A randomised Monty Hall experiment: The positive effect of conditional frequency feedback

The Monty Hall dilemma (MHD) is a notorious probability problem with a counterintuitive solution. There is a strong tendency to stay with the initial choice, despite the fact that switching doubles the probability of winning. The current randomised experiment investigates whether feedback in a series of trials improves behavioural performance on the MHD and increases the level of understanding of the problem. Feedback was either conditional or non-conditional, and was given either in frequency format or in percentage format. Results show that people learn to switch most when receiving conditional feedback in frequency format. However, problem understanding does not improve as a consequence of receiving feedback. Our study confirms the dissociation between behavioural performance on the MHD, on one hand, and actual understanding of the MHD, on the other. We discuss how this dissociation can be understood.     

Working memory and counterexample retrieval for causal conditionals

The present study is part of recent attempts to specify the characteristics of the counterexample retrieval process during causal conditional reasoning. The study tried to pinpoint whether the retrieval of stored counterexamples (alternative causes and disabling conditions) for a causal conditional is completely automatic in nature or whether the search process also demands executive working memory (WM) resources. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a counterexample generation task and a measure of WM capacity. We found a positive relation between search efficiency, as measured by the number of generated counterexamples in limited time, and WM capacity. Experiment 2 examined the effects of a secondary WM load on the retrieval performance. As predicted, burdening WM with an attention-demanding secondary task decreased the retrieval efficiency. Both low and high spans were affected by the WM load but load effects were less pronounced for the most strongly associated counterexamples. Findings established that in addition to an automatic search component, the counterexample retrieval draws on WM resources.     

The grim reasoner: Analytical reasoning under mortality salience

The human species enjoys uniquely developed capacities for analytical reasoning and rational decision making, but these capacities come with a price: They make us aware of our inevitable physical death. Drawing on terror management theory and dual-process theories of cognition, we investigate the impact of mortality awareness on analytical reasoning. Two experiments show that experimentally induced thoughts of death impair analytical reasoning performance, just as cognitive load would. When made aware of their own mortality, reasoners allocate their executive resources to the suppression of this disturbing thought, therefore impairing their performance on syllogisms that require analytic thought. This finding has consequences for all aspects of rational thinking that draw on executive resources, and calls for an integrated approach to existential psychology and the psychology of rational thought.     

The Meaning of Lives and the Meaning of Things

Meaning in life is an important aspect of human well-being and motivation. But as the notion of ‘meaning in life’ is not easily assimilated to that of semantic meaning, it is difficult to define. While meaning in life is standardly discussed in terms of meaningful ways of living, I here take the alternative approach of discussing the meaningfulness of things for agents. I claim that such meaningfulness, or significance, consists in the ways in which things invite agent-relevant responses. Meaningfulness in that sense is important for understanding, not just meaning in life for mature human beings, but also meaning for children, meaning in the arts, the continuity between ‘mere’ living and living meaningfully, and the connection between meaning in life and semantic meaning.     

Automatic–heuristic and executive–analytic processing during reasoning: Chronometric and dual-task considerations

Human reasoning has been shown to overly rely on intuitive, heuristic processing instead of a more demanding analytic inference process. Four experiments tested the central claim of current dual-process theories that analytic operations involve time-consuming executive processing whereas the heuristic system would operate automatically. Participants solved conjunction fallacy problems and indicative and deontic selection tasks. Experiment 1 established that making correct analytic inferences demanded more processing time than did making heuristic inferences. Experiment 2 showed that burdening the executive resources with an attention-demanding secondary task decreased correct, analytic responding and boosted the rate of conjunction fallacies and indicative matching card selections. Results were replicated in Experiments 3 and 4 with a different secondary-task procedure. Involvement of executive resources for the deontic selection task was less clear. Findings validate basic processing assumptions of the dual-process framework and complete the correlational research programme of K. E. Stanovich and R. F. West (2000).     

Age and Education Differences in Marriages and their Effects on Life Satisfaction

Within marriages husbands typically tend to be older and higher educated than their wife. This paper tries to explain this by analyzing whether age and education differences between spouses have an effect on happiness. Two alternative hypotheses are tested on the relation between age and education gaps between partners and life satisfaction. It is found that a positive age gap between husband and wife increases both male and female life satisfaction, while female life satisfaction increases if the education gap is smaller.     

Conditions for factor (in)determinacy in factor analysis

The subject of factor indeterminacy has a vast history in factor analysis (Guttman, 1955; Lederman, 1938; Wilson, 1928). It has lead to strong differences in opinion (Steiger, 1979). The current paper gives necessary and sufficient conditions for observability of factors in terms of the parameter matrices and a finite number of variables. Five conditions are given which rigorously define indeterminacy. It is shown that (un)observable factors are (in)determinate. Specifically, the indeterminacy proof by Guttman is extended to Heywood cases. The results are illustrated by two examples and implications for indeterminacy are discussed.     

Motor,affective and cognitive empathy in adolescence: Interrelations between facial electromyography and self-reported trait and state measures

This study examined interrelations of trait and state empathy in an adolescent sample. Self-reported affective trait empathy and cognitive trait empathy were assessed during a home visit. During a test session at the university, motor empathy (facial electromyography), and self-reported affective and cognitive state empathy were assessed in response to empathy-inducing film clips portraying happiness and sadness. Adolescents who responded with stronger motor empathy consistently reported higher affective state empathy. Adolescents' motor empathy was also positively related to cognitive state empathy, either directly or indirectly via affective state empathy. Whereas trait empathy was consistently, but modestly, related to state empathy with sadness, for state empathy with happiness few trait–state associations were found. Together, the findings provide support for the notion that empathy is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Motor, affective and cognitive empathy seem to be related processes, each playing a different role in the ability to understand and share others' feelings.