Some implications of the logical calculus for empirical classes for social science methodology

An exposition of a calculus for empirical classes (CEC), one of the few attempts by logicians to deal with the problem of constructs and indicators, is presented. The CEC provides the groundwork for a formal structure for the situation in which individuals have a degree of membership in various classes rather than having either membership or nonmembership—a situation nearly always true in empirical research. The CEC is presented and its relation to various social science concepts is mentioned. An application of the CEC model to latent structure analysis (LSA) suggests alternatives to the local independence assumption including one called the local scale assumption, which has a close relation to a Guttman scale.     

Trait interpersonal vulnerability attenuates beneficial effects of constructive criticism on failure responses

The extant literature on interpersonal criticism suggests that relative to destructive criticism, constructive criticism significantly minimizes the injurious psychological aftermath people experience after failure. However, we propose the possibility that for some people, these psychological benefits of constructive criticism are less apparent. Specifically, we hypothesized that for people high in trait interpersonal vulnerability, a construct marked by maladaptive cognitive‐emotional responses in interpersonal contexts and/or by dysfunctional relational concerns, effects of constructive (vs. destructive) criticism on reduced maladaptive appraisals will diminish, and this diminution of reduced maladaptive appraisals will predict downstream effects on worsened post‐failure mood. An experiment had a college sample (N = 349) complete four instruments represented under an interpersonal vulnerability construct (IVC). Next, participants imagined failing in various domains and receiving subsequent feedback from emotionally important others. Feedback type was manipulated to typify either destructive criticism or constructive criticism. Finally, participants provided ratings of maladaptive appraisals and post‐failure mood. Latent variable path modelling supported hypotheses. Effects of constructive (vs. destructive) criticism on reduced maladaptive appraisals (namely, shame proneness) diminished as IVC increased, which predicted worsened post‐failure mood. Findings have implications for multidisciplinary theoretical perspectives relevant to interpersonal vulnerability and offer practical considerations for clinicians working with vulnerable clients.     

Baseline reinforcement rate and resurgence of destructive behavior

Concepts from behavioral momentum theory, along with some empirical findings, suggest that the rate of baseline reinforcement may contribute to the relapse of severe destructive behavior. With seven children who engaged in destructive behavior, we tested this hypothesis in the context of functional communication training by comparing the effects of different baseline reinforcement rates on resurgence during a treatment challenge (i.e., extinction). We observed convincing resurgence of destructive behavior in four of seven participants, and we observed more resurgence in the condition associated with high‐rate baseline reinforcement (i.e., variable‐interval 2 s in Experiment 1 or fixed‐ratio 1 in Experiment 2) compared to a low‐rate baseline reinforcement condition. We discuss the implications of these results relative to schedules of reinforcement in the treatment of destructive behavior and strategies to mitigate resurgence in clinical settings.     

Does Cooperation in the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of a Broad Trait?

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S‐1 bifactor model using 276 participants' Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self‐reported and peer‐reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games' shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self‐reported and peer‐reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self‐assessments and peer‐assessments of cooperativeness. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology