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911.
David Blumenfeld 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(3):311-319
This essay critically examines Alfred R. Mele’s attempt to solve a problem for libertarianism that he calls the problem of
present luck. Many have thought that the traditional libertarian belief in basically free acts (where the latter are any free
A-ings that occur at times at which the past up to that time and the laws of nature are consistent with the agent’s not A-ing
at that time) entail that the acts are due to luck at the time of the act (present luck) rather than to the kind of agent control required for genuinely free, morally responsible
action. While libertarians frequently have tried to rebut the claim that basically free acts are due to present luck, Mele
argues for the daring thesis that they should embrace present luck rather than try to explain it away. His strategy is to
argue that the assumption of present luck in the decisions of very young children (or “little agents”) does not preclude us
from attributing to them a small amount of moral responsibility and that this makes it possible to conceive of moral development
as a gradual process in which as the frequency of the indeterministically caused free actions increases, the agents take on
greater and greater moral responsibility. In this paper I give several possible reconstructions of Mele’s argument and analyze
in detail why none of them succeeds. 相似文献
912.
Bradford Skow 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(3):325-344
In this paper I distinguish interpretations of the question ``How fast does time pass?’’ that are important for the debate over the reality of objective becoming from interpretations that are not. Then I discuss how one theory that incorporates objective becoming—the moving spotlight theory of time—answers this question. It turns out that there are several ways to formulate the moving spotlight theory of time. One formulation says that time passes but it makes no sense to ask how fast; another formulation says that time passes at one second per supersecond; and a third says that time passes at one second per second. I defend the intelligibility of this final version of the theory. 相似文献
913.
914.
915.
Michael Anthony IstvanJr 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(3):399-420
Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument for the impossibility
of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an
agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred
Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when no factor
contributing to that action is up to that agent. Against Derk Pereboom and Clarke, I argue that the versions of agent-causal
libertarianism they claim can immunize the agent to the Basic Argument actually fail to do so. Against Robert Kane, I argue
that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that simply the presence of indeterministic factors in the process of
bringing an action about is itself what rules out the agent’s chance for being responsible for that action. 相似文献
916.
Corey J. Maley 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(1):117-131
Representation is central to contemporary theories regarding the mind/brain. But the nature of representation—both in the
mind/brain and more generally—is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish
between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations
vary in a step-wise manner. In other words, ‘digital’ is synonymous with ‘discrete’, while ‘analog’ is synonymous with ‘continuous’.
I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is (and should be) used in
cognitive science; in its place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis’s account of analog
and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation.
I will argue that the distinctions available in this fourfold account better accord with representational features of interest
in cognitive science than the received analog/digital dichotomy. 相似文献
917.
Andrew William Howat 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(2):155-172
This paper explores a distinction between two types of response-dependence (RD) account (shallow vs. deep). This distinction
is inherent in much of the existing literature, however it is neither widely nor well understood, and has never been drawn
explicitly. The distinction is often taken to be a metaphysical, or ‘realism-relevant’ one—i.e. deep RD accounts entail qualified
realism (or perhaps anti-realism), while shallow RD accounts are metaphysically neutral. I argue that the distinction is not
reliably realism-relevant. I formulate a weaker version of the distinction that may help prevent some common and understandable
confusion about RD biconditionals and their relationship to realism. The weaker distinction rests on the different roles assigned
to RD biconditionals by the two types of account. 相似文献
918.
Ilhan Inan 《Philosophical Studies》2011,154(2):279-283
I argue that Millianism has the very odd consequence that there are simple direct questions that Millians can grasp, but they
cannot answer them in the positive or the negative, or in some other way, nor could they say that they do not know the answer. 相似文献
919.
Casey O’Callaghan 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):143-160
Recent work on non-visual modalities aims to translate, extend, revise, or unify claims about perception beyond vision. This
paper presents central lessons drawn from attention to hearing, sounds, and multimodality. It focuses on auditory awareness
and its objects, and it advances more general lessons for perceptual theorizing that emerge from thinking about sounds and
audition. The paper argues that sounds and audition no better support the privacy of perception’s objects than does vision;
that perceptual objects are more diverse than an exclusively visual perspective suggests; and that multimodality is rampant.
In doing so, it presents an account according to which audition affords awareness as of not just sounds, but also environmental
happenings beyond sounds. 相似文献
920.
Ruth Weintraub 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(2):181-188
An impossibility result pertaining to the aggregation of individual judgements is thought by many to have significant implications
for political theory, social epistemology and metaphysics. When members of a group hold a rational set of judgments on some
interconnected questions, the theorem shows, it isn’t always (logically) possible for them to aggregate their judgements into
a collective one in conformity with seemingly very plausible constraints. I reject one of the constraints which engender the
dilemma. The analogy with the lottery paradox, I argue, shows that rational belief needn’t be consistent. So the alleged implications
of the dilemma are dispelled. 相似文献