Fishing: Finding One’s Way to the Unconscious

By imagining ourselves to be fishing in the deep waters of the unconscious, we consider here many questions about the meeting of the personal ego and the powerful unknown energies that lie below—questions ranging from “Why should we even want to connect with such forces?” to “What’s the best way of doing it?” There are many more questions to ask, such as how does the unconscious express itself and when should we avoid a direct meeting with it and why?

As individuals and as cultures, we have long histories with the unconscious, sometimes welcoming it, sometimes trying to wall it off, sometimes being overwhelmed by it. In this article the author emphasizes the necessity of becoming aware of the unconscious, knowing it as something that is always active in us, recognizing that it is not under our control, and realizing that it is not of our own making.     

Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology

A standard view in contemporary philosophy is that belief is involuntary, either as a matter of conceptual necessity or as a contingent fact of human psychology. We present seven experiments on patterns in ordinary folk-psychological judgments about belief. The results provide strong evidence that voluntary belief is conceptually possible and, granted minimal charitable assumptions about folk-psychological competence, provide some evidence that voluntary belief is psychologically possible. We also consider two hypotheses in an attempt to understand why many philosophers have been tempted to view belief as involuntary: that belief is a prototype concept and that belief is a dual character concept. Altogether, our findings contribute to longstanding philosophical debates about the relationship between the will and the intellect, while also advancing scientific understanding of important social judgments.     

Pragmatism, Critical Realism, and the Cognitive Value of Religion and Science

Pragmatism and critical realism are different vocabularies for talking about the cognitive value of religion and science. Each can be, and has been, used to make the case for cognitive parity between religious and scientific discourse. Critical realism presupposes a particular form of cognitive psychology that entails general skepticism about the external world and forecloses scientific inquiry in the name of a preconceived idea of what the nature of human cognition must be. Thus, of the two, pragmatism is the better vocabulary for fostering mutual understanding between religion and science.     

Effects of computer interfaces on computer-based statistical analysis

Thirty-one first-year psychology graduate students in a computer applications course completed a set of structured problems, unstructured problems, and data-screening problems in each of two statistical computing environments: a menu-based interface (SPSS for Windows) and a traditional command-based interface (SPSSx). Performance on the menu-based interface was generally superior to performance on the command-based interface. More of the structured problems were completed successfully within the menu-based interface. The menu-based interface also facilitated error identification, was rated as easier to use, and was preferred nearly 4 to 1 over the command-based interface. For the unstructured problems, students identified more relationships in the data set and issued more statistical commands when working with the menu-based interface. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that because the menu-based interface requires fewer mental resources to be dedicated to the mechanics of analysis, more resources are available to devote to higher level problem solving.     

Effect of prefrontal cortex damage on resolving lexical ambiguity in text

The function of suppression of context-inappropriate meanings during lexical ambiguity resolution was examined in 25 adults with prefrontal cortex damage (PFCD) localized to the left (N=8), right (N=6), or bilaterally (N=11); and 21 matched Controls. Results revealed unexpected inverse patterns of suppression between PFCD and Control groups, with measures suggesting decreased interference across time in the PFCD group and increased interference in the Control group. The PFCD group, however, had significantly lower accuracy rates for the context-inappropriate condition. Results suggest a loss of the control aspects of inhibitory processes in lexical ambiguity resolution following PFCD. An aging effect on suppression function is also suggested.     

Thinking straight while seeing red: the influence of anger on information processing

Because angry people apparently rely on heuristic cues when making judgments, anger has been claimed to trigger superficial, nonanalytic information processing. In three studies, the authors found that induced anger promoted analytic processing. Experiment 1 showed that angry participants were more likely to discriminate between weak and strong arguments than participants in neutral moods. Experiment 2 demonstrated that anger overrode dispositional preferences not to process, causing even those low in need for cognition to process analytically. Experiment 3 reconciled these findings with previous work by showing that angry people used accessible, valid, and relevant heuristics but otherwise processed analytically, as indicated by attitude change and elaboration data. Together, these experiments showed that angry people can have both the capacity and motivation to process and that their selective use of heuristics reflects the cue's perceived validity and not the failure to process analytically.