Abacs for determination of a correlation coefficient corrected for restriction of range

Abacs approximating the product-moment correlation for both explicit and implicit selection are presented. These abacs give accuracy to within .01 of the corresponding analytic estimate.     

Murphy on Postmodernity, Science, and Religion

Nancey Murphy claims that a shift in "thinking strategy" from modern to postmodern modes of thought makes it easier to exhibit the intellectual respectability of theology vis-à-vis the sciences. Her case for this proposition depends on modernist interests, most notably in systematizing the sciences for reasons that have their origin in Plato's divided line.     

Narrative aspects of a doctor-patient encounter

In this essay I want to examine the ways that doctors communicate with their patients, in particular the stories that doctors tell their patients. I contend that the kinds of stories that physicians tell patients have a direct bearing on the nature of their relationship as a whole. Specifically, I shall argue that physicians who tell their patients the most complete stories possible about their illnesses, acknowledging uncertainties wherever they exist (to the extent that this is possible), show the greatest amount of respect for their patients as persons. This quest for completeness must be supplemented by an attempt on the part of the physician to explore the patient's understanding and beliefs so as to formulate not only a more complete narrative, but also to formulate one that better serves the needs of the patient.     

IF OUR GENES ARE FOR US,WHO CAN BE AGAINST US? THOUGHTS OF A PRAGMATIST ON SCIENCE AND MORALITY

Abstract. The philosopher Michael Ruse accounts for the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, and thus the origin of distinctively moral obligations like that of altruism, in genetic terms. This is part of an attempt to develop a philosophy that takes Darwin seriously by substituting respectable scientific entities, specifically those of evolutionary biology, for suspect theological or philosophical ones, like God or the transcendental ego, as a basis for addressing philosophical questions. Pragmatists take Darwin seriously, but in a very different way from that proposed by Ruse. Darwin introduced a “logic” into the study of living things—including human beings, the human mind, and culture— that leads philosophers to ask new and different questions about morality rather than trying to supply new answers to the same old questions. This essay contrasts these two different ways of taking Darwin seriously for purposes of philosophy and claims certain advantages for the pragmatist way over Ruse's.     

Some consequences of conceiving society as a large group

There is today a convergence between politics and therapy, and disillusion with both. As awareness of boundaries increases, the question of how to both comprehend society and manage oneself becomes acute. We need always to connect the socio- with the psycho-. Study of the large group offers one such means. Life in the large group matches that in society and individual experience. The two basic defenses found in the large group (polarizing and institutionalizing) need not necessarily be defenses. They indicate another connection, namely, to the family. The family may be regarded as the place where we first learn about projections and have our first experience of an institution. The large group links individual, society, and family, especially when we see that the dynamics of the large group and the very small group (family sized) are congruent. Study of the large group is especially important for those whose primary work is with individuals. It may be confusing and exasperating, but that way lies learning.He has written a number of books on theology and pastoral practice employing the basic conceptual framework which underlies the group relations studies of the Tavistock Institute and the A. K. Rice Institute. He has extensive experience in such work. With E. R. Shapiro he has recently published a wider study of the application of such thinking to individuals, groups and society:Lost in Familiar Places: Creating New Connections Between the Individual and Society.     

Netscal: A network scaling algorithm for nonsymmetric proximity data

A simple property of networks is used as the basis for a scaling algorithm that represents nonsymmetric proximities as network distances. The algorithm determines which vertices are directly connected by an arc and estimates the length of each arc. Network distance, defined as the minimum pathlength between vertices, is assumed to be a generalized power function of the data. The derived network structure, however, is invariant across monotonic transformations of the data. A Monte Carlo simulation and applications to eight sets of proximity data support the practical utility of the algorithm.I am grateful to Roger Shepard and Amos Tversky for their helpful comments and guidance throughout this project. The work was supported by National Science Foundation Grant BNS-75-02806 to Roger Shepard and a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship to the author. Parts of this paper were drawn from a doctoral dissertation submitted to Stanford University (Hutchinson, 1981).     

ANTIVOLUNTARISM AND THE BIRTH OF AUTONOMY

Traditionalist and radical orthodox critiques of the Enlightenment assert that the modern discourse on moral self‐government constitutes a radical break with the theocentric model of morality which preceded it. Against this view, this paper argues that the conceptions of autonomy emerged from the effort to reconcile commitments within the Christian tradition. Through an analysis of the moral thought of the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, this paper contends that distinctively Christian theological concerns concerning moral accountability to God and the character of divine‐human moral relationships produced a theory of moral autonomy which anticipates that of Kant. This paper highlights the role of anti‐voluntarism in the creation of this moral standpoint, and argues that the resultant moral view is an “internalization” of the voluntarist model of sovereignty.