Academic Advising: An Approach From Learning Disabilities Research

This article describes a program designed to improve academic performance of academically at-risk students at a small liberal arts college. Developed from research on successful adults with learning disabilities, the program emphasizes strategic goal planning and incorporates approaches often found in support services for college students with learning disabilities. Preliminary results indicate that a relation exists between the program and increased grade point average of at-risk students.     

The U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Jaffee v. Redmond: Implications for Counselors

In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court held that communications between licensed psychotherapists and their patients are privileged under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The nature of privileged communication, the history of this Supreme Court decision, and implications of the decision for counselors are discussed.     

THE EFFECTS OF ALIGNABILITY ON MEMORY

Abstract— According to structure-mapping theory, the process of comparison in one of alignment and mapping between representational structures. This process induces a focus on commonalities and alignable differences (i.e., those related to the commonalities). Non-alignable differences (i.e., those not related to the commonalities) are held to be neglected. The theory thus predicts increased focus on the corresponding information, Whether these are commonalities or differences. In this article, we explore the implications of this claim for memory: Specifically, we test the prediction that alignable differences are more likely to be processed and stored than nonalignable differences.
We present a study in which people made similarity comparisons between pairs of pictures and then were probed for recall. The recall probes were figures taken from the pictures and were either alignable or nonalignable differences between the pairs. The alignable differences were better memory probes than the nonalignable differences, suggesting that people were more likely to encode and store the corresponding information than the noncorresponding information.     

Dialektik Und Formalisierung

Dialectics and Formalization. In an appendix to his article Can the concept of dialectic be made clear? (JGPS 27: 131–165) the author critically examined an attempt by D. Wandschneider of reconstructing Hegelian dialectical logic by displaying antinomic structures. The main steps of this reconstruction were formalized within the framework of second order predicate logic. In his reply (JGPS 27: 347–352) Wandschneider argues that formalization is the wrong way of interpreting and judging his reconstruction project on the ground that the understanding of predication is already presupposed by predicate logic and, therefore, cannot be formalized. In the present contribution it is shown that Wandschneider's criticism is based on a fundamentally mistaken conception of formalization and formal logic and that the problems posed by his project remain completely unresolved.     

Correspondence

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Adjusting Social Inferences in Familiar and Unfamiliar Domains: The Generality of Response to Situational Pragmatics

Two experiments investigated the influence of situational pragmatics on the selective use of specific instances and generalized knowledge structures to make social inferences. In Experiment 1, social inferences were made in an unfamiliar domain similar in structure to a typical situation of social greetings and address, but devoid of useful cues to social schemas. Participants were told that either one or another of the features of the situation was more pragmatically important for deriving inferences about appropriate social behaviour; consistent with predictions from a computational model of analogical mapping (ACME), they made reliable inferences based on analogies to specific instances, with the situational importance of relations guiding the selection of the optimal analogue. In Experiment 2, social inferences were examined in the more familiar domain of predicting social behavior between low and high status persons and between members of an ingroup and an outgroup in Japan. The availability of specific examples was varied, as was the perceived importance of status and group membership. The situation was isomorphic to that in the first experiment, except for the availability of generalized knowledge structures to guide inferences. Participants made relatively veridical inferences that were sensitive to variations in the pragmatic importance of dimensions. Provision of specific analogues had little impact on inferences, suggesting that participants were relying instead on more general and cross-culturally applicable knowledge about adjusting social relations according to situational pragmatics.     

Ethics, theism and metaphysics: An analysis of the theocentric ethics of James Gustafson

Modern ethics has been shaped by two dominant philosophical assumptions: (1) that there can be no theoretical knowledge of God, i.e., denial of metaphysics, and (2) that moral claims can be redeemed independently of theistic affirmations, i.e., morality does not require theism. These assumptions have influenced much of modern theological ethics. Yet, insofar as theological ethics accepts that morality does not require any explicit or implicit religious beliefs, it affirms that a secularistic morality is possible. But this affirmation is directly at odds with the essence of theism, namely, that God is the source and end of all things, including the moral life. By accepting the dominant consensus, therefore, theological ethics undermines its fundamental theistic claim. Focusing on James Gustafson's theocentric ethics, I seek to show the price that theological ethics pays for subscribing to the dominant consensus. I argue that: (1) Gustafson embraces an inconsistent self-understanding, which undermines his theocentric claim, (2) this is due to his dismissal of metaphysics, and (3) his theocentric ethic would be more compelling if formulated in terms of Whitehead's process metaphysics.     

Self as the feminine principle

In analytical psychology, ego is associated with consciousness and the masculine principle. Although die feminine principle generally characterizes the unconscious, it was not assigned a psychic structure equivalent to the ego. This paper proposes a model of the psyche where self and ego are the major modes of psychic experience. The self as the 'being' mode represents the feminine principle and functions according to primary process; the ego represents 'doing', the masculine principle and secondary process. Feminine and masculine principles are considered to be of equal significance in both men and women and are not limited to gender.
Jung's concept of the self is related to the Hindu metaphysical concepts of Atman and Brahman, whose source was the older Aryan nature-oriented, pagan religion. The prominence of self in analytical psychology and its predominantly 'feminine' symbolism can be understood as Jung's reaction to the psychoanalytic emphasis on ego and to Freud's 'patriarchal' orientation. In Kabbalah, a similar development took place when the feminine principle of the Shekinah emerged in a central, redemptive role, as a mythic compensation to the overtly patriarchal Judaic religion.
In the proposed model of the psyche neither ego nor self represents the psychic totality. The interplay of both psychic modes/principles constitutes the psyche and the individuation process.