A longitudinal study of "intrusion-based reasoning" and posttraumatic stress disorder after exposure to a train disaster

Previously, we found that chronic PTSD relates to “intrusion-based reasoning” (IR), i.e. the tendency to interpret distressing intrusions themselves as evidence that danger is impending, regardless of objective danger information (Engelhard et al., Behav. Res. Ther. 39 (2001) 1139). This study was intended to elucidate the causal status of this relation. Twenty-nine residents of a Belgian town witnessed a train crash and were assessed for IR and PTSD symptoms within 1 month and were re-assessed for PTSD at 3.5 months. Fourteen control residents did not witness the crash and were also tested for IR. The IR paradigm involved rating the danger of brief scenarios in which objective danger and presence of intrusions about the crash were systematically varied. The directly exposed residents showed greater danger ratings to scenarios in which intrusions were included than did the controls. IR was strongly related to both acute and chronic PTSD symptoms. It did not significantly predict chronic PTSD symptoms after controlling for acute symptoms, although the partial correlation (r=0.26, p=0.09) was in the expected direction. The data suggest that IR is involved in the onset and maintenance of PTSD symptoms, but more clarity about causality awaits future larger and experimental studies.     

Sense of body and sense of action both contribute to self-recognition

Recognizing oneself, easy as it appears to be, seems at least to require awareness of one's body and one's actions. To investigate the contribution of these factors to self-recognition, we presented normal subjects with an image of both their own and the experimenter's hand. The hands could make the same, a different or no movement and could be displayed in various orientations. Subjects had to tell whether the indicated hand was theirs or not. The results showed that a congruence between visual signals and signals indicating the position of the body is one component on which self-recognition is based. Recognition of one's actions is another component. Subjects had most difficulty in recognizing their hand when movements were absent. When the two hands made different movements, subjects relied exclusively on the movement cue and recognition was almost perfect. Our findings are in line with pathological alterations in the sense of body and the sense of action.     

Learning subjective health complaints

Symptom episodes often show a spatio-temporal structure, that is, they occur in a specific context for a certain duration. Repeated experiences may therefore be construed as associative learning trials, in which context elements are turned into predictive cues, triggering anticipatory processes conducive to subjective health complaints. A series of experiments, using inhalations of air enriched with CO2 and external (odors) or internal (mental images) stimuli as cues, is discussed to show that subjective health complaints may occur upon presenting the cue alone. Learned symptoms may be unrelated to bodily responses and easily generalize to new related cues. Better learning occurs to cues with a negative affective valence and in participants scoring high for negative affectivity. Our findings are relevant to the understanding of medically unexplained ("functional") syndromes and the poor relationship between objective and subjective health indicators in general.     

Personally familiar proper names are relatively successfully processed in the human right hemisphere; or, the missing link

Responding to our abstract in Brain and Language (Ohnesorge & Van Lancker, 1999), which proposed that famous proper nouns are successfully processed in both cerebral hemispheres, Schweinberger, Landgrebe, Mohr, and Kaufmann (2001) claimed that the "link" between personal names and the right hemisphere is "illusory." Ohnesorge and Van Lancker (2001) further described six experimental studies in which LVF/RH recognition of famous proper nouns was influenced by task conditions and stimulus familiarity. Here presenting two more experiments performed to explore the refutation presented by Schweinberger et al., this article confirms an ability of the right hemisphere to recognize famous proper nouns and explains why appropriate stimulus development and task conditions are essential in furthering our understanding of the role of the right hemisphere in processing personal relevance.     

Effect of speech task on intelligibility in dysarthria: a case study of Parkinson's disease

This study assessed intelligibility in a dysarthric patient with Parkinson's disease (PD) across five speech production tasks: spontaneous speech, repetition, reading, repeated singing, and spontaneous singing, using the same phrases for all but spontaneous singing. The results show that this speaker was significantly less intelligible when speaking spontaneously than in the other tasks. Acoustic analysis suggested that relative intensity and word duration were not independently linked to intelligibility, but dysfluencies (from perceptual analysis) and articulatory/resonance patterns (from acoustic records) were related to intelligibility in predictable ways. These data indicate that speech production task may be an important variable to consider during the evaluation of dysarthria. As speech production efficiency was found to vary with task in a patient with Parkinson's disease, these results can be related to recent models of basal ganglia function in motor performance.     

Variability in aphasic patients' response times

Response time studies of acquired language disorders are plagued by tremendous variability in patients' response times. In this brief report we demonstrate how variability itself may provide informative data. Lexical decision response times, generated by nine patients, illustrate how within-patient variability may estimate stability in cognitive dynamics.     

The influence of word frequency on recency effects in directed free recall

Leading theoretical explanations of recency effects are designed to explain the reported absence of a word frequency effect on recall of words from recency serial positions. The present study used a directed free-recall procedure (J. J. Dalezman, 1976) and manipulated the frequency composition of the word lists (pure and mixed). Overall, with pure lists, a greater proportion of high-frequency (HF) words were recalled than low-frequency (LF) words, and with mixed lists, a greater proportion of LF words were recalled than HF words. Of importance, this recall advantage for one frequency over the other as a function of list composition was evident across the last three serial positions, indicating an influence of word frequency on recency effects that is dependent on the frequency composition of the lists. These results challenge one of the major assumptions on which several theories of recency effects have been based.     

Action-based and vision-based selection of input: Two sources of control

In the first part of this paper we review evidence suggesting that there exists a mechanism that selects input on the basis of its similarity to the required action. This response-based input selection differs from the more established space- and object-based input selection in that it is not constrained by the structure of the input. Our evidence suggests that the two-choice Stroop effect is caused by this response-based selection mechanism. By contrast, it is known that the flanker effect is determined by the space- and object- based selection mechanisms. We explore whether the conflict resolution of the Stroop and flanker tasks is different as well by embedding these two tasks in a PRP (Psychological Refractory Period) paradigm. We show that the Stroop and the PRP effects are additive whereas the flanker and the PRP effects are underadditive, suggesting that the processes in charge of the conflict resolution in the Stroop and the flanker tasks are indeed different. We discuss possible reasons for this difference, and discuss possible ways in which the response-based mechanism can be implemented in information processing models.     

Physical,neural, and mental timing

The conclusions drawn by Benjamin Libet from his work with colleagues on the timing of somatosensorial conscious experiences has met with a lot of praise and criticism. In this issue we find three examples of the latter. Here I attempt to place the divide between the two opponent camps in a broader perspective by analyzing the question of the relation between physical timing, neural timing, and experiential (mental) timing. The nervous system does a sophisticated job of recombining and recoding messages from the sensorial surfaces and if these processes are slighted in a theory, it might become necessary to postulate weird operations, including subjective back-referral. Neuroscientifically inspired theories are of necessity still based on guesses, extrapolations, and philosophically dubious manners of speech. They often assume some neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) as a part of the nervous system that transforms neural activity in reportable experiences. The majority of neuroscientists appear to assume that the NCC can compare and bind activity patterns only if they arrive simultaneously at the NCC. This leads to a search for synchrony or to theories in terms of the compensation of differences in neural delays (latencies). This is the main dimension of the Libet discussion. Examples from vision research, such as "temporal-binding-by-synchrony" and the "flash-lag" effect, are then used to illustrate these reasoning patterns in more detail. Alternatively one could assume symbolic representations of time and space (symbolic "tags") that are not coded in their own dimension (not time in time and space in space). Unless such tags are multiplexed with the quality message (tickle, color, or motion), one gets a binding problem for tags. One of the hidden aspects of the discussion between Libet and opponents appears to be the following. Is the NCC smarter than the rest of the nervous system, so that it can solve the problems of local sign (e.g., "where is the event"?) and timing (e.g., "when did it occur?" and "how long did it last?") on its own, or are these pieces of information coded symbolically early on in the system? A supersmart NCC appears to be the assumption of Libet's camp (which includes Descartes, but also mystics). The wish to distribute the smartness evenly across all stages of processing in the nervous system (smart recodings) appears to motivate the opponents. I argue that there are reasons to side with the latter group.