Rational endorsement

It is valuable for inquiry to have researchers who are committed advocates of their own theories. However, in light of pervasive disagreement (and other concerns), such a commitment is not well explained by the idea that researchers believe their theories. Instead, this commitment, the rational attitude to take toward one’s favored theory during the course of inquiry, is what I call endorsement. Endorsement is a doxastic attitude, but one which is governed by a different type of epistemic rationality. This inclusive epistemic rationality is sensitive to reasons beyond those to think the particular proposition in question is true. Instead, it includes extrinsic epistemic reasons, which concern the health of inquiry more generally. Such extrinsic reasons include the distribution of cognitive labor that a researcher will contribute to by endorsing a particular theory. Recognizing endorsement and inclusive epistemic rationality thus allows us to smooth a tension between individual rationality and collective rationality. It does so by showing how it can be epistemically rational to endorse a theory on the basis of the way this endorsement will benefit collective inquiry. I provide a decision theoretic treatment for inclusive epistemic rationality and endorsement which illustrates how this can be accomplished.     

Gambling as a search for justice: examining the role of personal relative deprivation in gambling urges and gambling behavior

The present article explores the hypothesis that gambling might serve a justice-seeking function for some people, as gambling might offer a means to pursuing desirable outcomes that people feel they deserve but might be unable or unwilling to attain through conventional means. In Study 1, across two separate samples, self-reports of personal relative deprivation predict problem gambling and gambling urges over and above relevant control variables. In Study 2, the authors manipulate personal relative deprivation by informing participants that they have either less or more discretionary income than "similar others." They then give participants $20 and the opportunity to gamble. The results show that a greater percentage of participants who are "relatively deprived" (vs. "not relatively deprived") opt to gamble. Two manipulation validation studies demonstrate that the "relatively deprived" participants are preoccupied with justice during a modified Stroop task and feel resentful. Implications for understanding why people gamble are discussed.     

Foregoing the labor for the fruits: The effect of just world threat on the desire for immediate monetary rewards

Previous theorizing and research suggest that the need to believe in a just world develops when children begin to understand the benefits of foregoing their immediate gratifications for more desirable, long-term outcomes. Drawing on this previous work, we propose that an extant just world threat may induce a desire for smaller, immediate rewards at the expense of larger, delayed rewards. Participants were exposed to the suffering of an innocent or non-innocent victim and then, in a different context, completed a temporal discounting task that assessed, across six time delays, their preferences for smaller, immediate monetary rewards versus a constant, larger, delayed reward. Consistent with our reasoning, participants exposed to the suffering of an innocent versus non-innocent victim more steeply discounted the value of the delayed reward—that is, they were willing to accept smaller immediate rewards in place of the larger, delayed reward. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.     

Cognitively impaired older adults exhibit comparable difficulties on naturalistic and laboratory prospective memory tasks

Prospective memory, or remembering future intentions, is critical for independent living for all ages, but especially older adults. Previous laboratory research has found that cognitively impaired older adults may have particular difficulties with prospective memory, but previous studies have not examined whether these difficulties occur in everyday life. In normal ageing, a dissociation between settings has been observed, with older adults selectively impaired in laboratory (but not naturalistic) contexts. Consequently, in the present study 15 cognitively impaired older adults were compared to demographically matched controls on laboratory and naturalistic measures of prospective memory. The results indicated that the cognitively impaired group performed more poorly on both measures, with the magnitude of the deficit comparable across setting. These results indicate that for older adults who present with cognitive impairment prospective memory deficits observed in laboratory settings may be a valid indicator of difficulties experienced executing delayed intentions in everyday life. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Atheists

Atheists represent an inconspicuous minority, identifiable only by their disbelief in God(s). Despite being highly stigmatized and disliked, until recent scientific endeavors, little has been known about this group including why they don't believe, how many people are atheists, and why they trigger intense reactions. Thus, this paper aims to synthesize what is known about atheists (so far) and to help explain the widespread negative attitudes and prejudice towards atheists; the possible cognitive, motivational, and cultural origins of disbelief; and the unique challenges facing the study of religious disbelievers. To do so, we will explore current findings in psychological research on atheism by considering the complex interactions of cultural learning, motivations, and core cognitive processes. Although significant scientific progress has been made in understanding the factors underlying atheism, there remains much to be explored in the domain of religious disbelief.     

Identität, Familie, Patienten, Olympier

The author deals with the tradition of mental patterns in psychoanalytic institutes shaping the character of training. He discusses several patterns which in his opinion have become dysfunctional and are already in change: the family model, the patient model, the conception of training analysts as Olympians, the psychoanalytic identity as the endpoint of training and the model of the closed society. He argues for further transformation of these institutionalized patterns in order to avoid stagnation and remain future oriented. For each pattern he proposes concrete measures, which can be helpful for change.     

The Fictitious Audience of 1 Peter

Recent scholarship has argued that Simon Peter is not the author of 1 Peter, whilst maintaining that the addressees in 1:1 are the real recipients of the letter. We contend that both the stated author and the stated audience are part of the author’s deception. We propose instead that the author may have simply argued that this text was an older letter from Peter. This proposal is consistent with the widely-held view that pseudepigraphical letters were not knowingly accepted in early Christian circles, as well as the ancient tradition that Peter was believed to be the real author of the text and offers a simple solution as to how the letter escaped the scrutiny that came with pseudepigraphical works. If this thesis is followed, scholarship concerned with uncovering the socio-economic status of the Christians in Asia Minor based on this text is therefore misguided.