Reality monitoring in patients with body dysmorphic disorder

Patients with body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) typically have very poor insight into their disorder. Their conviction in their ugliness is often of delusional intensity. Reality monitoring is the ability to distinguish in memory between things that one has imagined and things that one has perceived. Deficits in reality monitoring have been associated with the development of other delusional beliefs. Therefore, in the present study we investigated whether individuals with BDD (n = 20) demonstrate impairments in reality monitoring relative to individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; n = 20) and healthy controls (n = 20). This hypothesized impairment might predispose people with BDD to confuse memories of how they imagine themselves to appear (i.e., ugly) with memories of how they actually appear (i.e., normal). All participants completed a memory task assessing reality-monitoring ability for verbal stimuli. The BDD patients did not exhibit a reality-monitoring deficit despite elevated levels of focal delusionality. The results suggest that impairments in reality monitoring do not contribute to the development or maintenance of appearance-related beliefs in BDD.     

Influences of Gender as a Basic-Level Category in Person Perception on the Gender Belief System

The use of gender as an organizing category in social perception and its influence on the gender belief systemwere investigated. A modified version of the Role Construct Repertory Test and selected self-report questionnaires were completed by 190 college students (165 women and 25 men). All the participants used gender to organize their person schemas, and using gender in this way related positively to gender stereotyping. Both sexist gender attitudes and use of gender as an organizing category predicted gender stereotyping. Components of the gender belief system were only correlated if they were conceptually similar. The findings are congruent with gender transcendent and multifactorial gender identity theories.     

What moderates implicit—explicit consistency?

Implicit and explicit indicators of attitudes or personality traits are positively, and variably, related. This review places the question of implicit ‐ explicit consistency into the tradition of attitude/trait ‐ behaviour consistency (e.g., Wicker, 1969). Drawing on dual-process models, such as the recent distinction between associative and propositional representations (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), we identify a working model of implicit ‐ explicit consistency that organises the empirical evidence on implicit ‐ explicit moderation into five factors: translation between implicit and explicit representations (e.g., representational strength, awareness), additional information integration for explicit representations (e.g., need for cognition), properties of explicit assessment (e.g., social desirability concerns), properties of implicit assessment (e.g., situational malleability), and research design factors (e.g., sampling bias, measurement correspondence).     

Explanatory priority monism

Philosophical Studies - Explanations are backed by many different relations: causation, grounding, and arguably others too. But why are these different relations capable of backing explanations? In...     

Working memory and intelligence--their correlation and their relation: comment on Ackerman, Beier, and Boyle (2005)

On the basis of a meta-analysis of pairwise correlations between working memory tasks and cognitive ability measures, P. L. Ackerman, M. E. Beier, and M. O. Boyle (2005; see record 2004-22408-002) claimed that working memory capacity (WMC) shares less than 25% of its variance with general intelligence (g) and with reasoning ability. In this comment, the authors argue that this is an underestimation because of several methodological shortcomings and biases. A reanalysis of the data reported in Ackerman et al. using the correct statistical procedures demonstrates that g and WMC are very highly correlated. On a conceptual level, the authors point out that WMC should be regarded as an explanatory construct for intellectual abilities. Theories of working memory do not claim that WMC is isomorphic with intelligence factors but that it is a very strong predictor of reasoning ability and also predicts general fluid intelligence and g.     

Are current theories of panic falsifiable?

The authors examine 6 theories of panic attacks as to whether empirical approaches are capable of falsifying them and their heuristic value. The authors conclude that the catastrophic cognitions theory is least falsifiable because of the elusive nature of thoughts but that it has greatly stimulated research and therapy. The vicious circle theory is falsifiable only if the frightening internal sensations are specified. The 3-alarms theory postulates an indeterminate classification of attacks. Hyperventilation theory has been falsified. The suffocation false alarm theory lacks biological parameters that unambiguously index dyspnea or its distinction between anticipatory and panic anxiety. Some correspondences postulated between clinical phenomena and brain areas by the neuroanatomical hypothesis may be falsifiable if panic does not depend on specific thoughts. All these theories have heuristic value, and their unfalsifiable aspects are capable of modification.     

Applying evidence to support ethical decisions: Is the placebo really powerless?

Using placebos in day-to-day practice is an ethical problem. This paper summarises the available epidemiological evidence to support this difficult decision. Based on these data we propose to differentiate between placebo and “knowledge framing”. While the use of placebo should be confined to experimental settings in clinical trials, knowledge framing — which is only conceptually different from placebo — is a desired, expected and necessary component of any doctor-patient encounter. Examples from daily practice demonstrate both, the need to investigate the effects of knowledge framing and its impact on ethical, medical, economical and legal decisions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “Placebo: Its Action and Place in Health Research Today,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 12–13 April, 2003.     

Are “implicit” attitudes unconscious?

A widespread assumption in recent research on attitudes is that self-reported (explicit) evaluations reflect conscious attitudes, whereas indirectly assessed (implicit) evaluations reflect unconscious attitudes. The present article reviews the available evidence regarding unconscious features of indirectly assessed "implicit" attitudes. Distinguishing between three different aspects of attitudes, we conclude that (a) people sometimes lack conscious awareness of the origin of their attitudes, but that lack of source awareness is not a distinguishing feature of indirectly assessed versus self-reported attitudes, (b) there is no evidence that people lack conscious awareness of indirectly assessed attitudes per se, and (c) there is evidence showing that, under some conditions, indirectly assessed (but not self-reported) attitudes influence other psychological processes outside of conscious awareness. Implications for the concept of "implicit attitudes" are discussed.