Putting the client in control: The perception of control in the behavioral treatment of anxiety

Traditional explanations of anxiety reduction through behavioral interventions such as extinction, habituation, reciprocal inhibition, and counterconditioning do not adequately account for all instances and aspects of anxiety reduction and clinical methods employed in contemporary behavior therapy. This article examines the role of an additional process — the alterations of perceptions of control — believed to be operative in anxiety reduction. We discuss three targets for establishing control in behavioral treatments of anxiety: (1) control over one's physiological responding while in an anxiety-producing situation, (2) control over the anxiety-producing stimulus or situation itself, and (3) control over the conduct of exposure. These three types of control perceptions are differentially important for different types of anxiety disorders. Implications for the conduct of behavioral treatments and possibilities for increasing client perceptions of control in anxiety treatment programs are outlined. We also recommend that client perceptions of control should be systematically assessed in order to relate them to treatment successes and failures.     

Basal ganglia, dopamine and temporal processing: performance on three timing tasks on and off medication in Parkinson's disease

A pervasive hypothesis in the timing literature is that temporal processing in the milliseconds and seconds range engages the basal ganglia and is modulated by dopamine. This hypothesis was investigated by testing 12 patients with Parkinson's disease (PD), both 'on' and 'off' dopaminergic medication, and 20 healthy controls on three timing tasks. In a seconds range (30-120 s) time production task, patients tested 'on' medication showed a significantly different accuracy profile compared to controls and when tested 'off' medication. However, no group or on vs off medication differences in accuracy were found on a time reproduction task and a warned reaction time task requiring temporal processing within the 250-2000 ms range. Variability was measured using the coefficient of variation, with the performance of the patient group on the time reproduction task violating the scalar property, suggesting atypical temporal processing mechanisms. The data suggest that the integrity of the basal ganglia is necessary for 'typical' time production in the seconds range as well as for time reproduction at shorter intervals. Exploratory factor analysis suggested that the time production task uses neural mechanisms distinct from those used in the other two timing tasks. The dissociation of the effects of dopaminergic medication and nature of task on performance in PD raises interesting questions about the pharmacological mediation and task-specificity of deficits in temporal processing.     

Formalization and the Objects of Logic

There is a long-standing debate whether propositions, sentences, statements or utterances provide an answer to the question of what objects logical formulas stand for. Based on the traditional understanding of logic as a science of valid arguments, this question is firstly framed more exactly, making explicit that it calls not only for identifying some class of objects, but also for explaining their relationship to ordinary language utterances. It is then argued that there are strong arguments against the proposals commonly put forward in the debate. The core of the problem is that an informative account of the objects formulas stand for presupposes a theory of formalization; that is, a theory that explains what formulas may adequately substitute for an inference in proofs of validity. Although such theories are still subject to research, some consequences can be drawn from an analysis of the reasons why the common accounts featuring sentences, propositions or utterances fail. Theories of formalization cannot refer to utterances qua expressions of propositions; instead they may refer to sentences and rely on additional information about linguistic structure and pragmatic context.     

New Confucianism and the semantics of individuality. a Luhmannian analysis

This article discusses New Confucian views on individuality and related philosophical problems. Special emphasis is given to the position of Tu Wei‐Ming (Du Weiming), a foremost living New Confucian thinker. It is pointed out that many New Confucian philosophers share a vision of a Confucian ‘ideal’ individuality or selfhood based on social integration – as opposed to a Western type of individuality sometimes portrayed as an individuality by isolation. These patterns of individuality are further examined on the basis of Niklas Luhmann's historical analysis of the semantics of individuality and his categories of ‘individuality by inclusion’ and ‘individuality by exclusion’. Finally, some parallels and differences between Confucian and the Luhmannian viewpoints are pointed out, and a suggestion on how a Luhmannian perspective might contribute to reformulations of New Confucian thought is attempted.     

The Psychometric Costs of Applicants' Faking: Examining Measurement Invariance and Retest Correlations Across Response Conditions

This study examines the stability of the response process and the rank-order of respondents responding to 3 personality scales in 4 different response conditions. Applicants to the University College of Teacher Education Styria (N = 243) completed personality scales as part of their college admission process. Half a year later, they retook the same personality scales in 1 of 3 randomly assigned experimental response conditions: honest, faking-good, or reproduce. Longitudinal means and covariance structure analyses showed that applicants' response processes could be partially reproduced after half a year, and respondents seemed to rely on an honest response behavior as a frame of reference. Additionally, applicants' faking behavior and instructed faking (faking-good) caused differences in the latent retest correlations and consistently affected measurement properties. The varying latent retest correlations indicated that faking can distort respondents' rank-order and thus the fairness of subsequent selection decisions, depending on the kind of faking behavior. Instructed faking (faking-good) even affected weak measurement invariance, whereas applicants' faking behavior did not. Consequently, correlations with personality scales—which can be utilized for predictive validity—may be readily interpreted for applicants. Faking behavior also introduced a uniform bias, implying that the classically observed mean raw score differences may not be readily interpreted.     

Emotional Intelligence and cognitive abilities – associations and sex differences

In order to expand on previous research, this cross-sectional study investigated the relationship between Emotional Intelligence (EI) and cognitive abilities in healthy adults with a special focus on potential sex differences. EI was assessed by means of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional-Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), whereas cognitive abilities were investigated using the Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS), which measures key aspects of cognitive functioning, i.e. verbal memory, working memory, motor speed, verbal fluency, attention and processing speed, and reasoning and problem solving. 137 subjects (65% female) with a mean age of 38.7 ± 11.8 years were included into the study. While males and females were comparable with regard to EI, men achieved significantly higher BACS composite scores and outperformed women in the BACS subscales motor speed, attention and processing speed, and reasoning and problem solving. Verbal fluency significantly predicted EI, whereas the MSCEIT subscale understanding emotions significantly predicted the BACS composite score. Our findings support previous research and emphasize the relevance of considering cognitive abilities when assessing ability EI in healthy individuals.     

What’s the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Matter</Emphasis> with cognition? A ‘Vygotskian’ perspective on material engagement theory

The cross-disciplinary framework of Material Engagement Theory (MET) has emerged as a novel research program that flexibly spans archeology, anthropology, philosophy, and cognitive science. True to its slogan to ‘take material culture seriously’, “MET wants to change our understanding of what minds are and what they are made of by changing what we know about what things are and what they do for the mind” (Malafouris 2013, 141). By tracing out more clearly the conceptual contours of ‘material engagement,’ and firming up its ontological commitments, the main goal of this article is to help refine Malafouris’ fertile approach. In particular, we argue for a rapprochement between MET and the tradition of Cultural-Historical Activity Theory, based on the ‘Vygotskian’ hypothesis of scaffolded and/or distributed cognition.