Is Imagination Introspective?

The literature suggests that in sensory imagination we focus on the imagined objects, not on the imaginative states themselves, and that therefore imagination is not introspective. It is claimed that the introspection of imaginative states is an additional cognitive ability. However, there seem to be counterexamples to this claim. In many cases in which we sensorily imagine a certain object in front of us, we are aware that this object is not really where we imagine it to be. So it looks as if in these cases of imagination, we are aware of the mere appearance of the imagined object, and hence introspection is a constitutive part of imagination. In this article, I address this contradictory state of affairs and argue that we should classify at least some forms of sensory imagination as introspective. For this purpose I use the appearance-reality distinction as a central notion for introspection. I also defend the thesis of introspective imagination against the objection that young children imagine without yet understanding the concept of experience.     

Quine on Hume and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically, this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit in David Hume.     

Contextual influences on resistance to disruption in children with intellectual disabilities

Training context can influence resistance to disruption under differing reinforcement schedules. With nonhumans, when relatively lean and rich reinforcement schedules are experienced in the context of a multiple schedule, greater resistance is found in the rich than the lean component, as described by behavioral momentum theory. By contrast, when the schedules are experienced in separated blocks of sessions (i.e., as single schedules), resistance is not consistently greater in either component. In the current study, two groups of 6 children with intellectual disabilities responded to stimuli presented in relatively lean or rich components. For both, reinforcers were delivered according to the same variable-interval reinforcement schedule; additionally, the rich component included the delivery of response-independent reinforcers. The Within group was trained on a multiple schedule in which lean and rich components alternated regularly within sessions; the Blocked group was trained on two single schedules in which sessions with either the lean or rich schedule were conducted in successive blocks. Disruption tests presented a concurrently available alternative stimulus disrupter signaling the availability of tangible reinforcers. All 6 Within participants showed greater resistance to disruption in the rich component, consistent with behavioral momentum theory. By contrast, there was no consistent or significant difference in resistance for Blocked participants. This finding is potentially relevant to the development of interventions in applied settings, where such interventions often approximate single schedules and include response-independent reinforcers.