Drag Gender: Experiences of Gender for Gay and Queer Men who Perform Drag

The present study explored the experience and understanding of gender for gay and queer men who perform drag. It is part of a 20-year program of research focused on how LGBTQ gender identities arise, why they coalesce, and how they are enacted within their social contexts. Interviewers on this topic involving 18 participants were subjected to a grounded theory analysis. Drag genders were tied to common experiences of overcoming social messages that maligned femininity within men, an appreciation of performance arts, and a desire to use social power to confront issues of sexism, genderism, and/or heterosexism. At the same time, participants reported differences in experiencing gender as binary or fluid and in whether they experienced their gender as shifting when engaged in performance. The study contributes to the program of research on LGBTQ genders by examining how drag gender is both essential and constructed, and how it resist sets of oppressive values and is eroticized. It examines how gendered communication functions when performed for audiences and how the social position of these men is both elevated and stigmatized within LGBTQ community. Drag gender’s multiple meanings are credited to its position between gay and transgender politics within this socially transformative moment in time.     

Binding in short-term visual memory

The integration of complex information in working memory, and its effect on capacity, shape the limits of conscious cognition. The literature conflicts on whether short-term visual memory represents information as integrated objects. A change-detection paradigm using objects defined by color with location or shape was used to investigate binding in short-term visual memory. Results showed that features from the same dimension compete for capacity, whereas features from different dimensions can be stored in parallel. Binding between these features can occur, but focused attention is required to create and maintain the binding over time, and this integrated format is vulnerable to interference. In the proposed model, working memory capacity is limited both by the independent capacity of simple feature stores and by demands on attention networks that integrate this distributed information into complex but unified thought objects.     

Similarity and difference in the processing of same- and other-race faces as revealed by eye tracking in 4- to 9-month-olds

Fixation duration for same-race (i.e., Asian) and other-race (i.e., Caucasian) female faces by Asian infant participants between 4 and 9 months of age was investigated with an eye-tracking procedure. The age range tested corresponded with prior reports of processing differences between same- and other-race faces observed in behavioral looking time studies, with preference for same-race faces apparent at 3 months of age and recognition memory differences in favor of same-race faces emerging between 3 and 9 months of age. The eye-tracking results revealed both similarity and difference in infants’ processing of own- and other-race faces. There was no overall fixation time difference between same race and other race for the whole face stimuli. In addition, although fixation time was greater for the upper half of the face than for the lower half of the face and trended higher on the right side of the face than on the left side of the face, face race did not impact these effects. However, over the age range tested, there was a gradual decrement in fixation time on the internal features of other-race faces and a maintenance of fixation time on the internal features of same-race faces. Moreover, the decrement in fixation time for the internal features of other-race faces was most prominent on the nose. The findings suggest that (a) same-race preferences may be more readily evidenced in paired comparison testing formats, (b) the behavioral decline in recognition memory for other-race faces corresponds in timing with a decline in fixation on the internal features of other-race faces, and (c) the center of the face (i.e., the nose) is a differential region for processing same- versus other-race faces by Asian infants.     

On the persuadability of memory: Is changing people's memories no more than changing their minds?

The observation of parallels between the memory distortion and persuasion literatures leads, quite logically, to the appealing notion that people can be ‘persuaded’ to change their memories. Indeed, numerous studies show that memory can be influenced and distorted by a variety of persuasive tactics, and the theoretical accounts commonly used by researchers to explain episodic and autobiographical memory distortion phenomena can generally predict and explain these persuasion effects. Yet, despite these empirical and theoretical overlaps, explicit reference to persuasion and attitude‐change research in the memory distortion literature is surprisingly rare. In this paper, we argue that stronger theoretical foundations are needed to draw the memory distortion and persuasion literatures together in a productive direction. We reason that theoretical approaches to remembering that distinguish (false) beliefs in the occurrence of events from (false) memories of those events – compatible with a source monitoring approach – would be beneficial to this end. Such approaches, we argue, would provide a stronger platform to use persuasion findings to enhance the psychological understanding of memory distortion.