Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise

Experimental philosophers have empirically challenged the connection between intuition and philosophical expertise. This paper reviews these challenges alongside other research findings in cognitive science on expert performance and argues for three claims. First, evidence taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by the well‐researched failures and limitations of genuine expertise. Second, studying the failures and limitations of experts across many fields provides a promising research program upon which to base a new model of philosophical expertise. Third, a model of philosophical expertise based on the limitations of genuine experts may suggest a series of constraints on the reliability of professional philosophical intuition.

Even when the experts all agree, they may well be mistaken. — Bertrand Russell, On the Value of Scepticism

     

Error possibility,contextualism, and bias

Synthese - A central theoretical motivation for epistemic contextualism is that it can explain something that invariantism cannot. Specifically, contextualism claims that judgments about...     

Poset Products as Relational Models

Studia Logica - We introduce a relational semantics based on poset products, and provide sufficient conditions guaranteeing its soundness and completeness for various substructural logics. We also...     

Masculinity,status, and subordination: Why working for a gender stereotype violator causes men to lose status

Occupying gender stereotype-incongruent roles can lead individuals to lose status and earn a lower salary. The present research examined whether merely working for a supervisor in a gender-atypical occupational role leads a subordinate to lose status. Two studies found that male subordinates of gender deviants (i.e., a female supervisor in a masculine domain or a male supervisor in a feminine domain) were accorded lower status and were paid less than male subordinates of supervisors in gender-congruent roles (i.e., a female supervisor in a feminine domain or a male supervisor in a masculine domain). However, the status of female subordinates was unaffected by working for a gender atypical supervisor. Moreover, the status loss for male subordinates was mediated by a perceived lack of masculinity. Thus, establishing the male subordinate's masculine credentials eliminated the bias.     

Response to Amesbury, Knepper, and Schillbrack

This is a response to three commentary papers on Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry: Envisioning a Future for the Philosophy of Religion (SUNY, 2010).     

The roles of planning,learning, and mental models in repeated dynamic decision making

Repeated search and decision making is a common consumer activity that should benefit from advanced planning. In three simulated shopping experiments, we find that people often fail to plan spontaneously or, when they do plan, do not use an appropriate mental model of the search problem. We also manipulate the mental models used by subjects and find that while our manipulation successfully encourages the development of appropriate mental models and improves performance when search costs are low, it does not result in the type of sophisticated mental model required to change strategies based on increased search costs. Finally, we show that the benefits of planning generalize to real world shopping behavior in a field experiment.     

The Value of Zoo Experiences for Connecting People with Nature

ABSTRACT

Zoos aspire to bring people closer to nature through visitor education and by creating environments that immerse visitors into naturalistic surroundings. Yet to date, the psychological and behavioral consequences of these attempts have not been well-documented through empirical study. The present study was designed to determine if visiting a zoo had a measurable impact on visitors' relationships with nature and to test whether this effect was moderated by the zoo setting and/or type of zoo experience. Data were collected from three different types of zoos in New York City. A total of 242 zoo visitors participated in this study by completing a set of scales measuring explicit and implicit self-nature associations. Findings suggest that zoo experiences do promote an increased implicit connectedness with nature, but no changes were found for self-reported explicit connectedness with nature. The authors found no evidence that this effect was moderated by a specific design strategy or scale of institution.     

Function and feeling machines: a defense of the philosophical conception of subjective experience

Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs about the entity to which those experiential states are attributed. In two experiments, we demonstrate that ordinary attributions of subjective experiences (of smell and felt emotions) to a simple robot are not sensitive to valence, but instead respond to functional assumptions about the entity to which the states are (or are not) attributed.