On the masking and disclosure of unconscious elaborate processing. A reply to Van Opstal, Reynvoet, and Verguts (2005)

We have recently argued that unconscious numerical stimuli might activate responses by a match with prespecified action trigger codes (action trigger account) rather than by semantic prime processing (elaborate processing account). [Van Opstal, F., Reynvoet, B., and Verguts, T. (2005). How to trigger elaborate processing? A comment on Kunde, Kiesel, and Hoffmann (2003). Cognition] replicate one piece of evidence for our inference—an inefficiency of primes not presented in target format (verbal or Arabic). But this was found only with letter masks and not with hash masks. The authors conclude that letter masks block unconscious prime processing, and that elaborate processing can account for unconscious priming effects if all its (sometimes subtle) side conditions are considered. We agree that the type of mask in general is an important factor in priming studies but we note that (i) the authors' mask-blocking hypothesis is not well supported by the data, (ii) clear evidence for semantic prime processing in their study is lacking and, (iii) differences in mask efficiency (rather than mask type) might account for the conflicting results. To corroborate this inference we replicate van Opstal et al.'s results with letter masks but reduced mask efficiency. Altogether their data do not challenge the action-trigger account nor do they strongly support the elaborate processing view.     

Consciousness and cognitive control

The implementation or change of information processing routines, known as cognitive control, is traditionally believed to be closely linked to consciousness. It seems that we exert control over our behavior if we know the reasons for, and consequences of, doing so. Recent research suggests, however, that several behavioral phenomena that have been construed as instances of cognitive control can be prompted by events of which actors are not aware. Here we give a brief review of this research, discuss possible reasons for inconsistencies in the empirical evidence, and suggest some lines of future research. Specifically, we suggest to differentiate cognitive control evoked either because of explicit or because of implicit control cues. While the former type of control seems to work outside of awareness, the latter type of control seems to be restricted to consciously registered events that call for control.     

Trust my face: cognitive factors of head fakes in sports

In many competitive sports, players try to deceive their opponents about their behavioral intentions by using specific body movements or postures called fakes. For example, fakes are performed in basketball when a player gazes in one direction but passes or shoots the ball in another direction to avert efficient defense actions. The present study aimed to identify the cognitive processes that underlie the effects of fakes. The paradigmatic situation studied was the head fake in basketball. Observers (basketball novices) had to decide as quickly as possible whether a basketball player would pass a ball to the left or to the right. The player's head and gaze were oriented in the direction of an intended pass or in the opposite direction (i.e., a head fake). Responding was delayed for incongruent compared to congruent directions of the player's gaze and the pass. This head fake effect was independent of response speed, the presence of a fake in the immediately preceding trial, and practice with the task. Five further experiments using additive-factors logic and locus-of-slack logic revealed a perceptual rather than motor-related origin of this effect: Turning the head in a direction opposite the pass direction appears to hamper the perceptual encoding of pass direction, although it does not induce a tendency to move in the direction of the head's orientation. The implications of these results for research on deception in sports and their relevance for sports practice are discussed.     

An information-based approach to action understanding

It has been proposed that the ability to make sense of other agents' behavior relies on the activation of internal mechanisms that map action perception onto action execution. In this study we explored the constraints on this ability introduced by eyeheight-scaled information in the optic array. Short and tall participants provided maximum overhead reaching judgments for themselves and another participant. Perceptual information was manipulated by changing the participants' optically specified eyeheight. Observers were modestly accurate in perceiving maximum overhead reach for themselves and for another actor whose action capabilities differed. Perceived maximum overhead reach increased for both self- and other-judgments when the perceiver's eyeheight was increased. The results suggest an important role of perceptual information that has gone unrecognized in existing accounts of action understanding and prediction.     

Validity and Adverse Impact Potential of Predictor Composite Formation

Previous research on the validity and adverse impact (AI) of predictor composite formation focused on the merits of regression‐based or ad hoc composites. We argue for a broader focus. Ad hoc chosen composites are usually not Pareto‐optimal, whereas the regression‐based composite represents only one element from the total set of Pareto‐optimal composites and can, therefore, provide only limited information on the potential for validity and AI reduction of forming predictor composites when both validity and AI are of concern. In that case, other Pareto‐optimal composites may provide a better benchmark to decide on the merits of the predictor composite formation. We summarize a method to determine the set of Pareto‐optimal composites and apply the method to a representative collection of selection predictors. The application shows that the assessment of the AI and validity of predictor composite formation can differ substantially from the one arrived at when considering only regression‐based composites.     

Female degus (Octodon degus) monitor their environment while foraging socially

Vigilance or scanning involves interruptions in foraging behavior when individuals lift their heads and conduct visual monitoring of the environment. Theoretical considerations assume that foraging with the "head down", and scanning ("head up") are mutually exclusive activities, such that foraging precludes vigilance. We tested this generalization in a socially foraging, small mammal model, the diurnal Chilean degu (Octodon degus). We studied spontaneous bouts of scanning of captive degus when foraging in pairs of female sibs and non-sibs. We examined the extent to which foraging (head down postures) and scanning (head up postures) were mutually exclusive in subjects exposed to none, partial, and complete lateral visual obstruction of their partners. In addition, we monitored the orientation of their bodies to examine the target of attention while foraging and scanning. Lastly, we examined the temporal occurrence of scanning events to assess the extent of scanning coordination, and whether this coordination is kin-biased. Visual obstruction had a significant influence on degu vigilance. Focal degus increased their quadrupedal and semi-erect scanning when foraging under a partially obstructed view of their partners. Degus oriented their bodies toward partners when foraging and scanning. Despite this, degus did not coordinate scanning bouts; instead, they scanned independently from one another. Relatedness among cage mates did not influence any aspect of degu behavior. Contrary to theoretical expectations, these results indicate that foraging and vigilance are not mutually exclusive, and that kinship per se does not influence scanning behavior and coordination.     

Goal congruency without stimulus congruency in bimanual coordination

Two experiments explored the role of stimulus congruency and goal congruency for the generation of object-oriented actions with two hands. Participants had to place two objects into either parallel or opposite orientations by carrying out either symmetrical or asymmetrical forearm rotations. Performance was superior when the required object orientations were identical rather than different, almost independent of the symmetry of the required arm movements. In extending previous research, goal congruency effects ensued even under conditions in which congruency of imperative response signals could not have contributed to goal congruency effects, either because only a single stimulus was used to indicate the required goals in an individual trial (Experiment 1) or such stimuli were absent at all (Experiment 2). The results thus confirm the importance of goal codes for the reconcilableness of bimanual actions, and rule out accounts in terms of stimulus-related processes.     

Global Distributive Justice

The paper discusses the problem of global distributive justice. It proposes to distinguish between principles for the domestic and for the global or intersocietal distribution of wealth. It is argued that there may be a plurality of partly diverging domestic conceptions of distributive justice, not all of which need to be liberal egalitarian conceptions. It is maintained, however, that principles regulating the intersocietal distribution of wealth have to be egalitarian principles. This claim is defended against Rawls's argument in The Law of Peoples that egalitarian principles of distributive justice should not be applied globally. Moreover, it is explained in detail, why Rawls's "duty of assistance to burdened societies" cannot be an appropriate substitute for a global principle of distributive justice.