Assessing semantic coherence and logical fallacies in joint probability estimates

A constellation of joint probability estimates is semantically coherent when the quantitative relationship among estimates of P(A), P(B), P(A and B), and P(A or B) is consistent with the relationship among the sets described in the problem statement. The possible probability estimates can form an extremely large number of permutations. However, this entire problem space can be reduced to six theoretically meaningful patterns: logically fallacious (conjunction or disjunction fallacies), identical sets (e.g., water and H₂O), mutually exclusive sets (e.g., horses and zebras), subsets (e.g., robins and birds), overlapping sets (e.g., accountants and musicians), and inconsistent overlapping sets. Determining which of these patterns describes any set of probability estimates has been automated using Excel spreadsheet formulae. Researchers may use the semantic coherence technique to examine the consequences of differently worded problems, individual differences, or experimental manipulations. The spreadsheet described above can be downloaded as a supplement from http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

Rational emotive behavior therapy successes and failures: Eight personal perspectives

Eight experts in Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) provided personal examples of their own successes and failures in applying REBT to themselves. The experts actively talked to themselves both rationally and irrationally. Understandably, there were far more shoulds, oughts, musts, and have to’s in the narratives in which the experts described when they failed to use REBT than when they succeeded in using REBT. Rational self-talk was more prevalent in the examples of how REBT was successfully used by the experts. Reprinted from Journal of Counseling & Development, Summer 2001, Volume 79. ACA. Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction authorized without written permission from the American Counseling Association.     

Why don't we see changes?: The role of attentional bottlenecks and limited visual memory

Seven experiments explore the role of bottlenecks in selective attention and access to visual short-term memory in the failure of observers to identify clearly visible changes in otherwise stable visual displays. Experiment One shows that observers fail to register a color change in an object even if they are cued to the location of the object by a transient at that location as the change is occurring. Experiment Two shows the same for orientation change. In Experiments Three and Four, attention is directed to specific objects prior to making changes in those objects. Observers have only a very limited memory for the status of recently attended items. Experiment Five reveals that observers have no ability to detect changes that happen after attention has been directed to an object and before attention returns to that object. In Experiment Six, attention is cued at rates that more closely resemble natural rates and Experiment Seven uses natural images. Memory capacity remains very small (<4 items).     

Lost in the supermarket: Quantifying the cost of partitioning memory sets in hybrid search

The items on a memorized grocery list are not relevant in every aisle; for example, it is useless to search for the cabbage in the cereal aisle. It might be beneficial if one could mentally partition the list so only the relevant subset was active, so that vegetables would be activated in the produce section. In four experiments, we explored observers’ abilities to partition memory searches. For example, if observers held 16 items in memory, but only eight of the items were relevant, would response times resemble a search through eight or 16 items? In Experiments 1a and 1b, observers were not faster for the partition set; however, they suffered relatively small deficits when “lures” (items from the irrelevant subset) were presented, indicating that they were aware of the partition. In Experiment 2 the partitions were based on semantic distinctions, and again, observers were unable to restrict search to the relevant items. In Experiments 3a and 3b, observers attempted to remove items from the list one trial at a time but did not speed up over the course of a block, indicating that they also could not limit their memory searches. Finally, Experiments 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d showed that observers were able to limit their memory searches when a subset was relevant for a run of trials. Overall, observers appear to be unable or unwilling to partition memory sets from trial to trial, yet they are capable of restricting search to a memory subset that remains relevant for several trials. This pattern is consistent with a cost to switching between currently relevant memory items.     

Sexual Jealousy in Heterosexuals,Lesbians, and Gays

The present study tests various hypotheses about effects of gender and sexual orientation on jealousy. One hypothesis is derived from an evolutionary perspective and implies that the stimuli that elicit jealousy are sex-linked and independent of sexual orientation. Several others are based on a sociocultural perspective and imply that the experience of jealousy is linked to social experiences and beliefs that differ for men and women and for homosexuals and heterosexuals. To test these hypotheses, we examined the relative distress reported by heterosexual and homosexual participants while thinking about a partners' sexual vs. emotional infidelity. Participants were predominately Caucasian and included students at a Midwestern state university and attendees at a regional gay and lesbian conference. The results reveal that all groups except heterosexual men experience greater distress when confronted with a partners' emotional infidelity. This pattern contradicts the evolutionary hypothesis that the experience of romantic jealousy is sex-linked. However, our multifaceted attempt to identify social experiences or beliefs that account for the greater sexual jealousy of heterosexual men relative to everyone else was only partly successful.     

Signal detection evidence for limited capacity in visual search

The nature of capacity limits (if any) in visual search has been a topic of controversy for decades. In 30 years of work, researchers have attempted to distinguish between two broad classes of visual search models. Attention-limited models have proposed two stages of perceptual processing: an unlimited-capacity preattentive stage, and a limited-capacity selective attention stage. Conversely, noise-limited models have proposed a single, unlimited-capacity perceptual processing stage, with decision processes influenced only by stochastic noise. Here, we use signal detection methods to test a strong prediction of attention-limited models. In standard attention-limited models, performance of some searches (feature searches) should only be limited by a preattentive stage. Other search tasks (e.g., spatial configuration search for a "2" among "5"s) should be additionally limited by an attentional bottleneck. We equated average accuracies for a feature and a spatial configuration search over set sizes of 1-8 for briefly presented stimuli. The strong prediction of attention-limited models is that, given overall equivalence in performance, accuracy should be better on the spatial configuration search than on the feature search for set size 1, and worse for set size 8. We confirm this crossover interaction and show that it is problematic for at least one class of one-stage decision models.     

How does our search engine “see” the world? The case of amodal completion

This article illustrates a dissociation between the perceived attributes of an object and the ability of those attributes to guide the deployment of attention in visual search. Orientation is an attribute that guides search. Thus, a vertical line will “pop out” amid horizontal distractors. Amodal completion can create perceptually convincing oriented stimuli when two elements appear to form a complete object partially hidden behind an occluder. Previous work (e.g., Rensink &; Enns, Vision Research, 38, 2489–2505, 1998) has shown a preattentive role for amodal completion in search tasks. Here, we show that orientation based on perceptually compelling amodal completion may fail to guide attention. The broader conclusion is that introspection is a poor guide to the capabilities of our internal search engine.     

When categories collide: accumulation of information about multiple categories in rapid scene perception

Experiments have shown that people can rapidly determine if categories such as "animal" or "beach" are present in scenes that are presented for only a few milliseconds. Typically, observers in these experiments report on one prespecified category. For the first time, we show that observers can rapidly extract information about multiple categories. Moreover, we demonstrate task-dependent interactions between accumulating information about different categories in a scene. This interaction can be constructive or destructive, depending on whether the presence of one category can be taken as evidence for or against the presence of the other.