Verbal response-effect compatibility

Ideomotor theory states that motor responses are activated by an anticipation of their sensory effects. We assumed that anticipated effects would produce response-effect (R-E) compatibility when there is dimensional overlap of effects and responses. In a four-choice task, visual digit stimuli called for verbal responses (color names). Each response produced a written response-effect on the screen. In different groups, the response-effect was a colored color word (e.g., blue in blue), a white color word, or a colored nonword (Xs in blue). In different blocks, the predictable effects were either incompatible (e.g., response "blue" --> effect: green) or compatible with the response. We found faster responses with compatible than with incompatible R-E mappings. The compatibility effect was strongest with colored words, intermediate with white words, and smallest with colored nonwords. We conclude that effect anticipation influences response selection on both a perceptual level (related to the word's color) and a conceptual level (related to the word's meaning).     

No anticipation–no action: the role of anticipation in action and perception

This paper reviews psychophysical evidence for the existence and the nature of two types of anticipation in goal-oriented action. The first one relates to attained changes of the perceptual world, thus to action goals. These anticipations determine appropriate motor output. We argue that goal codes do not only serve as a reference unit, against which currently produced behavioral effects are compared. Rather voluntary actions appear to be planned literally in terms of intended behavioral effects. The second type of anticipation relates to the environmental conditions that have to be met to bring an intended effect into being. These anticipations serve to trigger selected actions, when appropriate execution conditions are encountered. Altogether, the behavioral evidence portrays a remarkable automaticity of goal-oriented action. Once a goal exists (wherever it might come from), corresponding efferent output is generated and executed under appropriate conditions.     

Joint response–effect compatibility

When performing jointly on a task, human agents are assumed to represent their coactor’s share of this task, and research in various joint action paradigms has focused on representing the coactor’s stimulus–response assignments. Here we show that the response–effect (R–E) contingencies exploited by a coactor also affect performance, and thus might be represented as if they were used by oneself. Participants performed an R–E compatibility task, with keypresses producing spatially compatible or incompatible action effects. We did not observe any R–E compatibility effects when the task was performed in isolation (individual go–no-go). By contrast, small but reliable R–E compatibility effects emerged when the same task was performed in a joint setting. These results indicate that the knowledge of a coactor’s R–E contingencies can influence whether self-produced action effects are used for one’s own motor control.     

Asymmetric transfer effects between cognitive and affective task disturbances

Task-irrelevant features of a stimulus can disturb performance on a given task, and this can occur for cognitive reasons such as irrelevant stimulus position, and affective reasons such as high stimulus valence. The human brain adapts to such disturbances in order to ensure successful task performance. Adaptations can occur in a transient manner in response to recent events, and they can also be sustained to account for overall probabilities of disturbances. Here, we study the mutual interplay between affective and cognitive task disturbances under conditions of sustained conflict adaptation. More precisely, we examined the trajectory of finger movements in a speeded classification task and investigated whether adaptation to a high probability of spatial disturbances transfers to the impact of affective disturbances (Experiment 1) and whether adaptation to a high probability of affective disturbances transfers to the impact of spatial disturbances (Experiment 2). Our observations point towards an asymmetric transfer from adaptation to affective onto the processing of cognitive disturbances, but not the other way around.     

Challenging the By-Product Theory of Religion in the Cognitive Science of Religion

In this short article I argue that neurotheology should be conceived and practiced within a theological framework. Taking the case of Catholic theology as an example, five proposals are provided that offer a glimpse and, in my estimation, a realistic account of a (future) Catholic neurotheology. I identify two possible modes of how to practice Catholic neurotheology and conclude that any Catholic neurotheology that attempts to be practiced in accordance with these five proposals will be extremely challenging for Catholic theology.