Psychotherapy as Moral Encounter: A Crisis of Modern Conscience

Psychotherapy can no longer be understood as a morally neutral or value-free practice. Many have argued that psychology is implicitly and inevitably laden with moral assumptions and has a significant impact on the moral and ethical fabric of its clients and surrounding society (Browning 1987; Doherty 1995; Dueck and Reimer 2003; Kelly and Strupp 1992; Rieff 1987, 2006). In this work, the authors highlight the profound identity crises within the field of psychology around the place of morality/ethics in its theories and practices. Chronicling some of the shifts between modern and postmodern theory will allow for a meaningful engagement with this issue. The postmodern shifts in the field have left clinicians ideologically hampered in their ability to attend to the moral dimensions of their clients’ lives. In conclusion, the authors posit a virtue ethics and consider avenues of holistically and meaningfully infusing clinical practice with moral sensibilities.     

Woman's changing image of self

Not only is the Heart a Hornbook, It is the Minds Bible, it is the Minds experience, it is the teat from which the Mind or intelligence sucks its identity. Keats     

Open-mindedness and Religious Devotion

To be open-minded is to be willing to revise or entertain doubts about one’s beliefs. Commonly regarded as an intellectual virtue, and often too as a moral virtue, open-mindedness is a trait that is generally desirable for a person to have. However, in the major theistic traditions, absolute commitment to one’s religious beliefs is regarded as virtuous or ideal. But one cannot be completely resolved about an issue and at the same time be open to revising one’s beliefs about it. It appears, then, that religious devotion is inconsistent with open-mindedness. The more religiously devout a person is, the more firmly she will hold to her convictions. And the stronger her belief commitments, the less open-minded she will be regarding these beliefs. So there appears to be a paradox here, where from the standpoint of religious devotion, it is virtuous to display an intellectual vice, namely closed-mindedness. I discuss this problem and explore some potential routes of escape from the paradox.     

Jewish Blood: Reality and Metaphor in History,Religion, and Culture

Although Rodney Stark is best known for his work on religious economies, he has recently turned his attention to the social effects of monotheism. If we look carefully on the theoretical trajectory evident in this recent work, what we find is a social-evolutionary approach to religion that was prevalent in the 19th century, but long ago assumed by most academics to be discredited. Furthermore, as becomes increasingly evident going through this series, the particular social-evolutionary sequence that Stark constructs has been shaped by a vision of Protestant triumphalism, and a privileging of evangelical Protestantism, that also belongs to an earlier time. While it would easy to ignore Stark's work (and the last two books in this series do seem to have been ignored in academic circles), there are reasons (which include the popular appeal of his work and his treatment of Islam) for taking his work seriously.     

An eye for relations: eye-tracking indicates long-term negative effects of operational thinking on understanding of math equivalence

Prior knowledge in the domain of mathematics can sometimes interfere with learning and performance in that domain. One of the best examples of this phenomenon is in students’ difficulties solving equations with operations on both sides of the equal sign. Elementary school children in the U.S. typically acquire incorrect, operational schemata rather than correct, relational schemata for interpreting equations. Researchers have argued that these operational schemata are never unlearned and can continue to affect performance for years to come, even after relational schemata are learned. In the present study, we investigated whether and how operational schemata negatively affect undergraduates’ performance on equations. We monitored the eye movements of 64 undergraduate students while they solved a set of equations that are typically used to assess children’s adherence to operational schemata (e.g., 3 + 4 + 5 = 3 + __). Participants did not perform at ceiling on these equations, particularly when under time pressure. Converging evidence from performance and eye movements showed that operational schemata are sometimes activated instead of relational schemata. Eye movement patterns reflective of the activation of relational schemata were specifically lacking when participants solved equations by adding up all the numbers or adding the numbers before the equal sign, but not when they used other types of incorrect strategies. These findings demonstrate that the negative effects of acquiring operational schemata extend far beyond elementary school.     

Richard (Routley) Sylvan: Writings on Logic and Metaphysics

Richard Sylvan (né Routley) was one of Australasia's most prolific and systematic philosophers. Though known for his innovative work in logic and metaphysics, the astonishing breadth of his philosophical endeavours included almost all reaches of philosophy. Taking the view that very basic assumptions of mainstream philosophy were fundamentally mistaken, he sought radical change across a wide range of theories. However, his view of the centrality of logic and recognition of the possibilities opened up by logical innovation in the fundamental areas of metaphysics resulted in his working primarily in these two, closely connected fields. It is this work in logic and metaphysics that is the main focus of what follows.     

On Russell's vulnerability to Russell's paradox

Influenced by G. E. Moore, Russell broke with Idealism towards the end of 1898; but in later years he characterized his meeting Peano in August 1900 as ‘the most important event’ in ‘the most important year in my intellectual life’. While Russell discovered his paradox during his post-Peano period, the question arises whether he was already committed, during his pre-Peano Moorean period, to assumptions from which his paradox may be derived. Peter Hylton has argued that the pre-Peano Russell was thus vulnerable to (at least one version of) Russell's paradox and hence that the paradox exposes a pre-existing difficulty in Russell's Moorean philosophy. Contrary to Hylton, I argue that the Moorean Russell adhered to views which insulated him against the paradox. Further, I argue that Russell became vulnerable to his paradox as a result of changes in his Moorean position occasioned, first, by his acceptance of Cantor's theory of the transfinite, and, second, by his correspondence with Frege. I conclude with some general comments regarding Russell's acceptance of naïve set theory.