

Is Evidence Normative?

Philosophia - This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact,...     

The I: A dimensional account

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - I have a clear idea of what it means that I have experiences in the past or future, and it does not seem to mean that experiences take place that possess...     

An Accuracy Argument in Favor of Ranking Theory

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Fitelson and McCarthy (2014) have proposed an accuracy measure for confidence orders which favors probability measures and Dempster-Shafer belief functions as...