How undistorted spatial memories can produce distorted responses

Reproducing the location of an object from the contents of spatial working memory requires the translation of a noisy representation into an action at a single location—for instance, a mouse click or a mark with a writing utensil. In many studies, these kinds of actions result in biased responses that suggest distortions in spatial working memory. We sought to investigate the possibility of one mechanism by which distortions could arise, involving an interaction between undistorted memories and nonuniformities in attention. Specifically, the resolution of attention is finer below than above fixation, which led us to predict that bias could arise if participants tend to respond in locations below as opposed to above fixation. In Experiment 1 we found such a bias to respond below the true position of an object. Experiment 2 demonstrated with eye-tracking that fixations during response were unbiased and centered on the remembered object’s true position. Experiment 3 further evidenced a dependency on attention relative to fixation, by shifting the effect horizontally when participants were required to tilt their heads. Together, these results highlight the complex pathway involved in translating probabilistic memories into discrete actions, and they present a new attentional mechanism by which undistorted spatial memories can lead to distorted reproduction responses.     

The Force of Habit

Habits figure in action-explanations because of their distinctive force. But what is the force of habit, and how does it motivate us? In this paper, I argue that the force of habit is the feeling of familiarity one has with the familiar course of action, where this feeling reveals a distinctive reason for acting in the usual way. I do this by considering and rejecting a popular account of habit's force in terms of habit's apparent automaticity, by arguing that one can do something out of habit and from deliberation, before going on to defend The Familiarity View.     

Traditional vs. nontraditional women and men's perceptions of the personalities and physiques of ideal women and men

Traditional and nontraditional women and men's perceptions of ideal people, in terms of both traits and physiques, were assessed using 80 male and 80 female Caucasian undergraduates as study participants. The data indicated that traditional women and men perceived the ideal male as mesomorphic and as having more instrumental than expressive traits. Nontraditional women and men also favored a mesomorphic physique for the ideal male, but they differed from traditionals in that they saw this mesomorphic male as being androgynous in regard to traits. Concerning the ideal female, traditional and nontraditional women and men preferred an androgynous physique, but they differed in their perceptions of the ideal personality for a woman. Traditional women and men perceived their ideal women as having more expressive than instrumental traits, whereas nontraditional women and men saw their ideal women as being androgynous in regard to traits. The results are discussed within the framework of Bem's gender schema and enculturated lens theories.     

Theologian,Teacher, and Friend: Tributes to James M. Gustafson

James M. Gustafson, who died in 2021, has influenced generations of theologians and ethicists. In this article, five students, colleagues, and friends provide short reflections on what Gustafson has meant for their work as scholars of theology and religious ethics.     

Resolving Compensation Disputes with Three-party Job Evaluation

Des conflits naissent dans les organisations a propos du montant de la retribution versee aux titulaires de certains postes. Aux Etats-Unis par exem-ple, le probleme de la contribution-retribution a provoque recemment plusieurs conflits autour des postes traditionnellement reserves aux femmes. Mediation et arbitrage sont les procedures habituellement retenues, mais une evaluation du travail regroupant trois partenaires est une solution originate dont les retombees favorables sur l'organisation depassent la resolution d'un conflit particulier.
Un groupe tripartite a exploite pour 1'evaluation du travail des dimensions pourvues d'echelles precises. Des equipes de deux personnes representant les parties adverses ont evalue des postes convenablement retribues a partir des dimensions sus-mentionnees. Les donnees ont été statistiquement synthetisees. Des equipes de deux personnes ont ensuite evalue tous les postes defendus par le syndicat implique dans le conflit. Cet eventail de postes incluait ceux qui etaient en litige.
Une tierce partie neutre devait conseiller les adversaires dans l'application d'une methode d'evaluation du travail qui resolvait le conflit, depistait les postes susceptibles de poser probleme a l'avenir et fournissait un moyen pour retribuer equitablement les nouveaux postes.     

Constraints and Preferences in Inductive Learning: An Experimental Study of Human and Machine Performance

The paper examines constraints and preferences employed by people in learning decision rules from preclassified examples. Results from four experiments with human subjects were analyzed and compared with artificial intelligence (AI) inductive learning programs. The results showed the people's rule inductions tended to emphasize category validity (probability of some property, given a category) more than cue validity (probability that an entity is a member of a category given that it has some property) to a greater extent than did the AI programs. Although the relative proportions of different rule types (e.g., conjunctive vs. disjunctive) changed across experiments, a single process model provided a good account of the data from each study. These observations are used to argue for describing constraints in terms of processes embodied in models rather than in terms of products or outputs. Thus AI induction programs become candidate psychological process models and results from inductive learning experiments can suggest new algorithms. More generally, the results show that human inductive generalizations tend toward greater specificity than would be expected if conceptual simplicity were the key constraint on inductions. This bias toward specificity may be due to the fact that this criterion both maximizes inferences that may be drawn from category membership and protects rule induction systems from developing over-generalizations.