The Principle of Semantic Compositionality

The Principle of Semantic Compositionality (sometimes called Frege's Principle) is the principle that the meaning of a (syntactically complex) whole is a function only of the meanings of its (syntactic) parts together with the manner in which these parts were combined. This principle has been extremely influential throughout the history of formal semantics; it has had a tremendous impact upon modern linguistics ever since Montague Grammars became known; and it has more recently shown up as a guiding principle for a certain direction in cognitive science.Despite the fact that The Principle is vague or underspecified at a number of points — such as what meaning is, what counts as a part, what counts as a syntactic complex, what counts as combination — this has not stopped some people from viewing The Principle as obviously true, true almost by definition. And it has not stopped other people from viewing The Principle as false, almost pernicious in its effect. And some of these latter theorists think that it is an empirically false principle while others think of it as a methodologically wrong-headed way to proceed.In fact, there are approximately 318 arguments against The Principle which can be found in the literature, whereas there are only three (or maybe four) arguments proposed in favor of The Principle. This paper will adjudicate among these arguments. And at the end it will suggest some other way to look at what proponents of compositionality really want.     

Negative and affirmative precepts

Summary That negative precepts play the critical role in the generalization principle is a consequence of the relationship of negative to affirmative precepts, i.e. that the negative give the essential negative condition for observing the affirmative precept. This relationship in turn is based on the nature of: 1) the negative precept which obliges to inaction and consequently demands action in order to violate it; 2) the affirmative precept which obliges to action and can be violated by inaction. Since action requires agency, and agency involves more responsibility than does the non-agency present in violating affirmative percepts, we conclude that violating negative precepts demands more responsibility and consequently that they oblige more than do affirmative precepts. To emphasize this critical role of agency I shall conclude with an example proposed by Michael Tooley: Imagine a machine which contains two children, John and Mary. If one pushes a button, John will be killed, but Mary will emerge unharmed. If one does not push the button, John will emerge unharmed, but Mary will be killed. In the first case one kills John, while in the second case one merely lets Mary die. Does one seriously wish to say that the action of intentionally refraining from pushing the button is morally preferable to the action of pushing it, even though exactly one person will perish in either case?²⁰ Tooley's judgment on this example indicates that the outcome - in either case one person will perish - is the sole moral determinant (intentions do not enter this case) and that agency of pushing the button is of no moral significance. Yet, if you, the reader, stood before this machine and tried to decide what you should do, the fact of your agency in pushing the button would control your decision. Consider pushing the button. What reason could you have for that action? That otherwise Mary would die. But who can say that Mary's life is more valuable than John's? That Mary will die is no valid reason for pushing the button. But what of saving Mary's life? You can't do that without yourself actively killing John. But if you don't, Mary will die. This is true, but she will not die from your agency, and this is critical to your choice. What a machine may or may not do may or may not be under your control. What you do is under your control, and you may not do evil, not even that good may come of it. Consequently, you would be forced to say: the decision of intentionally refraining from pushing the button is morally preferable to the action of pushing it even though exactly one person perishes in either case.     

Barriers to Adult Career Change

Adults have unique problems in making career changes. They face crucial economic, educational, and psychological barriers that require special guidance services. In this article, barriers to adult career change are identified and a five-county regional learning service using paraprofessionals is described. Results in working with more than 200 adults making career changes is reported. Suggestions for overcoming some of the problems adults face in making career changes are explained.     

Are introverts still more religious?

The JEPQ and a religious attitude scale, ASC 4B, were completed by 1715 school children aged 11–17 yrs. Attitude to religion was found to decline across the age range, girls were found to be more religious than boys, and introverts more religious than extraverts. The relationship between introversion and religiosity is consistent with previous research and the present study adds substance to this relationship with the use of a more recent E scale on an extended age range.