Reason in Teaching: Scheffler's Philosophy of Education “A Maximum of Vision and a Minimum of Mystery”

This discussion cocnentrates on the distinctive conception of teaching which Scheffler develops, one in which teachers recognize and obligation both to offer reasons for their beliefs and to accept questions and objections raised by their students; and it shows how this conception is rooted in ethical and epistemological considerations. It emerges that Scheffler has anticipated, and answered, various arguments currently being raised against an approach to teaching which values critical reflection by students, and that he has also succeeded in avoiding the excesses of neutralism and relativism. It is argued too that his work exemplifies his own belief in maintaining a linkage between philosophy and practical concerns     

Long-term effects of intensive treatment for a client with both a cluttering and stuttering disorder

This study presents data on the effects of an intensive smooth speech treatment program for stuttering on the speech and psychological status of a man, aged 21 years who stuttered and who was also diagnosed as a clutterer (S 29). Stuttering was mild to moderate (7% syllables stuttered) (%SS) and consisted mostly of rapid repetitions with an occasional block. The client had stuttered since the age of 5 years. Initial rate could not be determined with accuracy due to its irregularity and speed, but was estimated to be between 260 to 300 syllables per minute (SPM). Speech was also characterized by irregular quick bursts that were often unintelligible. There was no evidence of abnormal psychological traits. However, a higher than normal level of negative communication attitudes was evidenced. An intensive 3-week smooth speech program designed to reduce and control stuttering was initiated. It was believed the training, which involved rate control, would control the cluttering symptoms as well. After successful completion of the program, stuttering was greatly reduced, and the gains were maintained after 10 months. Speech rate was reduced to normal levels and was also maintained at the 10-month follow-up. Negative attitudes to communication, furthermore, were greatly reduced both in the short- and long-term. Consequently the cluttering symptoms after treatment were minimal. This case study suggests that an intensive treatment for stuttering, which contains rate control, can also be a successful treatment for cluttering, at least for those who also stutter.     

Temporal necessity; Hard facts/soft facts

Conclusion In conclusion, then, the notion of temporal necessity is certainly queer and perhaps a misnomer. It really has little to do with temporality per se and everything to do with counterfactual openness or closedness. We have seen that the future is as unalterable as the past, but that this purely logical truth is not antithetical to freedom or contingency. Moreover, we have found certain past facts are counterfactually open in that were future events or actualities to be other than they will be, these past facts would have been different as a consequence. God's beliefs about the future are such past facts. Moreover, the effects of actions which God would have taken had He believed differently are also such past facts. Oddly enough, then, virtually any past fact is potentially counterfactually open, and the only necessity that remains is purely de facto. We, of course, do not in general know which events of the past depend counterfactually on present actions, and those cases we do know about seem rather trivial. Our intuitions of the necessity, unalterability, and unpreventability of the past as opposed to the future stem from the impossibility of backward causation, which is precluded by the dynamic nature of time and becoming. But the counterfactual dependence of God's beliefs on future events or actualities is not a case of backward causation: rather future-tense propositions are true in virtue of what will happen, given a view of truth as correspondence, and God simply has the essential property of knowing all and only true propositions. With regard to the future, virtually all facts are counterfactually open, and therefore future-tense propositions are not temporally necessary. Propositions thus move from being temporally contingent to being temporally necessary when all the opportunities to affect things counterfactually have slipped by. Hence, the mere fact that an event is past is no indication that it is counterfactually closed. This is especially evident in the case of God's foreknowledge. If we say that God foreknows that I shall do x and therefore I cannot refrain from doing x, lest I change God's past foreknowledge, we are being deceived by a modality which has nothing to do with my power or freedom. All that is impossible is the conjunction of God's foreknowledge that p and of ~ p; but this modality in sensu composito has no bearing on my ability to act such that ~ p would be true and God would have foreknown differently. Temporal necessity, then, turns out to be only obliquely temporal and modally weak, certainly no threat to freedom or divine foreknowledge.     

The authority of the moral sense

The Journal of Value Inquiry -