佛陀的一生(中)

中道公元前589年7月的月圆日傍晚,太阳西下,明月同时升起,在荫凉的鹿野苑仙人住处,佛陀对他们说:诸比丘!出家人不应有此二种极端。何等为二?纵欲为低等、粗俗、世间、卑劣,有助于伤害;自我折磨乃痛苦、卑劣有助于伤害。诸比丘!如来理解之中道,避免此二极端,具备视野与知识,导致安静、证悟、菩提与涅槃。诸比丘!何为中道?即八正道:正见、正思维、正语、正业、正命、正精进、正念、正定。     

Articulatory and Phonological Determinants of Word Length Effects in Span Tasks

Several previous studies have shown that memory span is greater for short words than for long words. This effect is claimed to occur even when the short and long words are matched for the number of syllables and phonemes and so to provide evidence for subvocal articulation as being one mechanism that underlies memory span (Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975). The three experiments reported in this paper further investigate the articulatory determinants of word length effects on span tasks. Experiment 1 replicated Baddeley et al.'s finding of an effect of word length on auditory and visual span when the stimuli consist of words that differ in terms of the number of syllables. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the effects of word length are eliminated when the words in the span task are matched for the number of syllables and phonemes but differ with respect to the duration and/or complexity of their articulatory gestures. These results indicate that it is the phonological structure of a word and not features of its actual articulation that determines the magnitude of the word length effect in span tasks.     

HOW TO TALK TO YOURSELF OR KRIPKE's WITTGENSTEIN's SOLITARY LANGUAGE ARGUMENT AND WHY IT FAILS

Abstract: In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke's Wittgenstein argues that it is possible for individuals in communities to speak a language and otherwise follow rules, but impossible for a single, conceptually isolated individual to do so. I show that the roots of the argument lie in his general account of the legitimacy of practices, and that he actually argues for two distinct conclusions: (a) solitary individuals cannot have useful practices of rule‐following and (b) solitary individuals cannot place substantive restrictions on their own behavior. I show that if it is, in fact, possible for individuals in communities to use language and follow rules, then both of Kripke's Wittgenstein's anti‐solitary language arguments fails; and, furthermore, that his general account not only fails to exclude the possibility of solitary language‐use and rule‐following, it actually guarantees their possibility.