Habituation, response to novelty, and dishabituation in human infants: tests of a dual-process theory of visual attention

Two experiments were conducted to test a dual-process theory of infants' performance on visual habituation-dishabituation tasks. The findings demonstrate that (a) infant habituation functions are often nonmonotonic, with fixation increasing before the eventual response waning; (b) this initial increment in responding is related to stimulus "complexity"; (c) response to novelty is enhanced by increasing the "complexity" of the novelty-test stimulus; and (d) dishabituation, followed by decay, occurs for familiarized patterns when retested after the introduction of a "complex" stimulus, but not after introduction of a "simple" stimulus. Following P. Groves and R. Thompson (1970, Psychological Review, 77, 419-450) we propose that infant visual attention to repeated presentations of a stimulus involves two processes, habituation and sensitization.     

On the automaticity of emotion processing in words and faces: event-related brain potentials evidence from a superficial task

The degree to which emotional aspects of stimuli are processed automatically is controversial. Here, we assessed the automatic elicitation of emotion-related brain potentials (ERPs) to positive, negative, and neutral words and facial expressions in an easy and superficial face-word discrimination task, for which the emotional valence was irrelevant. Both emotional words and facial expressions impacted ERPs already between 50 and 100 ms after stimulus onset, possibly reflecting rapid relevance detection. Following this initial processing stage only emotionality in faces but not in words was associated with an early posterior negativity (EPN). Therefore, when emotion is irrelevant in a task which requires superficial stimulus analysis, automatically enhanced sensory encoding of emotional content appears to occur only for evolutionary prepared emotional stimuli, as reflected in larger EPN amplitudes to faces, but not to symbolic word stimuli.     

Stress modulates the use of spatial versus stimulus-response learning strategies in humans

Animal studies provided evidence that stress modulates multiple memory systems, favoring caudate nucleus-based "habit" memory over hippocampus-based "cognitive" memory. However, effects of stress on learning strategy and memory consolidation were not differentiated. We specifically address the effects of psychosocial stress on the applied learning strategy in humans. We designed a spatial learning task that allowed differentiating spatial from stimulus-response learning strategies during acquisition. In 13 subsequent trials, participants (88 male and female students) had to locate a "win" card out of four placed at a fixed location in a 3D model of a room. Relocating one cue in the last trial allowed inferring the applied learning strategy. Half of them participated first in the "Trier Social Stress Test." Salivary cortisol and heart rate measurements were taken. Stressed participants used a stimulus-response strategy significantly more often than controls. Subsequent verbal report revealed that spatial learners had a more complete awareness of response options than stimulus-response learners. Importantly, learning performance was not affected by stress. Taken together, stress prior to learning facilitated simple stimulus-response learning strategies in humans-at the expense of a more cognitive learning strategy. Depending on the context, we consider this as an adaptive response.     

Satisficing in financial decision making — a theoretical and experimental approach to bounded rationality

We apply the theoretical construct of bounded rationality to an investment game, allowing participants to invest their monetary endowment in riskless bonds and risky assets. In our experiment, we elicit aspiration levels from participants: one captures a subsistence threshold, the other a success threshold. Participants can be classified according to these aspirations and the corresponding investment behavior. We differentiate between potential and actual satisficing. By presupposing specific cardinal utility functions, we also relate the bounded rationality approach to the traditional rational choice model.