Robert E. Park at Fisk

Nothing is known about Robert E. Park's last years at Fisk University. He retired to Fisk University in 1935. The following account reports about the positions that Park held in the last two years of his life, about research, the teaching of sociology, human ecology, and especially about various aspects of race and intercultural relations. In the conclusion, Park's theoretical notions are evaluated.     

Kausalgesetz und Quantenmechanik

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Categorization of multidimensional geometrical figures by chickens (Gallus gallus f. domestica): fit of basic assumptions from exemplar, feature and prototype theory

Five hens, experienced in discrimination of two categories of multidimensional geometrical figures presented in fixed pairs in a simultaneous discrimination, were tested with familiar figures arranged as new pairs to assess the dependence of categorization performance on learned relational or configural cues. Test performance did not differ from training: relational or configural cues still influenced discrimination performance. It was suggested that – in accordance with exemplar theories – this influence depended on differences between pairs of probe exemplars that facilitate retrieval of learned category members. To test whether exemplar, feature or prototype theory was most suitable to explain categorization by chickens, the rates of pecking at exemplars were analysed using principal components analysis (PCA). The distribution of the exemplars' component loads on the single component obtained was examined in the light of the conditions dictated by the three types of theories on how representative category exemplars should be. The least constraining theory, i.e. the exemplar theory, was most suitable. Defining factors of classificatory behaviour are discussed with a special emphasis on the characteristics of category-defining stimulus attributes. Accepted after revision: 29 May 2001 Electronic Publication     

Philosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell,Carnap, Wittgenstein,and Husserl

Philosophical intuition has become one of the most debated problems in recent years, largely due to the rise of the movement called experimental philosophy which challenged the conviction that philosophers have some special insight into abstract ideas such as being, knowledge, good and evil, intentional action, etc. In response to the challenge, some authors claim that there is a special cognitive faculty called philosophical intuition which delivers justification to philosophical theses, while some others deny it based on experimental results. A relatively smaller group of researchers aim at clarifying what the alleged intuition is. I follow the latter path. In this paper I argue that philosophical intuition is in the first place the capacity enabling one to what I refer to as the recognition of one’s epistemic position. The latter means becoming aware of the seemingly trivial “fact” that the way in which the world manifests itself depends on the cognitive apparatus one has, thereby propelling one to draw a distinction between appearances and reality. The recognition at stake is a very specific capacity to approach the world solely as it is experienced. This capacity, I argue, is the core and the defining feature of philosophical intuition. As part of my argumentation I also distinguish between the intuition in question and its different manifestations; and then introduce a novel notion of erotetic intuition. My argument is called “old-fashion” to emphasize the fact that I draw mostly on four figures who were pivotal in the twentieth- century philosophy and whose influence on the current debate concerning philosophical intuition should be, I believe, stronger than it is; I mean Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl.