Comparing color-word and picture-word Stroop-like effects: A test of the Glaser and Glaser (1989) model

Summary Glaser and Glaser (1989) assume that the processing of colors and pictures is highly similar in that, compared to words, both kinds of stimulis have privileged access to semantic information. This assumption was tested in the present research. In Experiment 1, the season corresponding to the color or to the word of color-word Stroop stimuli had to be named (e.g., green for spring). In Experiment 2, subjects had to name the season corresponding to the picture or the word of a picture-word stimulus (e. g., flower for spring). According to Glaser and Glaser (1989), privileged semantic processing of colors and pictures should be evidenced by a larger interfering power of color and picture distractors than of word distractors. However, the asymmetric pattern of interference was observed only with picture-word stimuli (Experiment 2), but not with color-word stimuli (Experiment 1), suggesting that, unlike pictures, colors do not have privileged access to semantic information. It was also found that word distractors interfered with the semantic processing of pictures, a result that is incompatible with the dominance rule postulated by Glaser and Glaser (1989). From these results, an adapted version of the Glaser and Glaser model is proposed: colors are assumed to have privileged access to a separate color processing system and the pattern of interference depends upon the relative activation strength of the response alternatives activated by the target and the distractor.     

Discrimination of 3-D shape and 3-D curvature from motion in active vision

We examined the ability of human observers to discriminate between different 3-D quadratic surfaces defined by motion, and with head position fed back to the stimulus to provide an up-to-date dynamical perspective view. We tested whether 3-D shape or 3-D curvature would affect discrimination performance. It appeared that discrimination of 3-D quadratic shape clearly depended on shape but not on the amount of curvature. Even when the amount of curvature was randomized, subjects’ performance was not altered. On the other hand, the discrimination of 3-D curvature clearly depended linearly on curvature with Weber fractions of 20% on the average and, to a small degree, on 3-D shape. The experiment shows that observers can easily separate 3-D shape and 3-D curvature, and that Koenderink’s shape index and curvedness provide a convenient way to specify shape. These results warn us against using just any arbitrary 3-D shape in 3-D shape perception tasks and indicate, for example, that emphasizing 3-D shape in computer displays by exaggerating curvature does not have any effect.     

Social value related response latencies: Unobtrusive evidence for individual differences in information processing

While much research concerning decision-making in interdependency situations concentrates on the influence of social values or different preferences for certain distributions of outcomes for self and other (McClintock, 1978), little attention has been paid to the cognitive processes underlying the expression of these different social values. The present research focuses on the cognitive processes by examining the influence of the dominant social values on decision-makers' response latencies (RLs) in interdependency situations. Using the Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand 1984), three experiments were conducted to assess these RLs. Experiment 1 examines the reliability of the social value construct and the RL effect. Experiments 2 and 3 investigate the generality of the RL effect across presentation of combinations of own and other's outcomes (all positive versus all negative). As predicted, RLs were shorter for individualists than for cooperators and competitors. Further, regardless of values, shorter RLs occurred across experiments when own outcomes are positive rather than negative. More important, the predicted interaction between social value and outcome distribution was observed, reflecting increasing RLs for cooperators as their joint outcomes decreased, longer RLs for individualists when own outcomes were negative rather than positive, and longer RLs for competitors when they were outcome disadvantaged rather than advantaged relative to other. These findings are consistent with the expectation that (I) the transformations associated with different social values require different cognitive processes, and (2) subsequent to the value transformations of outcomes, RLs increase when the utility of the transformed outcome distributions decreases.     

Social value orientation and intelligence: A test of the goal prescribes rationality principle

The present study examines the influence of pre-existing individual differences in social value orentations, or preferences for certain patterns of outcomes to oneself and others (McClintock, 1978), on perceptions of rationality in a social dilemma. In Experiment 1 conducted in Groningen (the Netherlands), it was found that people with pro-social orientations expected more cooperation from another described as intelligent than from another described as unintelligent, whereas individualists and competitors expected relatively more cooperation from another described as unintelligent. The cross-cultural generalizability of this finding was examined and supported in Experiment 2 which was conducted in Santa Barbara (U.S.A.). Results from both studies are consistent with the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle (Van Lange, Liebrand and Kuhlman, 1990) which assumes that people with pro-social (cooperative) orientations would perceive rationality in social dilemmas primarily from the collective perspective, whereas individualists and competitors would take a strong egocentric perspective on rationality. In addition, we found a strong relationship between expectations of other's cooperation and own cooperative behaviour when the other was described as intelligent. The strength of this relationship was reduced, particularly for individualists and competitors, when the other person was described as unintelligent.     

The effect of social motives,communication and group size on behaviour in an N-person multi-stage mixed-motive game

Two experiments investigated the impact of social motives or individuals' preferences for specific self—other outcome distributions, on behaviour in an n-person game. Subjects' social motives (altruistic, cooperative, individualistic, competitive) were assessed prior to the decision-making in either 7-person games (Experiment 1) or 20-person games (Experiment 2). A modification of the n-person game format normally employed is introduced in this research to permit the choices made by players on a given trial to modify the payoff matrix available to self and others on subsequent trials. The game format, a simulated social dilemma, was presented in terms of a conservation of resources problem. In Experiment 1 communication opportunities were manipulated. As predicted, there were consistent differences between the four classes of social motivation in the amount of the resources taken for self competitive subjects took the most, individualistic subjects took less than the competitive ones but more than the average, while cooperative and altruistic subjects took the smallest amount of the resources for themselves. Moreover, competitive subjects expected the others to take fewer resources than they intended to themselves, and altruistic subjects expected the others to take more resources than they intended to themselves. These findings are only partly consistent with existing theories concerning the relationship between behaviour and expected behaviour of others. In addition, when communication was allowed, significantly fewer resources were taken for self Contrary to the predictions based on previous research findings, subjects in the 20-person groups did not take more resources for self than subjects in the 7-person groups.     

Testing the dopamine overdose hypothesis in action control: A study in people with Parkinson's disease

Prior work on patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) has shown that the administration of dopaminergic medication in the early to intermediate stages of PD benefits (motor) functions associated with the dopamine-depleted dorsal striatal circuitry but may ‘overdose’ and interfere with (cognitive) functions associated with the relatively intact ventral striatal circuitry. The present study aimed to elucidate this so-called dopamine overdose hypothesis for the action control domain. Using a within-subject design in a sample of 13 people with PD, we evaluated the effect of dopaminergic medication on two cognitive processes underlying goal-directed behaviour, namely action selection and initiation through event binding and conflict adaptation. We also investigated whether individual differences in the magnitude of medication effects were associated across these processes. Results showed no indications that dopaminergic medication affects action selection and initiation or conflict adaptation in PD patients. Additionally, we observed no correlations between both cognitive processes nor between individual differences in medication effects. Our findings do not support the notion that dopaminergic medication modulates action control processes, suggesting that the dopamine overdose hypothesis may only apply to a specific set of cognitive processes and should potentially be refined.     

Testing Measurement Invariance of the Dark Triad Dirty Dozen in a Belgian Adult Sample

The Dirty Dozen (Jonason & Webster, 2010) is a frequently used concise version of the Dark Triad to measure three socially aversive personality traits: Machiavellianism, psychopathy and, narcissism. The present study has examined measurement invariance in a sample of Belgian adults. The present study aims to assess measurement invariance of the Dutch version of the Dirty Dozen measure across gender in a large city-based representative adult sample in Belgium (N = 1587). Multi-group first-order confirmatory factor analysis for categorical indicators was utilized. In addition, unique associations between Dirty Dozen traits, trait self-control and, acceptance of illegitimate norms were examined in a series of structural equation models. Results indicated that the internal consistency of the Dirty Dozen subscales was good for Machiavellianism (α = 0.80) and narcissism (α = 0.80), but modest for psychopathy (α = 0.64). The hypothesized three correlated factors model with separate factors for Machiavellianism, psychopathy and, narcissism provided a poor fit for men and women. Invariance testing across gender showed evidence for weak invariance only, indicating that the underlying latent factors are measured the same way with the same metric in the two populations. However, we were not able to establish strong measurement invariance. Observed group differences should be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, Machiavellianism and psychopathy were strongly associated with trait self-control in both men and women. Strong correlations were found between acceptance of illegitimate norms and Dirty Dozen traits, Machiavellianism and, psychopathy, but not with narcissism.     

The role of teachers’ motivation and mindsets in predicting a (de)motivating teaching style in higher education: a circumplex approach

Motivation and Emotion - Although different measures for (de)motivating teaching are available for primary and secondary education, a fine-grained instrument to assess a variety of motivating and...     

Proactive interference in aging: A model-based study

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Proactive interference occurs when previously learned information interrupts the storage or retrieval of new information. Congruent with previous reports,...