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Demian Whiting 《European Journal of Philosophy》2011,19(2):281-303
Abstract: The ‘feeling theory of emotion’ holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear‐of‐something. To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the feeling theory of emotion against the challenge from the object‐directed emotions. 相似文献
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Daniel Whiting 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2017,51(2):398-420
A normative reason for a person to φ is a consideration which favours φing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person φs. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second‐order normative reasons (not) to φ for or on the basis of certain first‐order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second‐order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views in contemporary epistemology are committed to the existence of second‐order reasons, specifically, views about the epistemic norms governing practical reasoning and about the role of higher‐order evidence. If there are no second‐order reasons, those views are mistaken. 相似文献
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Daniel Whiting 《Philosophical Investigations》2005,28(4):369-375
Books reviewed:
Michael Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement , Blackwell Publishers, 2003, ix + 187, price £16.99 p.b. Reviewed by Daniel Whiting, University of Reading Department of Philosophy University of Reading Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AA danieljwhiting@hotmail.com 相似文献
Michael Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement , Blackwell Publishers, 2003, ix + 187, price £16.99 p.b. Reviewed by Daniel Whiting, University of Reading Department of Philosophy University of Reading Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AA danieljwhiting@hotmail.com 相似文献
35.
L.B. Estil H.T.A. Whiting H. Sigmundsson R.P. Ingvaldsen 《Infant and child development》2003,12(3):253-265
A step‐wise methodology is employed in order to identify common neurological factors underlying motor and language impairments where they occur together. A sample of 15 5–10‐year‐old children with predetermined language impairment was tested comprehensively using the Illinois Test of Psycholinguistic Ability (ITPA) and the Movement Assessment Battery for Children (Movement ABC). On the basis of these tests, only four of the sample were found to have generally poor performance both in psycholinguistic (particularly indexed by problems with visual closure and sound blending) and motor abilities (particularly indexed by manual dexterity problems—bimanual co‐ordination and drawing—and static balance. Further detailed examination of the findings fostered a number of plausible hypotheses to account for this communality. The viability of these different alternatives is discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Demian Whiting 《Ratio》2004,17(1):90-103
In this paper I aim to provide a characterisation of emotional disorder. I begin by criticising the thought that an agent can be judged to be experiencing an emotional disorder if his emotion causes him some type of harm. This then leads me to develop the claim that emotional disorder relates to sufficiently inappropriate emotion, where (sufficiently) inappropriate emotion relates to emotion that fails to be (sufficiently) responsive to the agent's beliefs and/or desires. Finally, I conclude the paper by suggesting that if an essentially non‐cognitivist conception of emotion is accepted then – on the characterisation of emotional disorder that I defend – there may exist strong grounds for thinking that cognitive therapy will be an inappropriate form of treatment in cases of emotional disorder.1 相似文献
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A structural pattern recognition method for the quantitative determination of equivalence or similarity between movement patterns was examined. A chain encoding technique was implemented for the analysis of lower limb trajectories during walking and running. Conjoint angular displacement or angular velocity patterns provided kinematic data which were cross-correlated to determine geometric congruity of within and between subject motor patterns. The correlations of the movement patterns during different speeds of locomotion revealed numerical coefficients which consistently and quantitatively discriminated the similarity or dissimilarity of limb movement patterns. 相似文献
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In six experiments, rats received an odor or a taste alone or in simultaneous compound with another taste prior to lithium chloride-induced illness. Aversions to the target odor and the target taste were then assessed. In Experiments 1–3, the presence of the taste in compound with the target during conditioning attenuated the strength of the aversions to both the target odor and the target taste. Although these results were consistent with the familiar principles of compound conditioning, they contradicted previous reports of potentiation, rather than attenuation, of odor conditioning by taste. In Experiment 4, taste again attenuated the conditioning of odor when a second odor was presented during the CS-US interval. In Experiment 5, we looked for odor potentiation with a within-subject design, and in Experiment 6, we examined an alternative method of presenting odor. In neither case did we find odor potentiation by taste. Over the range of conditions investigated here, a taste often attenuates, and never potentiates, the conditioning of aversions to both odors and tastes. 相似文献
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