Dead Babies: Response to Orna Guralnik’s Paper

The author’s response to Orna Guralnik’s paper focuses on the patient’s dreams as potent carriers of disavowed histories, carrying within themselves the potential of symbolizing for the first time the unspeakable truths that are repressed and see their first shimmer of light in nocturnal dreams. In her discussion, the author links Freud’s concept of hypermnesic dreams to Lacan’s concept of the Real as an initial attempt to give words to the traumatic.     

Shifts in attention biases in response to acute pain induction: examination of a model of "conversion" among repressors

Unlike most people, those who are characterized by a repressive coping style report high levels of physical (sensory) pain but low levels of emotional distress (affective pain), which is a discrepancy that may suggest a "conversion" process. In two studies, we tested an attention allocation model, proposing that repressors direct attention away from threatening negative affective information and toward nonthreatening physical pain information during emotionally arousing (painful) situations. In Study 1, 84 participants underwent a cold pressor and then recovered. Repressors reported greater pain during recovery than low- and high-anxious participants, but they reported lower distress than high-anxious participants. Repressors reported significant and large discrepancies between high pain and low distress, whereas these differences were less pronounced for other groups. In Study 2, 77 participants underwent an ischemic pain task while performing a modified dot-probe task with sensory and negative affective pain words as stimuli. Repressors showed increasing biases away from affective pain words and toward sensory pain words as the pain task continued, whereas low- and high-anxious participants did not show these shifts in attention. The results support the notion that conversion among repressors may involve a process by which attention is directed away from emotional distress during noxious stimulation and is focused instead on sensory information from pain.     

Cognitive and Social Factors Associated with NSSI and Suicide Attempts in Psychiatrically Hospitalized Adolescents

Although non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) and suicide attempts (SA) frequently co-occur among youth, there is increasing evidence that both the risk factors and the phenomenology of the behaviors are distinct. This study examined how individuals who engage in NSSI only, individuals who attempt suicide only, and those who have histories of both NSSI and at least one suicide attempt may differ in terms of cognitions and perceived social support. Participants were 185 adolescents (78.1 % female) between the ages of 13 and 18 recruited from a psychiatric inpatient facility in the northeastern United States. One hundred forty-eight teens were identified with a history of self-injurious behavior and divided into three groups: NSSI only (n?=?45), SA only (n?=?24) or both NSSI and SA (NSSI+SA; n?=?79). Analyses showed that the NSSI+SA group exhibited more cognitive errors, negative self-statements, and negative views of self, world, and future, as well as less perceived familial support than either the NSSI or SA only groups. There were no differences between groups on perceived support from teachers or peers. No significant demographic or diagnostic differences were found between the NSSI and SA groups. Limitations and clinical implications of the current research are discussed.     

Nina Farhi: Leaning on an Annealed Identification: Commentary on Paper by Nina Farhi

In my response to Nina Farhi's paper, I begin my discussion with the concept of a placental space that Farhi develops to represent the psychotic's internal experience of living in a fusion with the Other. Farhi's new concept of an annealed identification provides a useful addition to the psychoanalytic literature to describe the living conditions of a psychotic who is severely entrenched in an unyielding maternal bond. Basing her conceptualizations on Milner's psychotic patient Susan, Farhi also focuses on Milner's discovery that no repressed unconscious existed for her patient Susan. I suggest in my response that Freud's nearly forgotten idea of primal repression and Lacan's idea of maternal jouissance would shed additional light onto the psychotic experience and expand Farhi's notion of an annealed identification with the maternal figure. In addition, I argue for an inclusion of the Third whose presence is so powerfully lacking in the case discussion and in the patient's life.     

Love,Desire, Jouissance: Two out of Three Ain't Bad

The author demonstrates in this paper the different dynamics of love, desire, and jouissance. This impossible affair of loving whom one does not desire and desiring whom one does not love is analyzed through the writings of Jacques Lacan and Stephen Mitchell. The author illustrates Lacan's use of the “objeta” as the fragment in the Other that gives the desiring individual the illusion of completeness whereas the desired Other has no notion for whom or what she or he is desired. Desire is unmasked as this hide-and-seek game of narcissistic illusions where one is wanted for what one does not have and one desires what one cannot have. Both Lacan and Mitchell suggest that love is a far more risky encounter because all narcissistic illusions risk to be jettisoned. Although Mitchell suggests that it is only through the Other that one can discover the otherness in oneself, Lacan states that to love is to give nothing of oneself and to accept the emptinessin the Other. Texts from popular culture are used to illustrate the dynamics of live and desire and the limits of jouissance.     

Countertransference: Our new royal road to the unconscious?

In this paper I am tracing the history of countertransference and how it has informed the current debate about self‐disclosure as a pivotal instrument of analytic work. Now that the analyst's “subjective factor”; has been understood as a central influence on the analysand and as a vital source of information about the analysand's intrapsychic life, I argue that certain currents in the relational school of psychoanalysis confuse the analyst's subjectivity with his personality. While becoming more “real”; with a patient may enliven a stale analytic dialogue, it ought not be confused with, or take the place of, an analysis of unconscious desires and phantasies. I claim that a two‐person psychology can exist only within a tripartite structure in which the analyst does not lose sight of his complex function of being the carrier, observer, and conveyor of the unconscious currents holding both participants in check.