Addressing Disadvantage and the Human Good

This paper sets out a framework in which we can distinguish between four types of redistributive attention to the disadvantaged: compensation; personal enhancement; targeted resource enhancement; and status enhancement. It is argued that in certain cases many of us will have strong intuitions in favour or against one or more strategies for addressing disadvantage, and it is further argued that in such cases it is likely that our reactions are based on assumptions about the human good. Hence the two issues — addressing disadvantage and the human good — shed light on one another [1].     

POLITICAL OBLIGATION,FAIRNESS, AND INDEPENDENCE

In the first section the problem of political obligation is motivated, and in Section 2 the core structure of the problem is laid bare. A recognition of this structure prompts reflection that the problem will appear very different to different thinkers, depending on their moral theories. It also invites the speculation that the problem will be incapable of solution on some moral theories while trivial on others. This polarity does reflect the state of much of the literature until fairly recently. However this picture is seen to be too crude, and in the third section it is shown how an interesting solution has been proposed by advocates of the ‘theory of fairness’. In Section 4 this theory is evaluated, concentrating particularly on George Klosko's version, which is, in part, rejected. However it is argued that no version of the theory is able to guarantee universal political obligations. In Section 5 it is argued that this is an unnoticed advantage of the theory, for it may well be that, morally at least, we should allow those who do not benefit from the existence of the state to escape political obligations. The consequences of this view are examined and found not to be as threatening as they might first have appeared.     

Nondirectiveness and genetic counseling

Nondirectiveness is the generally required and professed standard for genetic counseling. However, studies are lacking in the field of human genetics and in other disciplines which address either the theory or practice of this type of therapeutic procedure in the context of genetic counseling. Moreover, there is no indication the further development this concept has undergone in client-centered therapy has been acknowledged in human genetics. This could be due tot he historical development of genetic counseling, its inherent conflicts and often undefined goals, and the latent need of human geneticists to defend themselves against being accused of eugenic tendencies. Nondirectiveness and directiveness, however, can neither adequately describe what takes place in genetic counseling, nor can they — according to their original meaning — be used to define an ethical standard of genetic counseling. Starting with the writings by Carl Rogers (1942), an experiential approach is described, in which counseling is seen as a process of influence, which is wished by all the persons involved, during which activities are oriented toward the experience of the client, and which allows the counselor to communicate openly and directly with the client. The present study illustrates the use of the experiential approach in genetic counseling and shows that it can uphold the principle of ethics, which nondirectiveness demands and, at the same time, prevent the inevitable and unresolvable contradictions. This means that in their training genetic counselors must learn to recognize and constantly reflect on the influence they can and want to exert. In order to be able to use this influence in a responsible manner, genetic counselors must also learn to have a certain degree of flexibility so that they are able to check at any time how their client responds to this influence.