Asymmetric transfer effects between cognitive and affective task disturbances

Task-irrelevant features of a stimulus can disturb performance on a given task, and this can occur for cognitive reasons such as irrelevant stimulus position, and affective reasons such as high stimulus valence. The human brain adapts to such disturbances in order to ensure successful task performance. Adaptations can occur in a transient manner in response to recent events, and they can also be sustained to account for overall probabilities of disturbances. Here, we study the mutual interplay between affective and cognitive task disturbances under conditions of sustained conflict adaptation. More precisely, we examined the trajectory of finger movements in a speeded classification task and investigated whether adaptation to a high probability of spatial disturbances transfers to the impact of affective disturbances (Experiment 1) and whether adaptation to a high probability of affective disturbances transfers to the impact of spatial disturbances (Experiment 2). Our observations point towards an asymmetric transfer from adaptation to affective onto the processing of cognitive disturbances, but not the other way around.     

Challenging the By-Product Theory of Religion in the Cognitive Science of Religion

In this short article I argue that neurotheology should be conceived and practiced within a theological framework. Taking the case of Catholic theology as an example, five proposals are provided that offer a glimpse and, in my estimation, a realistic account of a (future) Catholic neurotheology. I identify two possible modes of how to practice Catholic neurotheology and conclude that any Catholic neurotheology that attempts to be practiced in accordance with these five proposals will be extremely challenging for Catholic theology.     

On the costs of refocusing items in working memory: a matter of inhibition or decay?

The present study investigates the mental processes that are applied to previously attended items of working memory. In an object-switching task, participants counted the number of sequentially presented objects. In Experiment 1 the processing time increased when the object category switched from the prior trial compared to a repetition. More importantly, the further in the past the last instance of a current category was presented, the more processing time was necessary - an observation suggesting passive decay rather than inhibition of previously attended items. However, results differed when only two object categories were employed. Experiment 2 suggests that the lack of a clear indication of decay with small numbers of categories was due to participants' expectancy of category switches rather than repetitions. Taken together, the results suggest that working memory items become less accessible the longer they have not been attended to, when strategic processes are controlled.     

Context-specific prime-congruency effects: On the role of conscious stimulus representations for cognitive control

Recent research suggests that processing of irrelevant information can be modulated in a rapid online fashion by contextual information in the task environment depending on the usefulness of that information in different contexts. Congruency effects evoked by irrelevant stimulus attributes are smaller in contexts with high proportions of incongruent trials and larger in contexts with high proportions of congruent trials (e.g., Corballis and Gratton, 2003, Lehle and Hübner, 2008). The present study investigates these context-adaptation effects in a masked-priming paradigm. Context-specific adaptation effects transfer to stimulus identities that are equiprobale in all contexts – an observation that renders explanations in terms of event-learning processes unlikely. Yet, context-specific effects vanished when the irrelevant information remained unconscious. The results suggest that context-specific adaptation of congruency effects reflect cognitive control operations that alter the processing of irrelevant information depending on the experienced utility of that information for action control.     

Visual and tactile action effects determine bimanual coordination performance

Effect-based models of motor control assign a crucial role to anticipated perceptual feedback in action planning. Two experiments were conducted to test the validity of this proposal for discrete bimanual key press responses. The results revealed that the normally observed performance advantage for the preparation of two responses with homologous rather than non-homologous fingers becomes inverted when homologous fingers produce non-identical visual effects, and non-homologous fingers produce identical visual effects. In the second experiment the finger homology effect was strongly reduced when homologous fingers produced non-identical tactile feedback. The results show that representations of to-be-produced visual and tactile action effects both contribute to action planning, though possibly to a varying degree. Implications of these results for effect-based models of motor control are considered.     

Extraversion, sensation seeking and electrodermal response: Probing a paradox

Extraversion and psychoticism are thought to relate inversely to electrodermal response amplitude. Paradoxically, sensation-seeking scales, which correlate positively with extraversion and psychoticism, have shown a positive relation to electrodermal response amplitude. In the present inquiry, inverse relationships were obeserved for extraversion and psychoticism with the electrodermal response to visual stimuli. Sensation seeking was also negatively related to the magnitude of the initial electrodermal response to pictures. A lowered response to words for low sensation seekers was observed that appeared to be influenced by skin conductance level.     

The Biological Function Paradigm Applied to the Immunological Self-Non-Self Discrimination: Critique of Tauber's Phenomenological Analysis

Biological self reference idioms in brain-centered or nervous-system-centered self determination of the consious Self reveal an interesting contrast with biological self-determination by immunological self/non-self discrimination. This contrast is both biological and epistemological. In contrast to the consciousness conscious of itself, the immunological self-determination imposes a protective mechanism against self-recognition (Coutinho et al. 1984), which adds to a largely unconscious achievement of the biological Self (Popper 1977; Medawar 1959). The latter viewpoint is in contrast with the immunological Self-determination as an essentially cognitive process as expressed in the analysis of Tauber (1994). Comparison of the immune system in vertebrates and invertebrates, according to new biological insights, has contributed to a better understanding of the relative role of innate (or inherited) immunity versus immunity acquired during each individual life. Also in this respect, immunological self-achievement shows both a striking analogy and a fundamental discrepancy with the activity of the nervous system. The analysis of immunological Self/non-self discrimination versus brain-centered self-determination adds to the understanding of the function paradigm in biological self-reference idioms, especially when regarding the importance of the connectivity notion in both systems. Adopting functional explanatory schemes for understanding immunological self-non-self discrimination, as well as for the understanding of functional mapping of the brain at (conscious) activity (Friston et al. 1993; Frith et al. 1995), forwards the notion of effective/functional connectivity. Network connectivity not only is a primary question in solving the dimensionality question for immunological ‘idiotypic networks’ (Jerne 1974a, b; 1984), it may also have an important value in describing phase transitions in the development of both immune and nervous systems. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.