Hegel,modal logic,and the social nature of mind

ABSTRACT

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in the light of modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood.     

Logical Foundations for Belief Representation

This essay presents a philosophical and computational theory of the representation of de re, de dicto, nested, and quasi-indexical belief reports expressed in natural language. The propositional Semantic Network Processing System (SNePS) is used for representing and reasoning about these reports. In particular, quasi-indicators (indexical expressions occurring in intentional contexts and representing uses of indicators by another speaker) pose problems far natural-language representation and reasoning systems, because—unlike pure indicators—they cannot be replaced by coreferential NPs without changing the meaning of the embedding sentence. Therefore, the referent of the quasi-indicator must be represented in such a way that no invalid coreferential claims are entailed. The importance of quasi-indicators is discussed, and it is shown that all four of the above categories of belief reports can be handled by a single representational technique using belief spaces containing intensional entities. Inference rules and belief-revision techniques for the system ore also examined.     

The perception of false self scale for adolescents: Reliability,validity, and longitudinal relationships with depressive and anxious symptoms

A scale assessing generalized false self‐perceptions (Perceptions of False Self, POFS) was developed and tested across three studies involving a total of 331 adolescents (11–16 years). In Study 1, interviews were conducted to develop items for the scale. In Study 2, psychometric techniques were used to derive a scale composed of 16 items. Study 2 also assessed the validity of the scale: depressive symptoms were found to increase POFS across 10 weeks, whereas false self‐perceptions had a reciprocal effect on anxiety. In Study 3, the convergent validity of the POFS scale was established. Overall, the evidence suggests that the POFS scale is a reliable and valid measure of generalized false self‐perceptions.