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901.
Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many
plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of “weak awareness
internalism” that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” horn of the dilemma. Second, we
show that there are versions of “strong awareness internalism” that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s “vicious regress” horn.
We note along the way that these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma’s
other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat. 相似文献
902.
Chad Kidd 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(3):361-383
In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational
approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems
arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation.
In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is
contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This
contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid
the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three
other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the
need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2)
a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are
a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure
of inner-representational states. 相似文献
903.
Ram Neta 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):3-17
In his volume reflective knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers an account of knowledge, an argument against internalist foundationalism,
and a solution to the problem of easy knowledge. This paper offers challenges to Sosa on each of those three things. 相似文献
904.
Marya Schechtman 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):65-79
Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity.
Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose
personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my
comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated
than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal
identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that
the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features
of memory that must be part of a complete account. 相似文献
905.
Richard Woodward 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(2):155-166
The standard Kripkean semantic theories for quantified modal logic allow the individuals that exist at other worlds to vary
from those that exist at the actual world. This causes a problem for those who deny the existence of non-actual individuals.
I focus on two prominent strategies for solving this problem, due respectively to Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta (who identify
the possible individuals with the actual individuals) and Alvin Plantinga (who identifies the possible individuals with the
individual essences). I argue, contra various commentators, that both of these solutions are acceptable by the lights of those
who deny the existence of mere possibilia. 相似文献
906.
Clare Batty 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):161-174
Much of the philosophical work on perception has focused on vision. Recently, however, philosophers have begun to correct this ‘tunnel vision’ by considering other modalities. Nevertheless, relatively little has been written about the chemical senses—olfaction and gustation. The focus of this paper is olfaction. In this paper, I consider the question: does human olfactory experience represents objects as thus and so? If we take visual experience as the paradigm of how experience can achieve object representation, we might think that the answer to this question is no. I argue that olfactory experience does indeed represent objects—just not in a way that is easily read from the dominant visual case. 相似文献
907.
Karl Schafer 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(1):1-15
In these comments I briefly discuss three aspects of the empiricist account of the epistemic role of experience that Anil
Gupta develops in his Empiricism and Experience. First, I discuss the motivations Gupta offers for the claim that the given
in experience should be regarded as reliable. Second, I discuss two different ways of conceiving of the epistemic significance
of the phenomenology of experience. And third, I discuss whether Gupta’s account is able to deliver the anti-skeptical results
he intends it to. I close by suggesting that, once fully fleshed out, Gupta’s account is best understood in terms of the fusion
of certain core ideas within both the empiricist and the rationalist traditions. 相似文献
908.
What is the best question to ask an omniscient being? The question is intriguing; is it also paradoxical? We discuss several versions of what Ned Markosian calls “the paradox of the question” and suggest solutions to each of those puzzles. We then offer some practical advice about what do if you ever have the opportunity to query an omniscient being. 相似文献
909.
Patrick Rysiew 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(1):111-120
910.
Luke Robinson 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(2):289-309
What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if they exist) ground moral obligations or—at the very least—particular moral truths? I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particular truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. Moreover, they can do other things that moral principles are supposed to do: explain the phenomena “falling within their scope,” support counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, “necessary connections” between obligating reasons and obligations. And they are apt to be the truthmakers for moral laws, or “lawlike” moral generalizations. 相似文献