Organization of the affective life a critical survey

Il est depuis longtemps reconnu que la vie affective de l'homme normal subit, surtout pendant l'enfance, une sorte d'organisation résultant d'une suite de transformations. On n'a cependant pas pris la peine de formulaer exactement les observations faites, ni d'en interprêter les conséquences avant Kant et Herbart. Ceux-ci ont aussi attiré l'attention sur la question de la différence entre émotions et passions.     

Stimulus control of avoidance behavior

The introduction of a warning signal preceding shocks greatly increased the effectiveness of avoidance responding. Periods of “warm-up” at the beginning of the session were eliminated, and the number of shocks received by the subjects was greatly reduced. With response-shock interval constant, response rate increased as the interval between the response and the onset of the warning signal was shortened. The response tended to occur shortly after the onset of the warning signal regardless of the duration of these “safe” periods. A greatly elevated response rate was maintained even when the duration of the safe period was reduced to 0.3 sec. Thus, the pre-shock signal obtained nearly exclusive control of the responding and overrode the usual “temporal discrimination” of the response-shock interval.     

The conditioning of textual responses using “extrinsic” reinforcers

Six 4-year-old Ss were presented with a textual program consisting of 26 words arranged so the word stimuli were gradually combined into sentences and then short “stories.” Three Ss were given the No-Reinforcement condition first, and only social reinforcers were presented. They were switched to the Reinforcement condition as soon as they requested discontinuance of the activity. The other three Ss were given Reinforcement—No Reinforcement—Reinforcement treatments. The No-Reinforcement treatment in this case lasted until S requested discontinuance of the activity. The reinforcers were mixed edibles and trinkets, as well as tokens backed up by small plastic toys on a 1:24 ratio. The unit of response was the number of new texts acquired as a result of each of the 45-min experimental sessions. It was demonstrated that the program, procedure, and reinforcement conditions produced curves which are analogous to those produced in common operant-conditioning procedures. The results indicate that other operant principles may be studied in this significant area of human behavior, with important practical consequences.     

Evidence for Context Switching in the Effects of Average Item Length and Item-Length Variability on Internal Consistency

This investigation examined the effects of 3 item characteristics—the average number of words per item, within-scale variability in item length, and item “direction”—on internal consistency reliability and interitem correlation. In Study 1, we examined the effects of these variables on overall scale-level reliability using 444 subscales from 9 personality scales. In Study 2, we examined interitem correlation at the paired-item level using 477 nonredundant item pairs from 14 personality scales. Lower scale reliability was associated with more average words per item, greater within-scale variability in item length, and a greater percentage of reverse-keyed items. Similarly, smaller interitem correlations were associated with a greater degree of mismatch in item length between the paired items and with a mismatch (vs. match) in the items' respective “directions.” The pattern of results across both studies supports our notion that lower internal consistency results from increased context switching; that is, from the confusion that occurs when respondents must switch back and forth between the interpretive frames pertaining to short versus long items, or between items pertaining to one pole of a personality dimension and its “opposite” pole. Suggestions for maximizing the internal consistency of personality scales are proposed.     

Limits to preference and the sensitivity of choice to rate and amount of food

Studies of choice holding food‐amount ratio constant while varying food‐rate ratio within sessions showed that local changes in preference depend on relative amount of food. The present study investigated whether sensitivity of choice to food‐rate ratio and sensitivity to food‐amount ratio are independent of one another when food‐rate ratios are varied across sessions and food‐amount ratios are varied within sessions. Food deliveries for rats’ presses on the left and right levers were scheduled according to three different food‐rate ratios of 1:1, 9:1, and 1:9; each food‐rate ratio lasted for 106 sessions and was arranged independently of seven food‐amount ratios (7:1, 6:2, 5:3, 4:4, 3:5, 2:6, and 1:7 food pellets) occurring within sessions in random sequence. Each amount ratio lasted for 10 food deliveries and was separated from another by a 60‐s blackout. Sensitivity to rate ratio was high (1.0) across food deliveries. Sensitivity to amount ratio was low when food rates were equal across alternatives, but was high when rate ratio and amount ratio opposed one another. When rate ratio and amount ratio went in the same direction, choice ratio reached an elevenfold limit which reduced sensitivity to approximately zero. We conclude that three factors affect sensitivity to amount: (1) the limit to preference, (2) the equal effect on preference of amounts greater than four pellets, and (3) the absence of differential effects of switches in amount in the equal‐rates (1:1) condition. Taken together, these findings indicate that rate and amount only sometimes combine independently as additive variables to determine preference when amount ratios vary frequently within sessions.     

Investigating neural representations: the tale of place cells

While neuroscientists often characterize brain activity as representational, many philosophers have construed these accounts as just theorists’ glosses on the mechanism. Moreover, philosophical discussions commonly focus on finished accounts of explanation, not research in progress. I adopt a different perspective, considering how characterizations of neural activity as representational contributes to the development of mechanistic accounts, guiding the investigations neuroscientists pursue as they work from an initial proposal to a more detailed understanding of a mechanism. I develop one illustrative example involving research on the information-processing mechanisms mammals employ in navigating their environments. This research was galvanized by the discovery in the 1970s of place cells in the hippocampus. This discovery prompted research in what the activity of these cells represents and how place representations figure in navigation. It also led to the discovery of a host of other types of neurons—grid cells, head-direction cells, boundary cells—that carry other types of spatial information and interact with place cells in the mechanism underlying spatial navigation. As I will try to make clear, the research is explicitly devoted to identifying representations and determining how they are constructed and used in an information processing mechanism. Construals of neural activity as representations are not mere glosses but are characterizations to which neuroscientists are committed in the development of their explanatory accounts.     

Case Report: Direct Access Genetic Testing and A False-Positive Result For Long QT Syndrome

We report the case of a woman who pursued direct access genetic testing and then presented with concerns regarding a positive test result for Long-QT syndrome. Although the result ultimately proved to be a false positive, this case illustrates that costs associated with follow-up of direct access genetic testing results can be non-trivial for both the patient and for health care systems. Here we raise policy questions regarding the appropriate distribution of these costs. We also discuss the possibility that, when confronted by a direct access genetic test result that reports high risk for one or more actionable diseases, a family physician might feel compelled to act out of a desire to avoid liability, even when information regarding the accuracy and validity of the testing were not easily accessible. This case outlines lessons that can easily be translated into clinical practice, not only by genetic counselors, but also by family physicians, medical specialists and members of the public.