Dual processing in reasoning: two systems but one reasoner

Human reasoning has been characterized as an interplay between an automatic belief-based system and a demanding logic-based reasoning system. The present study tested a fundamental claim about the nature of individual differences in reasoning and the processing demands of both systems. Participants varying in working memory capacity performed a reasoning task while their executive resources were burdened with a secondary task. Results were consistent with the dual-process claim: The executive burden hampered correct reasoning when the believability of a conclusion conflicted with its logical validity, but not when beliefs cued the correct response. However, although participants with high working memory spans performed better than those with lower spans in cases of a conflict, all reasoners showed similar effects of load. The findings support the idea that there are two reasoning systems with differential processing demands, but constitute evidence against qualitative individual differences in the human reasoning machinery.     

Numbers and space: a computational model of the SNARC effect

The SNARC (spatial numerical associations of response codes) effect reflects the tendency to respond faster with the left hand to relatively small numbers and with the right hand to relatively large numbers (S. Dehaene, S. Bossini, & P. Giraux, 1993). Using computational modeling, the present article aims to provide a framework for conceptualizing the SNARC effect. In line with models of spatial stimulus-response congruency, the authors modeled the SNARC effect as the result of parallel activation of preexisting links between magnitude and spatial representation and short-term links created on the basis of task instructions. This basic dual-route model simulated all characteristics associated with the SNARC effect. In addition, 2 experiments tested and confirmed new predictions derived from the model.     

Shared spatial representations for numbers and space: the reversal of the SNARC and the Simon effects

In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the reversal of spatial congruency effects when participants concurrently practiced incompatible mapping rules (J. G. Marble & R. W. Proctor, 2000). The authors observed an effect of an explicit spatially incompatible mapping rule on the way numerical information was associated with spatial responses. The authors also observed an effect of an incompatible numerical mapping rule (if smaller than 5, press right; if larger than 5, press left) on the Simon effect. This effect was observed only when both tasks used the same effectors. The results point to a shared spatial representation for explicit spatial information (locations) and implicit spatial information (numbers).     

Longitudinal Associations Between Personality Profile Stability and Adjustment in College Students: Distinguishing Among Overall Stability,Distinctive Stability,and Within‐Time Normativeness

ABSTRACT In the present study, longitudinal associations of 3 aspects of personality profile stability (i.e., overall stability, distinctive stability, and within‐time normativeness) with 3 adjustment measures (i.e., depressive symptoms, self‐esteem, and delinquency) were examined, using 4 waves of longitudinal data on a Belgian college sample (N=565). Longitudinal path models revealed strong longitudinal associations between adjustment and overall stability. Subsequent analyses showed that it is not the degree to which one's personality profile consistently diverges from the average personality profile within a population (i.e., distinctive stability) that is related to adjustment but the degree to which a personality profile of an individual matches the average personality profile within the sample at a certain point in time (i.e., within‐time normativeness). The current study thereby underscores the importance of distinguishing normativeness and distinctiveness when examining personality profile stability.     

Validation of a Theory-Driven Profile Interpretation of the Dutch Short Form of the MMPI Using the TAT Social Cognitions and Object Relations Scale (SCORS)

Sixty psychiatric inpatients were assigned to one of three groups on the basis of F and K MMPI validity scales. Staff ratings of patient behavior and recorded incidents of "acting-out" behavior were obtained for patients with: (a) "plea for help" validity profiles, (b) hyper-defensive profiles, and (c) average profiles. Patients with "plea for help"profiles were perceived as "acting out" more frequently and engendering more feelings of frustration than patients in the other groups. These patients account for 77% of the incidents of inappropriate, destructive behavior and 83% of the seclusions in the patients sampled. Although the "plea for help"profile is considered invalid in some scoring systems, results suggest that this validity profile may be useful in treatment planning.     

Are Actual and Perceived Intellectual Self‐enhancers Evaluated Differently by Social Perceivers?

Do actual and perceived self‐enhancement entail differing social impressions (i.e. interpersonal evaluations)? Actual self‐enhancement represents unduly positive self‐views, as gauged by an objective criterion (in this case, IQ scores), whereas perceived self‐enhancement involves the extent to which an individual is seen by informants (i.e. peers or observers) as self‐enhancing. In an online survey (N = 337), a laboratory experiment (N = 75), and a round‐robin study (N = 183), we tested the effects of actual and perceived intellectual self‐enhancement on (informant‐rated) emotional stability, social attractiveness, and social influence. Actual self‐enhancers were rated as emotionally stable, socially attractive, and socially influential. High perceived self‐enhancers were judged as socially influential, whereas low‐to‐moderate perceived self‐enhancers were deemed emotionally stable and socially attractive. Privately entertained, illusory positive (even extreme) self‐beliefs confer social benefits, whereas being perceived as self‐enhancing buys social influence at the cost of being despised. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Three-level meta-analysis of dependent effect sizes

Although dependence in effect sizes is ubiquitous, commonly used meta-analytic methods assume independent effect sizes. We describe and illustrate three-level extensions of a mixed effects meta-analytic model that accounts for various sources of dependence within and across studies, because multilevel extensions of meta-analytic models still are not well known. We also present a three-level model for the common case where, within studies, multiple effect sizes are calculated using the same sample. Whereas this approach is relatively simple and does not require imputing values for the unknown sampling covariances, it has hardly been used, and its performance has not been empirically investigated. Therefore, we set up a simulation study, showing that also in this situation, a three-level approach yields valid results: Estimates of the treatment effects and the corresponding standard errors are unbiased.     

A randomised Monty Hall experiment: The positive effect of conditional frequency feedback

The Monty Hall dilemma (MHD) is a notorious probability problem with a counterintuitive solution. There is a strong tendency to stay with the initial choice, despite the fact that switching doubles the probability of winning. The current randomised experiment investigates whether feedback in a series of trials improves behavioural performance on the MHD and increases the level of understanding of the problem. Feedback was either conditional or non-conditional, and was given either in frequency format or in percentage format. Results show that people learn to switch most when receiving conditional feedback in frequency format. However, problem understanding does not improve as a consequence of receiving feedback. Our study confirms the dissociation between behavioural performance on the MHD, on one hand, and actual understanding of the MHD, on the other. We discuss how this dissociation can be understood.     

Working memory and counterexample retrieval for causal conditionals

The present study is part of recent attempts to specify the characteristics of the counterexample retrieval process during causal conditional reasoning. The study tried to pinpoint whether the retrieval of stored counterexamples (alternative causes and disabling conditions) for a causal conditional is completely automatic in nature or whether the search process also demands executive working memory (WM) resources. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a counterexample generation task and a measure of WM capacity. We found a positive relation between search efficiency, as measured by the number of generated counterexamples in limited time, and WM capacity. Experiment 2 examined the effects of a secondary WM load on the retrieval performance. As predicted, burdening WM with an attention-demanding secondary task decreased the retrieval efficiency. Both low and high spans were affected by the WM load but load effects were less pronounced for the most strongly associated counterexamples. Findings established that in addition to an automatic search component, the counterexample retrieval draws on WM resources.     

The grim reasoner: Analytical reasoning under mortality salience

The human species enjoys uniquely developed capacities for analytical reasoning and rational decision making, but these capacities come with a price: They make us aware of our inevitable physical death. Drawing on terror management theory and dual-process theories of cognition, we investigate the impact of mortality awareness on analytical reasoning. Two experiments show that experimentally induced thoughts of death impair analytical reasoning performance, just as cognitive load would. When made aware of their own mortality, reasoners allocate their executive resources to the suppression of this disturbing thought, therefore impairing their performance on syllogisms that require analytic thought. This finding has consequences for all aspects of rational thinking that draw on executive resources, and calls for an integrated approach to existential psychology and the psychology of rational thought.