Reason and the Past: The Role of Rationality in Diachronic Self-Knowledge

Knowing one’s past thoughts and attitudes is a vital sort of self-knowledge. In the absence of memorial impressions to serve as evidence, we face a pressing question of how such self-knowledge is possible. Recently, philosophers of mind have argued that self-knowledge of past attitudes supervenes on rationality. I examine two kinds of argument for this supervenience claim, one from cognitive dynamics, and one from practical rationality, and reject both. I present an alternative account, on which knowledge of past attitudes is inferential knowledge, and depends upon contingent facts of one’s rationality and consistency. Failures of self-knowledge are better explained by the inferential account.     

Omitting Data—Ethical or Strategic Problem?

Omitting experimental data is often considered a violation of scientific integrity. If we consider experimental inquiry as a questioning process, omitting data is seen to be merely an example of tentatively rejecting (‘bracketing’) some of nature’s answers. Such bracketing is not only occasionally permissible; sometimes it is mandated by optimal interrogative strategies. When to omit data is therefore a strategic rather than ethical question. These points are illustrated by reference to Millikan’s oil drop experiment.     

A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding

Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. Our analysis provides a general account of how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types. In this way, it reconciles conflicting views of explanatory understanding, such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions.     

Two-dimensional semantics and the articulation problem

David Chalmerss version of two-dimensional semantics is an attempt at setting up a unified semantic framework that would vindicate both the Fregean and the Kripkean semantic intuitions. I claim that there are three acceptable ways of carrying out such a project, and that Chalmerss theory does not coherently fit any of the three patterns. I suggest that the theory may be seen as pointing to the possibility of a double reading for many linguistic expressions (a double reading which, however, is not easily identified with straightforward semantic ambiguity).     

John Dewey,The Other Face of the Brazilian New School

This paper intents to analyze the influence of John Dewey’s ideas in the movement that defended the educationl renovation in Brazil (named New School) at the end of the 1920s and in the 1930s. For this, it explains two trends of that movement: the first is described by the metaphor of industrial or mechanical efficiency, whose emphasis was in the power derived from the disciplinary idea of progress, which was embedded in the process of rationalization of the social relations submitted by a factory model; the second, developed by influence of Dewey, is characterized by a project of democratization of society and school that prevented the individual massification and the adoption of the rationalizing model inspired by the factory without any criticism. When Dewey was put in the center of the debate on political, pedagogical and social goals of the Brazilian New School, he was called to introduce a series of concepts that helped to find the balance between the respect for individuality and the observation of the social needs. This paper has some of the conclusions of a major research project, “Philosophy and Science in the New Educational Discourse (Brazil: l930–1960),” sponsored by CNPq.     

The locus of semantic priming in RSVP target search

At what stage does semantic priming affect accuracy in target search? In two experiments, participants viewed two streams of stimuli, each including a target word among distractors. Stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) between the targets (T1 and T2) ranged from 53 to 213 msec. A word semantically related to one or neither of the targets preceded each trial. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed to report both targets. Although more primed than unprimed targets were reported, there was no cost for unprimed words. A strong interaction between SOA and T1 versus T2 was found, but priming did not interact with either variable. In Experiment 2, only related targets were reported. Performance was similar to that for primed targets in Experiment 1. Semantic priming does not seem to modulate how attentional resources are initially allocated between targets, but instead affects a later stage of processing, the point at which a target word reaches lexical identification.     

False recognition across meaning,language, and stimulus format: Conceptual relatedness and the feeling of familiarity

Four experiments examined contributions of conceptual relatedness and feelings of familiarity to false recognition. Participants first studied lists of unrelated items (e.g., table, lock) followed by a recognition test with three types of items: (1) studied items (e.g., table), (2) semantically related lures (e.g., key), and (3) unrelated lures (e.g., cup). Participants falsely recognized more related than unrelated lures when the stimuli were words (Experiment 1A) and pictures (Experiment 1B), when the studied items and related lures differed in language (Experiment 2), and when they differed in perceptual format (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, an attribution manipulation, designed to make feelings of familiarity nondiagnostic for memory judgments, eliminated the false-recognition effect obtained in Experiment 3. Overall, the study suggests that conceptual relatedness produces false recognition even in the absence of shared perceptual surface features between study and test items, and it does so by generating feelings of familiarity.     

Disentangling encoding versus retrieval explanations of the bizarreness effect: Implications for distinctiveness

Recall effects attributed to distinctiveness have been explained by both encoding and retrieval accounts. Resolution of this theoretical controversy has been clouded because the typical methodology confounds the encoding and retrieval contexts. Using bizarre and common sentences as materials, we introduce a paradigm that decouples the nature of the encoding context (mixed vs. unmixed lists of items) from the retrieval set (mixed vs. unmixed retrieval sets). Experiment 1 presented unmixed lists for study, and Experiment 2 presented mixed lists for study. In both experiments, significant bizarreness effects were obtained in free recall when the retrieval set intermixed items but not when the retrieval set consisted of only one item type. Also, Experiment 1, using a repeated testing procedure, did not reveal evidence for more extensive encoding of bizarre sentences than of common sentences. The results support the idea that retrieval dynamics primarily mediate the bizarreness effect, and perhaps more generally, distinctiveness effects.