Trait interpersonal vulnerability attenuates beneficial effects of constructive criticism on failure responses

The extant literature on interpersonal criticism suggests that relative to destructive criticism, constructive criticism significantly minimizes the injurious psychological aftermath people experience after failure. However, we propose the possibility that for some people, these psychological benefits of constructive criticism are less apparent. Specifically, we hypothesized that for people high in trait interpersonal vulnerability, a construct marked by maladaptive cognitive‐emotional responses in interpersonal contexts and/or by dysfunctional relational concerns, effects of constructive (vs. destructive) criticism on reduced maladaptive appraisals will diminish, and this diminution of reduced maladaptive appraisals will predict downstream effects on worsened post‐failure mood. An experiment had a college sample (N = 349) complete four instruments represented under an interpersonal vulnerability construct (IVC). Next, participants imagined failing in various domains and receiving subsequent feedback from emotionally important others. Feedback type was manipulated to typify either destructive criticism or constructive criticism. Finally, participants provided ratings of maladaptive appraisals and post‐failure mood. Latent variable path modelling supported hypotheses. Effects of constructive (vs. destructive) criticism on reduced maladaptive appraisals (namely, shame proneness) diminished as IVC increased, which predicted worsened post‐failure mood. Findings have implications for multidisciplinary theoretical perspectives relevant to interpersonal vulnerability and offer practical considerations for clinicians working with vulnerable clients.     

Dispositional resilience in treatment‐seeking patients with obsessive‐compulsive disorder and its association with treatment outcome

There is a lack of research on the relation between obsessive‐compulsive disorder (OCD) and resilience. Dispositional resilience, as described and defined in literature on hardiness, consists of three facets, namely beliefs about having control in everyday living, having a sense of purpose or commitment, and a positive attitude toward challenges. This study explores associations between dispositional resilience (measured with the Dispositional Resilience Scale (DRS‐15‐R)), symptom severity, and treatment outcome in a sample of 89 patients treated with concentrated exposure therapy (cET), and compares the findings with scores from two reference groups (students and soldiers). The patient group had significantly lower resilience scores than the two reference groups. Weak correlations were observed between dispositional resilience and OCD symptoms. Differences in dispositional resilience were weakly related to remission status at follow‐up (odds ratio of 1.11). Furthermore, resilience improved from pre‐ to post‐treatment (Cohen's d of 0.65). Our results imply that patients’ initial resilience score does not hinder nor facilitate treatment effects to a great extent in this format of ERP treatment.     

Baseline reinforcement rate and resurgence of destructive behavior

Concepts from behavioral momentum theory, along with some empirical findings, suggest that the rate of baseline reinforcement may contribute to the relapse of severe destructive behavior. With seven children who engaged in destructive behavior, we tested this hypothesis in the context of functional communication training by comparing the effects of different baseline reinforcement rates on resurgence during a treatment challenge (i.e., extinction). We observed convincing resurgence of destructive behavior in four of seven participants, and we observed more resurgence in the condition associated with high‐rate baseline reinforcement (i.e., variable‐interval 2 s in Experiment 1 or fixed‐ratio 1 in Experiment 2) compared to a low‐rate baseline reinforcement condition. We discuss the implications of these results relative to schedules of reinforcement in the treatment of destructive behavior and strategies to mitigate resurgence in clinical settings.     

Correction to: Rational social and political polarization

Philosophical Studies - In the original publication of the article, the Acknowledgement section was inadvertently not included. The Acknowledgement is given in this Correction.     

Does Cooperation in the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of a Broad Trait?

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S‐1 bifactor model using 276 participants' Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self‐reported and peer‐reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games' shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self‐reported and peer‐reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self‐assessments and peer‐assessments of cooperativeness. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

The WISC-V in children and adolescents with epilepsy

Despite its popularity in the neuropsychological evaluation of children, the utility of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Fifth Edition (WISC-V) has not yet been investigated in children with epilepsy. Eighty clinically referred children and adolescents with epilepsy were administered the WISC-V as part of a comprehensive assessment and scores were compared to matched controls from the WISC-V standardization sample. T tests compared WISC-V indices and subtests between patients and controls and Chi-square analyses compared the rates of low scores. Correlational analyses assessed the relationships between epilepsy severity variables (e.g., age of onset, duration of epilepsy, number of antiepileptic drugs, seizure frequency). All WISC-V composites and subtests were significantly lower in patients versus controls and the rate of low scores was higher in patients than controls for all composites and subtests with the exception of Figure Weights. The Working Memory Index and Processing Speed Index were most sensitive to impairment, while the Verbal Comprehension Index and Fluid Reasoning Index were least sensitive. Of the epilepsy severity variables, age of seizure onset and number of antiepileptic drugs were strong predictors of deficits, whereas seizure frequency was the weakest predictor. Importantly, no significant differences were seen in children with right hemisphere epilepsy versus left on the five WISC-V composites, though a trend was seen towards a lower Visual-Spatial Index in those with right-sided focal seizures.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.