Psychologism and Metalogic

This paper examines two arguments againstpsychologism advanced by Frege andHusserl. The first argument says that thelaws of logic cannot be justified by thelaws of psychology, because the formerand a priori and certain, but the latterare probable only. The second argumentpoints out that the status of logicallaws as universal principles of thinking isnot intelligible on the psychologisticinterpretation of logic. The author tries toshow how to examine both arguments bymetalogical devices.     

On comparison of theories by their contents

Popper's definition of verisimilitude was criticized for its paradoxical consequences in the case of false theories. The aim of this paper is to show that paradoxes disappear if the falsity content of a theory is defined with help of dCn or Cn ^–1.To the memory of Jerzy SupeckiI am grateful to David Pearce, Gerhard Schurz, Peter Simons, Maciej Spasowski and Jan Zygmunt for their helpful discussions on issues analysed in this paper. Particularly, Zygmunt's and Spasowski's comments enabled me to correct several mistakes of the earlier drafts.