Temporal necessity; Hard facts/soft facts

Conclusion In conclusion, then, the notion of temporal necessity is certainly queer and perhaps a misnomer. It really has little to do with temporality per se and everything to do with counterfactual openness or closedness. We have seen that the future is as unalterable as the past, but that this purely logical truth is not antithetical to freedom or contingency. Moreover, we have found certain past facts are counterfactually open in that were future events or actualities to be other than they will be, these past facts would have been different as a consequence. God's beliefs about the future are such past facts. Moreover, the effects of actions which God would have taken had He believed differently are also such past facts. Oddly enough, then, virtually any past fact is potentially counterfactually open, and the only necessity that remains is purely de facto. We, of course, do not in general know which events of the past depend counterfactually on present actions, and those cases we do know about seem rather trivial. Our intuitions of the necessity, unalterability, and unpreventability of the past as opposed to the future stem from the impossibility of backward causation, which is precluded by the dynamic nature of time and becoming. But the counterfactual dependence of God's beliefs on future events or actualities is not a case of backward causation: rather future-tense propositions are true in virtue of what will happen, given a view of truth as correspondence, and God simply has the essential property of knowing all and only true propositions. With regard to the future, virtually all facts are counterfactually open, and therefore future-tense propositions are not temporally necessary. Propositions thus move from being temporally contingent to being temporally necessary when all the opportunities to affect things counterfactually have slipped by. Hence, the mere fact that an event is past is no indication that it is counterfactually closed. This is especially evident in the case of God's foreknowledge. If we say that God foreknows that I shall do x and therefore I cannot refrain from doing x, lest I change God's past foreknowledge, we are being deceived by a modality which has nothing to do with my power or freedom. All that is impossible is the conjunction of God's foreknowledge that p and of ~ p; but this modality in sensu composito has no bearing on my ability to act such that ~ p would be true and God would have foreknown differently. Temporal necessity, then, turns out to be only obliquely temporal and modally weak, certainly no threat to freedom or divine foreknowledge.     

The authority of the moral sense

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Describing organizations as reinforcer systems: A new use for job satisfaction and employee attitude surveys

Job satisfaction data on managerial personnel were used to illustrate how organizations can be differentiated and described as reinforcer systems. Twenty-seven specific satisfaction scales were regressed on overall job satisfaction, separately for each of five groups of managers from five organizations. For all groups, overall satisfaction was found to be determined mainly by scales concerning challenge of the job and prospects of one's chosen career. Application of decremental stepwise multiple regression procedures to obtain minimum-variable-set equations resulted in different, though overlapping, sets of variables in the equations for the different organizations. These results suggest a way of describing organizations as reinforcer systems, in terms of the specific determinants of overall satisfaction for the organization.     

MODIFICATION OF HUMAN GASTRIC ACID SECRETION WITH OPERANT-CONDITIONING PROCEDURES1

In an attempt to control gastric acid secretion with operant-conditioning techniques, four normal women were given visual feedback on gastric pH plus money reinforcers. When money was made dependent on increased secretion in a differential-reinforcement-of-high-rates schedule, the rate of secretion of three of the four subjects increased to three times baseline. When money was then made dependent on decreased secretion in a differential-reinforcement-of-other-behaviors schedule, the rate of secretion of these three subjects returned to baseline levels. Heart rate, respiratory frequency, abdominal electromyographic activity, and stomach motility (measured by the electrogastrogram method) were not consistently correlated with acid secretion across subjects, although individual subjects showed substantial correlations between acid secretion and one or more other physiological response.     

Skin conductance response conditioning with CS intensities equal to and greater than UCS intensity

With .2-sec bursts of white noise as both conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (UCS), conditioning of first-interval skin conductance responses was obtained when the intensity of the CS equaled and exceeded that of the UCS. There was no evidence that second-interval response conditioning occurred. Nonspecific response frequencies were also affected by the variations in stimulus intensity, this raising some question about typical controls employed in SCR conditioning. There was some evidence that second interval responses were suppressed by the intense CS values. It was concluded that the existence of simple conditioning with a CS/UCS intensity ratio equal to or greater than unity was contrary to the Pavlovian proposition that a CS must be biologically less salient than the UCS in order for conditioning to occur. It was noted, however, that the suppression of second-interval responses might indicate that anticipatory CRs which are not confounded with orienting reflexes are prevented from exhibiting a conditioning effect when a high CS/UCS intensity ratio is employed.     

Recall of logical and pragmatic implications in sentences with dichotomous and continuous antonyms

Thirty-six subjects recalled sentences containing dichotomous or continuous antonyms in affirmative or negative form. The subjects made a considerable number of meaning-preserving recall errors for both dichotomous antonyms (not alive recalled asdead) and continuous antonyms (not hot recalled ascold). The negation of a dichotomous antonym logically implies its antonym, whereas the negation of a continuous antonym only pragmatically implies its antonym. Thus, the results suggest that subjects hearing sentences containing a logical or pragmatic implication tend to make the logical or pragmatic inference involved. Then, in recall, they do not remember that this was an inference and make the error of recalling the logical or pragmatic implication in place of the presented sentence.